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This dissertation aims to explore political determinants of the magnitude and the pace of 
six dimensions of financial reforms in developing countries.  The magnitude of financial reforms 
refers to the degree a country engages in a larger scale of financial reforms at one time, while the 
pace of financial reforms refers to the degree to which a country speeds up financial reforms.   I 
argue that the IMF conditionality programs play a role in facilitating a larger magnitude of 
financial reforms and in speeding up the pace of each of the six dimensions of financial reforms.  
However, these IMF effects are conditioned by the number of veto players; namely, as the 
number of veto players increases, these IMF effects tend to decrease.  Further,  I predict that the 
stronger the influence of the manufacturing sector in a country, the larger the magnitude of 
financial reforms and also the quicker the pace of financial reforms for most dimensions, with 
the dimension of the enhancement of banking supervision as an exception.  Also, countries with 
a stronger influence of the banking sector tend to choose a smaller scale of financial reforms at 
one time and tend to delay financial reforms.  
These arguments were examined both quantitatively and qualitatively.  Quantitatively, 
using the Financial Reform Database developed by the IMF, I examined thirty developing 
countries’ data from 1973 to 2002.  Qualitatively, I employed case study analysis in three 
countries: Indonesia, Thailand, and Korea.  Results demonstrated that the IMF’s impact on 
financial reforms is contingent upon the number of veto players in both the pace and magnitude 
of financial reforms as hypothesized.  In addition, the effects of the manufacturing sector were 
confirmed in both quantitative and qualitative analyses, while the effects of the banking sector 
were confirmed in qualitative analysis.   
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1.  THE LACK OF EXISTING LITERATURE ON FINANCIAL REFORMS 
 
Financial reforms are one of the most important economic reforms in developing countries.  
Economists tend to assume that financial reforms have a welfare-enhancing effect (McKinnon 
1991; Shaw 1973).  Then, why do not developing countries all follow the same path of financial 
reforms?  In fact, the magnitude and the pace of financial reforms varied greatly from country to 
country when a surge of neoliberal economic reforms occurred during the 1980s and the 1990s in 
developing countries and they continue to be very diverse.  For instance, some Latin American 
countries such as Argentina and Uruguay initiated financial liberalization such as interest rate 
liberalization and elimination of entry barriers on banks during the 1970s.  On the other hand, 
East Asian countries such as Indonesia started to take these reform measures only after the 1980s.  
South Asian countries did not much commit to financial reforms until now.  However, even 
within the same South Asian region, Bangladesh has already fully liberalized foreign direct 
investment (FDI) whereas India has maintained many restrictions on capital account transactions.   
What accounts for these variations of financial reforms?  What makes the magnitude and 
the pace of financial reforms vary in developing countries?  The magnitude of financial reforms 
refers to the degree to which a country conducts financial reforms on a large scale, all at one time.  
On the other hand, the pace of financial reforms refers to the degree to which a country speeds 
up or delays financial reforms.  The aim of this dissertation is to explore how the International 
1 
 Monetary Fund (IMF) as an international factor and veto players and interest groups as domestic 
factors shape the magnitude and the pace of financial reforms in developing countries.  
Concerning conventional studies of financial reforms, vast amount of studies of financial 
reforms have been conducted by economists.1  However, these studies tend to focus only on 
policy outcomes of financial reforms and/or the impact of financial reforms on macroeconomic 
outcomes.  Therefore, these studies tend to ignore the question of why these reforms occurred.   
Scholars of international political economy (IPE), on the other hand, have paid most attention to 
capital account liberalization.  Much of the IPE literature is based on quantitative studies using 
large numbers of countries as cases or on studies in developed countries (Quinn 2000; Quinn and 
Toyoda 2007).  Regime type difference such as democracy versus autocracy is one of the central 
political explanations for explaining the level of capital account liberalization in conventional 
quantitative studies using a large number of countries as cases.  For example, a more democratic 
regime is argued to be associated with a higher degree of financial liberalization because a more 
democratic government is more likely than an autocracy to protect its citizens’ right to conduct 
international financial transactions (Quinn 2000). 
Studies of developed countries, on the other hand, have contributed to theoretical 
accounts examining causes of capital account liberalization.  Scholars have attributed the 
political causes of capital account liberalization to regimes (Quinn 2000; Garret et al. 2000), 
partisanship (Kastner and Rector 2005, 2003; Li and Smith 2002; Quinn and Inclan 1997), and 
veto players (Kastner and Rector 2003).  In addition to these studies, Ahlquist (2006) has 
conducted a study on portfolio flows and FDI flows to developing countries and shows that FDI 
                                                 
1 For example, see Hall (2003), Caprio et al. (2001), Williamson and Mahar (1998).   
2 
 flows are sensitive to a receiving country’s political institutions while portfolio flows are more 
sensitive to fiscal policy outcomes. 
Concerning previous studies on other than capital account liberalization, Rothenbluth and 
Schaap (2003) did conduct a study in which they examined banking regulations.  Also, some 
case studies on banking regulations have been done focusing on the role of banks as interest 
groups.  These case studies revealed that uncompetitive banks oppose banking deregulation 
(Perez 1997) and strong banks support banking deregulation (Economides et al. 1996; Krosner 
and Strahan 1999).  In addition, Satyanath (2006)’s work is an important previous study that 
looked at the cause of lax banking supervision using Asian countries as cases.  In examining the 
causes of the Asian financial crisis, he argues that under democracies with open capital accounts, 
lax banking regulations could occur even if an executive leader does not have crony ties with 
banks due to miscommunication between an executive leader and the economic technocrats.   
In the reform literature done by political economists, the causal determinants of 
neoliberal economic reforms are examined.  In this literature, developing countries have been 
examined using case studies.  In existing prior research, financial crisis (Weyland 1996; Rodrik 
1994; Haggard and Kaufman 1992), external pressures by the IMF (Haggard and Kaufman 1992; 
Stallings 1992), and political leadership changes (Haggard 2000; Haggard and Webb 1994; 
Kaufman 1985; Heller et al. 1998) are often identified as the most prominent causes of neoliberal 
economic reforms.   
Also, some recent quantitative studies have revealed that political institutions are 
significant predictors in explaining neoliberal economic reforms in developing countries.  
However, empirical results concerning how political institutions matter in predicting neoliberal 
3 
 economic reforms remain indeterminate (Neilson 2003; Johnson and Crisp 2003; Frye and 
Mansfield 2004; Biglaiser and DeRouen Jr. 2004).2   
As existing studies on financial reform have been concentrated on capital account 
liberalization, various forms of domestic financial reforms have tended to be neglected.  Notable 
exceptions are those studies conducted by economists Abiad and Mody (2005) and Lora (1998), 
where comprehensive indices of financial reforms are developed and the political impact on 
these reforms is examined; but their works barely show a significant impact of political variables 
on financial reforms.  Therefore, empirical findings in the existing literature concerning political 
determinants of financial reforms remain far from conclusive.  In this vein, this dissertation aims 
to contribute to the reform literature and the IPE literature by examining not only capital account 
liberalization but also other domestic dimensions of financial reforms or various banking reforms 
in developing countries.   
 
1.2.  WHY ARE FINANCIAL REFORMS IMPORTANT? 
 
The reason why most prior research has been concentrated on capital account liberalization as 
discussed above is that the consequences of capital account liberalization can be profound.  We 
have experienced a significant increase in financial globalization since the late 1980s (Claessens 
and Schmukler 2007; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2005).3  This phenomenon, financial globalization, 
                                                 
2 In terms of trade liberalization, an electoral system (Neilson 2003) and democracy and 
electoral timing (Frye and Mansfield 2004) are associated with trade liberalization.  Concerning 
neoliberal economic reforms in Latin America, while party ideologies in congressional elections 
are argued to be the best predictor by Johnson and Crisp (2003), Biglaiser and DeRouen Jr. 
(2004) contend that inflation is the only significant predictor of neoliberal economic reforms and 
that political institutions have a very minor impact.   
3  Financial globalization reached unprecedented levels as measured by gross capital flows and 
4 
 is a policy outcome of capital account liberalization.  Some scholars argue that the integration of 
the international capital market can be regarded as a structural condition of perfect capital 
mobility (Simmons 1999; Andrews 1994).  Hence, for example, highly mobile capital may put 
pressures on countries for policy convergence by constraining a country’s policy options (see 
Clark and Hallerberg 2000, for example).  Thus, capital account liberalization is one of the most 
important dimensions of financial reforms.  Nevertheless, financial reforms do not only mean 
capital account liberalization.  It is worth examining other dimensions of financial reforms, 
especially banking reforms including privatization of banks, banking supervision, and interest 
rate liberalization, given the imperative roles that banks play in developing countries.   
These imperative roles can be listed as follows.  First, given the lack of development of 
other financial intermediaries such as mutual funds and pension funds, banks tend to play a 
dominant role in a country’s financial system in developing countries.  Second, banks have been 
regarded as “special” because of the key roles that banks play in the economy.  Banks provide 
fundamental services such as deposit taking, credit extensions, and payment processing.  In 
addition, banks perform the liquidity transformation function from savings to investments.  Due 
to these key “special” roles that banks play, banking reforms are critical in order to achieve 
economic development for developing countries.  According to neoliberal economists such as 
Shaw (1973) and McKinnon (1973), financial reforms in such areas as interest rate liberalization, 
elimination of controls over banks’ reserve requirements, and credit allocations, for example, are 
key factors in economic development, creating a more liquid financial system and allowing 
financial deepening, which in turn, leads to economic development.  Third, banks play a 
                                                                                                                                                             
stocks of foreign assets and liabilities (Claessens and Schmukler 2007, 3).  Stallings (2007) 
reports that FDI flows to developing countries once decreased after the Asian financial crisis but 
again increased after 2004.   
5 
 “special” role in implementing monetary policy.  A central bank aims to control money supply 
by directly controlling banks’ quantity of money or by intermediating banks through policy tools 
such as market operations and discount rates.  Lastly, banks are extremely vulnerable if a bank 
run once occurs.4  If a bank run occurs, a bank run may trigger a crisis in the sector as a whole, 
and this banking crisis may have a devastating impact on the economy as a whole.  Hence, how 
to manage banks and how to reform banks can be critical to a country’s economic system as a 
whole. 
Despite these important economic roles of banks play in a developing world, political 
reasons that cause banking reforms in developing countries have been understudied in prior 
research by both international political economists and comparative political economists.  This is 
surprising given the profound impacts of banks on a country’s economy as discussed above.  To 
fill this gap, this dissertation focuses on not only capital account liberalization, but also other 
dimensions of financial reforms by mainly focusing on banking reforms.  In this light, I look at 
political determinants of the following six dimensions of financial reforms:  
 
1) Privatization of banks  
2) Enhancement of banking supervision over the banking sector 
3) Capital account liberalization 
4) Interest rate liberalization of banks’ deposits and credits 
5) Elimination of credit controls  
6) Elimination of entry barriers on banks   
                                                 
4 Bank assets are very liquid because they are typically cash while bank liabilities such as real 
estate are very rigid.  This mismatch of maturity makes banks vulnerable to a bank run.  For 
special roles of banks, see (E.A.J. 1997), for instance. 
6 
 In a developing country, maintenance of a heavily repressed financial system tends to be 
a pre-condition of financial reforms.  In such a repressed financial system, a government owns 
banks, prohibits the opening of new banks, and restricts capital account transactions.  Also, as a 
central bank directly decides credit allocations, sets interest rates of banks, and determines 
reserve requirements that banks have to hold, governments can exercise monetary policy by 
directly controlling banks as discussed above.  Therefore, financial reforms often mean that 
policy makers in developing countries will lose their direct means of controlling the quantity of 
money as a monetary policy tool.  In addition, by privatizing banks governments may lose an 
important source of money to finance their debts.   
Furthermore, by eliminating credit controls over the banking sector, politicians may lose 
politically important tools such as mandatory credit allocations for cultivating ties with particular 
groups.  On the other hand, financial reforms may open new opportunities for politicians to 
cultivate ties with particular groups.  For example, by opening foreign capital inflows such as big 
investment projects, politicians can be provided with better access to foreign capital or foreign 
investments for particular firms.   
Thus, exploring the dynamics of banking reforms has significance not only in the 
economic realm but also in the political realm.  Hence, examining various forms of financial 
reforms is important particularly in the contexts of developing countries.  Each of the six 
dimensions will allow explanation of political dynamics of financial reforms. 
Given the lack of prior research on various forms of financial reforms, much work still 
has to be done concerning why these various forms of financial reforms have occurred.  The lack 
of prior quantitative research may come from the fact that the comprehensive data measuring 
financial policy reforms has not existed.  Therefore, I make use of the Financial Reform 
7 
 Database constructed by the Research Department of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to 
comprehensively explore political determinants of each of the six dimensions of financial 
reforms. 
I focus particularly on causal determinants of the magnitude and the pace of financial 
reforms.  Concerning the magnitude of financial reforms, I aim to explore when a country is 
more likely to engage in a wider range of financial reforms at the same time.  On the other hand, 
in terms of the pace of financial reforms, I seek to specify conditions related to political factors 
which facilitate or hinder the pace of financial reforms.   
In assessing determinants of both the magnitude and the pace of financial reforms, I look 
at the relative importance of the following factors on three levels as determinants of financial 
reforms: 1) international pressures as an explanation at the international level, 2) the number of 
veto players as an explanation at the national level, and 3) interest group pressures as an 
explanation at the societal level in determining financial policies.  I examine the impact of the 
IMF as an international factor and I specifically examine how the IMF’s impact on financial 
reforms is conditioned by the number of veto players.  With regards to societal sectors, I explore 
the influence of two sectors: the manufacturing sector and the banking sector.   
In this vein, this project examine when and how banking reforms as well as capital 
account liberalization in developing countries is conducted.  Does a developing country choose 
financial reforms as a response to the strong international pressures to liberalize its domestic 
financial system?  Or is it that veto players play a role in facilitating financial reforms?  Or rather, 
should financial reforms be understood as the response to societal pressures?  What is the 
relative importance of these factors in determining financial reforms in developing countries?  
These are the central questions that I ask in this study.  I seek to account for political 
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 determinants of the magnitude of financial reforms as well as the pace of the six dimensions of 
financial reforms in developing countries. 
I argue that international pressures by the IMF are the major determinants of financial 
reforms in developing countries.  However, the IMF’s effects on financial reforms vary from 
country to country because the number of veto players conditions the effects of the IMF 
programs on financial reforms.  In this light, this dissertation contributes to a series of the IPE 
literature looking at how international and domestic factors shape a country’s economic policy 
outcomes by assessing not only capital account liberalization but also other various dimensions 
of banking reforms in developing countries.  How the IMF’s impact on the magnitude and the 
pace of financial reforms is conditioned by the number of veto players and societal pressures is 
assessed by both quantitative studies and case studies in the subsequent chapters, in addition to 
exploring the relative importance of political factors at three levels as discussed above.   
 
 
1.3.  PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
This dissertation is organized as follows:  In Chapter 2, I discuss theoretical arguments 
concerning political determinants of the magnitude and the pace of financial reforms.  I look at 
political sources on the following three levels — the IMF as an explanation at the international 
level, veto players as explanations at the national level, and the manufacturing sector and the 
banking sector at the societal level— to account for the magnitude of financial reforms or factors 
determining the degree to which a country is more likely to engage in big-bang type of financial 
reforms. I also examine the timing or factors facilitating or delaying the six dimensions of 
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 financial reforms in developing countries.  I hypothesize how decisions of policy makers in 
developing countries, corresponding to both the international pressures by the IMF and the 
societal pressures within the constraints of the number of veto players shape the magnitude and 
the pace of financial reforms.  In Chapter 3, using the IMF’s Financial Reform Database, which 
looks at six dimensions of financial reforms of thirty developing countries from 1973 to 2002, I 
perform quantitative analyses.  I employ ordinal logit regression models to quantitatively explore 
determinants of the magnitude of financial reforms.  I employ event history analysis to examine 
predictors of the pace of financial reforms in each of the six dimensions of financial reforms 
respectively.  Results of these quantitative analyses show that the effects of the IMF on the 
magnitude and the pace of financial reforms are conditioned by the number of veto players.  Also, 
the manufacturing sector is an important predictor of the magnitude and the pace of financial 
reforms.  However, the effects of the banking sector are not well confirmed in the quantitative 
analyses.    
In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, theoretical arguments are assessed employing case studies.  I 
conduct case studies of the following three countries: Indonesia in Chapter 4 and Thailand and 
Korea in Chapter 5.  Especially, I look at how these countries have engaged in financial reforms 
by comparing the pre- and post-Asian financial crisis.  All three countries were praised as 
countries that achieved the Asian miracle of growth.  Also, all three countries were severely hit 
by the Asian financial crisis.  Indonesia, Thailand, and Korea all asked for IMF rescue packages 
and all these countries also conducted banking reforms under similar IMF conditionality 
programs.  However, despite these similarities, these outcomes of the banking reforms for these 
countries have been diverse.  Therefore, I find that the number of veto players and their 
preferences explain the outcomes of financial reforms, holding the IMF pressures as constant.  
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 Also, I look at how interest groups such as the banking sector and the manufacturing sector exert 
influence by putting pressures on governments and sometimes by colluding with politicians.  It is 
important to examine the roles of the banking sector given that I was not able to obtain expected 
results in quantitative analyses.  Overall, I closely examine how the interactions between the IMF, 
policy makers, and interest groups shape the outcomes of financial reforms.   
In order to do so, in Chapter 4, I illustrate Indonesia as a case of delayed financial 
reforms due to collusion between politicians and banks.  I examine financial reforms from 1965 
to 2003 chronologically, starting from the beginning of the Suharto regime to graduation from 
the IMF programs.  Indonesia experienced four presidents from 1997 to 2003, when Indonesia 
was under the Fund conditionality programs.  Despite that Indonesia was under IMF pressures to 
facilitate financial reforms, commitment to financial reforms varied from a government to a 
government.  By examining temporal variation, I illustrate not only the IMF programs but the 
number of veto players and societal pressures matter in shaping financial reform outcomes.  Also, 
I illustrate which dimensions of financial reforms were facilitated or hindered was also 
conditioned upon not only IMF programs but also domestic political factors such as the number 
of veto players and interest group pressures. 
In Chapter 5, I look at the cases of Thailand and Korea, respectively.  Thailand is 
illustrated as a case of delayed financial reforms because of the large number of veto players as 
well as a strong banking sector presence.  Korea, on the other hand, is representative as a case 
where financial reforms were accelerated, in its case, by the executive initiative despite the long-
standing presence of powerful conglomerates or chaebols.  Lastly, I also make a comparison 
between three cases: Indonesia, Thailand, and Korea.  The differences in financial reforms after 
the Asian financial crisis in these three countries can be explained by looking at the number of 
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 veto players in each, especially if one looks at the dimensions of enhancement of banking 
supervision over the banking sector and restructuring of banks, both of which were emphasized 
by the IMF in their conditionality programs more than ever after the Asian financial crisis.  
Finally, in Chapter 6, I conclude by summarizing the findings and discussing future policy 
implications.   
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2.0  THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES OF FINANCIAL REFORMS 
 
“How conditionality works depends on 
country-specific circumstances, in particular the 
government’s commitment to reform…. If commitment is 
very weak, neither extensive conditionality nor a more 
limited approach may do much to improve 
implementation.  In intermediate cases, conditionality 
may, to some extent, help ensure the implementation of 
reforms that otherwise would not have been done, but 
there are clear limits to substituting conditionality for 
the authorities’ commitment (International Monetary 
Fund 2001b, 82).” 
 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter lays out theoretical arguments to account for the magnitude and the pace of six 
dimensions of financial reforms in developing countries.  In the next section, I explain each of 
the six dimensions of financial reforms and how politics may matter in each dimension.  In the 
third section, I lay out theoretical arguments concerning factors for shaping the magnitude and 
the pace of financial reforms.  To do so, I look at the relative importance of the following factors 
on three levels as determinants of financial reforms: 1) international pressures as an explanation 
at the international level, 2) veto players as an explanation at the national level, and 3) interest 
group pressures as an explanation at the societal level.  I examine the impact of the IMF as the 
international factor and the impact of the number of veto players as an explanation at the national 
level.  As societal factors, I explore two sectoral influences: the manufacturing sector and the 
banking sector.  Specifically, I argue that although currency crises and the following IMF 
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 conditionality programs are the most important predictors for determining the magnitude and the 
timing of financial reforms, veto players also matter in a way to intermediate the effects of the 
IMF on developing countries.  In the fourth section, I recapitulate the hypotheses.   
 
 
2.2. SIX DIMENSIONS OF FINANCIAL REFORMS 
 
In this section, I explain each of the six dimensions of financial reforms respectively and how 
politics matters in each dimension.  As listed in the previous chapter, the six dimensions of 
financial reforms are as follows: 1) privatization of banks, 2) enhancement of banking 
supervision over the banking sector, 3) capital account liberalization, 4) interest rate 
liberalization, 5) elimination of credit controls, and 6) elimination of entry barriers on banks.  
Table 2.1 below presents prototypical situations of pre- and post-financial reforms with respect 
to each of the six dimensions of financial reforms. 
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 Table 2.1 Prototypical Conditions of Pre-and Post-Financial Reforms 
 
Dimension of Financial 
Reforms Pre-Financial Reforms  Post-Financial Reforms  
Privatization of Banks Most banks are state owned All banks are privately owned 
Enhancement of Banking 
Supervision 
 
Lack of comprehensive legal 
framework, and/or lack of enforcement 
of banking supervision and prudent 
regulations  
 
Comprehensive legal framework, 
strict enforcement of banking 
supervision and prudential 
regulations 
 
Capital Account 
Liberalization 
 
Many restrictions on capital account 
transactions 
Free movement of capital 
without restrictions 
Interest Rate Liberalization Interests rates set by the central bank Interests rates determined at market rates 
Elimination of Credit 
Controls 
Credit allocation determined by the 
central bank, preferential credit 
allocation at subsidized interest rates 
Credit allocation determined by 
banks, no preferential credit 
allocation 
 
Elimination of Entry 
Barriers on Banks 
 
No entry of new banks allowed, no new 
branches allowed, restrictions on banks' 
activities 
 
Free entry of new banks, no 
branching restrictions, banks' wide 
range of activities permitted 
 
 
2.2.1. Privatization of banks  
 
In many developing countries, state-owned banks play a dominant role.  Since state-owned banks 
tend to be heavily protected from competition, privatization of banks is desirable from the 
viewpoint of efficiency maximization.  However, although many states try to privatize banks as a 
part of financial reform programs, in fact, privatization of banks tend to be delayed compared 
with other dimensions of reforms.  Politicians tend to hesitate to privatize state-owned banks in 
many circumstances.  Since governments can directly control state-owned banks, governments 
can collect necessary money and allocate for their own purposes.  Further, state-owned banks 
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 tend to finance government debts by buying government bonds in developing countries.  
Therefore, governments do not want to lose this resource to finance their debts.  Also, politicians 
may also utilize state-owned banks as sources for collusion with particular sectors or firms by 
offering better credit conditions to them than private banks would.  In addition, politicians may 
not want to sell banks to foreign investors or foreign banks, given the special roles that banks 
play in a country’s economic system.  Hence, to know when governments privatize banks has the 
important political implications given the important roles that state-owned banks play in 
developing countries. 
 
2.2.2. Enhancement of banking supervision over the banking sector 
 
This dimension refers to policies for enhancing supervision and prudential regulations over the 
banking sector.  Information asymmetry is high between banks and investors.  Namely, the 
amount of information possessed by banks is much larger than that by investors.  While banks 
know the real conditions underlying their own balance sheets, investors and depositors do not.  
Therefore, financial reforms toward financial liberalization without adequate supervision over 
the banking sector can cause banking crises and currency crises as seen in the cases of the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997.  Possible measures to prevent such crises can be deterring banks’ risky 
lending behavior, increasing the transparency of the available information concerning banks’ real 
balance sheets, and resolving banks’ problems as soon as possible.  In order to enhance banking 
supervision over the banking sector, countries can take various measures such as increasing the 
capital adequacy ratio, monitoring banks’ balance sheets, and strengthening the banking 
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 supervisory agency’s power to resolve banks’ problems by allowing the dissolving of insolvent 
banks, for example.  
However, in reality, it is very difficult for developing countries to enhance banking 
supervision.  For example, although Chile is well-known as being a rare case of a developing 
country which has an relatively independent central bank, Chilean banking supervision is weak 
according to the assessment of international financial institutions.5  
The lack of adequate bureaucratic and technical capacity in developing countries to 
estimate risks of banks might be one of the reasons in general, but political reasons should also 
be taken into consideration in accounting for the difficulties in enhancing effective banking 
supervision. 
Politicians do not want to enhance banking supervision because their influential 
supporters may be bank owners.  Even politicians themselves may be a part of financial 
conglomerates when they have crony ties with banks.  In other circumstances, the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) may not want to give up their influence over the banks, and conflicts between 
the MOF and the banking supervisory agency may prevent effective banking supervision over 
the banking sector.  In yet another case, firms that have strong connections with politicians may 
be provided with credit by banks, and therefore politicians may want to protect firms’ interests 
by delaying bank reforms.  As a result of these various conditions, governments may hesitate to 
enhance effective banking supervision.  Hence, a country will attempt to enhance banking 
supervision under very limited circumstances.   
 
 
                                                 
5 On this regard, see the report of the Financial Stability Assessment Program for Chile (IMF 
2004a). 
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 2.2.3. Capital account liberalization  
 
Contrary to the cases of developed countries, in the cases of developing countries, policy makers 
may not necessarily choose to open capital accounts even under the current integrated global 
financial market.  However, when they know the fact that capital is highly mobile due to the 
globalization of financial markets, in which the main capital comes from developed countries, it 
will become more difficult for policy makers in developing countries to maintain closed capital 
accounts or to make moves toward closing capital accounts once opened.   
If possible, leaders in developing countries would like to open capital accounts for capital 
inflow while they would like to prevent any form of capital outflow so that they can earn foreign 
and domestic capital.  However, in reality, without maintaining open capital accounts, investors 
with foreign capital will hesitate to enter into developing countries.  Also, domestic capital held 
by the rich people in developing countries may not stay in the country if they are afraid that their 
capital accounts may be closed and currency convertibility might become restricted.  Then, under 
what conditions does a country try to open capital accounts?   
 
2.2.4. Interest rate liberalization  
 
The fourth dimension, interest rate liberalization, refers to policy measures that allow banks to 
set deposit rates and lending rates free from intervention by the central bank.  In many 
developing countries, before reforms, the central bank directly determines deposit rates and 
lending rates for monetary policy purposes and banks are not allowed to set interest rates on 
deposits and lending rates at all.  Or the central bank imposes restrictions on deposit rates and 
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 lending rates by setting minimum values (floor) or maximum values (ceiling) on banks’ interest 
rates or allowing only a certain range of banks’ interest rates (band).  Under these circumstances, 
the banking sector does not face any competition or faces only limited competition as opposed to 
facing a more competitive environment, where banks would try to offer higher deposit rates and 
lower lending rates in order to attract depositors and borrowers.  In fact, under a repressed 
financial system, where restrictions on nominal interest rates are maintained, real deposit rates 
are often negative and loan interest rates are often high, which discourages savings and distorts a 
country’s efficient allocation of credits (Hallwood and MacDonald 2000, 432).6   Therefore, 
banks cannot play an effective role in transmitting money from savings into investments. 
Interest liberalization is an important policy tool for achieving financial deepening.  By 
liberalizing deposits and loan interest rates, banks will become more competitive, hence, savings 
are increased and investment projects can become more competitive, thereby allowing banks to 
play a more effective role in channeling financial savings to investments.   
The monetary base is more observable and controllable for central bankers if they use 
direct measures such as setting banks’ interest rates directly.  So, policy makers in developing 
countries may prefer to take these direct means to control the monetary base.  However, to take 
more indirect means of setting monetary policy by using market operations and discount rates is 
more desirable for financial deepening by enhancing banks’ functions to channel from savings to 
investments.  I will explore when a policy maker agree to let banks free in determining banks’ 
deposit rates and lending rates. 
 
                                                 
6 According to McKinnon (1981, 376), under financial repression, a positive relationship exists 
between real lending rates of interest and nominal inflation rate whereas a negative relationship 
exists between real deposit rate of interest and nominal inflation rate. 
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 2.2.5. Elimination of credit controls  
 
The fifth dimension, elimination of credit controls, captures the elimination of government 
control over banks’ credit allocation, including their giving preferable conditions to particular 
sectors, and/or the elimination of subsidized interest rates for certain sectors, and the elimination 
of excessive controls over banks’ liquidity management.   
In countries under a repressed financial system, the central bank tends to impose high 
levels of reserve requirements (i.e., the percentage of deposits that banks have to keep with them 
and not lend).  Also, the central bank tends to determine the banks’ credit allocation (i.e., set 
mandatory requirements of credit allocation to certain sectors, and/or the central bank requires 
banks to set subsidized interest rates for certain sectors).  Under these circumstances of strong 
government control, financial markets remain shallow, and less efficient credit allocation with a 
bank-dominated financial system becomes an obstacle to diversification of financial markets by 
impeding the development of other institutional investors (Lopez-Mejia 1999; Arvai and Heenan 
2005).  Hence, it is important to facilitate diversification of financial markets by eliminating 
controls over banks’ credit allocations and banks’ liquidity management. 
However, at the same time, policy makers tend to utilize credit controls over the banking 
sector as means to cultivate ties with particular sectors in exchange for political support.  By 
offering special credit allocations and better interest rates to these sectors, governments are able 
to create preferable credit conditions for particular groups or sectors, regardless of whether banks 
are publicly owned or privately owned.  Therefore, it may be difficult for policy makers in 
developing countries to choose reform options that may mean losing policy tools by which they 
can cultivate ties with supporters.   
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 2.2.6. Elimination of entry barriers on banks 
 
The sixth dimension, elimination of entry barriers on banks, refers to policy reforms that enhance 
competition among banks; namely, policies such as lowering entry barriers of new domestic and 
foreign banks into a domestic market, lifting branching restrictions of banks, and allowing a 
wider range of activities that banks can engage in.  Lack of competition among banks and/or 
with other financial and non-financial institutions such as security firms produces a 
predominance of inefficient banks.  Therefore, it is ideal to encourage various policy measures 
related to banking competition.  However, politicians may hesitate to support such policy 
measures as elimination of entry barriers of foreign banks because politicians would then lose 
control over banks.  On the other hand, lowering entry barriers of domestic banks and lifting 
branch restrictions may provide business opportunities for well-connected individuals or groups 
of firms. 
Thus, as discussed above, it is important to explore political determinants of not only 
capital account liberalization but also other dimensions of financial reforms in developing 
countries.  Exploring the dynamics of banking reforms has not only economic significance but 
also political significance.   
When and why will governments accept loss of control over the banking sector, given the 
economic and political importance of banks?  In the next section, I will lay out theoretical 
arguments to account for financial reforms in developing countries.   
 
 
21 
 2.3. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES OF FINANCIAL REFORMS 
 
2.3.1. The International Monetary Fund: an explanation at the international level 
 
2.3.1.1. Controversy about the effects of the International Monetary Fund 
 
The main predictor to determine the magnitude and the pace of financial reforms in 
developing countries is the effects of IMF programs as a factor at the international level.  The 
degree to which the IMF’s conditionality programs have an effect on macroeconomic outcomes 
remains controversial in quantitative examinations.  For example, concerning whether the IMF 
plays a role in helping a country to recover from banking crises, Montinola (2003) concludes that 
the IMF plays no role in banking crises resolution.  In addition, although reducing inflation is 
one of the primary purposes of the Fund (IMF 2001a), many existing quantitative studies show 
that IMF programs have no effects on reducing inflation.7  Also, the IMF claims that economic 
growth is one of the prominent purposes of the Fund (IMF 2001a).  However, Vreeland (2003) 
demonstrates that IMF programs deter a country’s economic growth and worsen income 
inequality, though other scholars (Lee and Rhee 2000; Dics-Mireaux et al. 2000) report that the 
IMF programs have positive effects in increasing economic growth.  Thus, existing literature 
remains inconclusive concerning the effects of the IMF on macroeconomic outcomes.8   
On the other hand, in past qualitative studies, the influence of the IMF on neoliberal 
economic reforms is widely acknowledged as a major cause of neoliberal economic reforms 
                                                 
7 See Conway (1994), for example.  However, Stone (2002)’s work, in which Stone reports that 
the IMF programs are effective in reducing inflation in cases of the post communist East 
European countries, is an exception. 
8 For a summary and review of various studies concerning the IMF impact, see Stone (2002, 41-
45), for instance. 
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 (Haggard and Kaufman 1992; Stallings 1992).  However, in fact, the implementation rate of the 
IMF programs in past studies remains only from around forty percent to seventy percent.9  For 
example, the IMF examined the 308 IMF programs, including 4600 structural conditions, from 
1987 to 1999, using the expanded IMF monitoring fund arrangement (MONA) database, and 
reported that while 69% of prior actions have been implemented, only 58% of performance 
criteria and 56% of structural benchmarks have been fully implemented (IMF 2001b).  In 
addition, by making use of the MONA database, Ivanova et al. (2003) reports that 44% of 170 
IMF supported programs approved between 1992 and 1998 experienced irreversible interruption 
and 70% of IMF programs experienced minor interruption.   
In this vein, given the increase in type and policy areas covered as the IMF conditionality 
programs over time, some scholars express concerns about “ownership problems” (Khan and 
Sharma 2003; Drazen 2002; Killick, Gunatilaka, and Marr 1998).  A country’s ownership of the 
IMF programs is defined as “the extent to which a country is interested in pursuing reforms 
independently of any incentives provided by multilateral lenders” (Drazen 2002, 37).  If a 
country lacks ownership of the Fund conditionality programs, governments will not commit to 
reforms; hence, the IMF programs remain ineffective.  Namely, even if a country is under the 
IMF’s conditionality program, a country may not necessarily implement the IMF programs.  
Moreover, the IMF may not enforce implementation of conditional programs equally in all 
recipient countries.  For example, it is easier for large and important developing countries to 
enter the IMF conditionality programs than small countries (Stone 2002).  Hence, important and 
larger developing countries may find it easier to enforce conditionality programs less strictly 
than smaller countries. 
                                                 
9 Concerning other studies on of implementation of the IMF conditionality programs, see 
Ivanova et al. (2003), Kahler (1992), IMF (2001b), and Dreher and Vaubel (2004).   
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 As discussed above, given these controversial past studies concerning effects on 
macroeconomic outcomes and the actual amount of implementation of the IMF’s conditionality 
programs, an unanswered question is the degree to which the IMF plays an important role in 
setting the magnitude of financial reforms and the pace of financial reforms in developing 
countries.  Does the IMF play the decisive role in determining both the magnitude and the pace 
of financial reforms?  Or does the IMF play a minor role and remain ineffective due to the 
ownership problems?  In Chapter 3, I empirically assess these questions employing quantitative 
analysis, and in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 I assess them employing case study methods.   
 
2.3.1.2. Theoretical aspects of the International Monetary Fund  
 
Conditionality programs of the Fund refer to “an explicit link between the approval or 
continuation of the Fund’s financing and the implementation of certain specified aspects of the 
government’s policy program” (IMF 2001a, 7).  Thus, the key to the IMF’s conditionality 
programs is a tight link between money disbursement and a country’s commitment to the 
planning and implementation of reform programs.10   
With respect to the magnitude of economic reforms, neoliberal economists’ prescription 
for ensuring economic reform outcomes is a simple one; “do all reforms immediately and 
simultaneously” (Sturzenegger and Tommasi 1998, 16).  While it is normatively important for 
the IMF to respect a state’s ownership in designing the IMF conditionality programs, the IMF 
cannot be certain of the degree to which a state has an independent “political will” to pursue 
                                                 
10 Conditionality programs of the Fund currently consist of six kinds of facilities.  Concerning 
the changes in the nature and the emphasis of the IMF conditionality programs over time, see 
Polak (1991), Goldstein (2000), and Dreher and Vaubel (2004), for instance.   
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 financial reforms when negotiating whether a state enters conditionality programs.  Even if a 
political leader has a will to commit financial reforms at the time when a state is negotiating with 
the IMF, a country may not necessarily implement the IMF conditionality programs later because 
a country may experience an unanticipated change in political conditions such as changes in 
political leadership or even regime transitions to and from democracy.  As the uncertainty of the 
IMF would be larger if a country engages in financial reforms in a gradual manner, the IMF tries 
to convince countries to conduct a larger magnitude of financial reforms.  Hence, a country 
under the IMF conditionality program will engage in a larger magnitude of financial reforms.   
With respect to the pace of financial reforms, the IMF demands a country firmly commit 
to financial reforms and implement necessary financial reforms as early as possible in exchange 
for the disbursement of money when negotiating contents and schedules of conditionality 
programs as the IMF cannot be certain of the degree to which a state will commit to financial 
reforms after entering programs.  Hence, the IMF tries to move economically necessary financial 
reforms at a fast pace when the IMF and a state are deciding whether a state enters a 
conditionality program and when negotiating contents and schedules of conditionality programs.  
In negotiating with the IMF, knowing that the disbursement of the IMF money is dependent upon 
the agreed conditions, a country will have to set a fast–paced schedule of financial reforms.  In 
addition, when a state tries to enter conditionality programs is not the only time that the IMF can 
influence a country’s financial reform plans.  Though whether or not money initially disbursed is 
critical for a recipient country, the IMF conditionality program is designed as “phased 
disbursement,” that is, money is disbursed gradually rather than once conditioned upon whether 
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 countries meet specified policy criteria.11  Therefore, the IMF continues to check progression of 
financial reforms using these various criteria. 
Furthermore, financial reforms are the key policy arena of IMF expertise; hence, the 
IMF’s role in facilitating a larger magnitude of financial reforms and in accelerating the pace of 
financial reforms is more observable than with other macroeconomic policy outcomes such as 
economic growth and stabilization of inflation, where empirical findings remain controversial.  
Despite the changing nature of the IMF programs and the increasing trend of the number of 
conditionalities that are covered under the IMF programs, financial sector policies are one of the 
core competent policy areas in which the IMF has expertise.  In addition, in terms of structural 
measures, financial sector policies have been the core components of the IMF structural 
conditionality programs, together with macroeconomic stabilization and fiscal and exchange rate 
policies (Goldstein 2000).12  In fact, in terms of financial reforms, enhancement of banking 
supervision, capital account liberalization, and privatization of banks, for instance, are major 
policy reform targets in the IMF’s conditionality programs.  Because of the IMF’s expertise in 
financial reforms relative to developing countries, where the lack of enough technical capability 
                                                 
11 Various monitoring measures are taken by the IMF in conditionality programs.  Prior actions 
.  
 
 
x, accessed on December 2, 
are measures that have to be taken before approval of a loan by the Executive Board of the Fund
Quantitative performance criteria set specific macroeconomic variables’ quantitative targets such 
as credit aggregates and need to be met for money disbursement.  Structural performance criteria 
are set as the critical structural policy measures that should be met for money disbursement.  For 
example, these structural measures include appropriate financial sector operations.  In addition, 
structural benchmarks are specified as a small step in a critical reform process or criteria that 
cannot be measured objectively enough as performance criteria.  Further, a recipient country is
usually subject to a quarterly program review of the Fund and the progress of reforms is checked
by the Fund staff (this information is available through the 
internet: http://www.imf.org/external/x10/changecss/changestyle.asp
2006). 
12 The IMF reports that the financial sector is the second-most concentrated on policy arena 
among the structural conditionality programs from 1991–1999 next to the fiscal sector, and the 
third most concentrated policy arena from 1987–1990 following the fiscal sector and trade 
regime (see IMF 2001b, 24).   
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 tends to be more common, developing countries have less alternative policy choices, especially 
in the turmoil of a currency crisis when negotiating the contents of the IMF conditionality 
programs.   
Concerning the preferences of the IMF in each of the six dimensions of financial reforms 
described in the previous section, the IMF firmly holds to the neoliberal perspective and aims to 
promote a set of neoliberal economic policies called “Washington consensus (Williamson 1990)”, 
in which financial reforms are one of the core policy areas.  The preferences of the IMF in each 
of the six dimensions of financial reforms are shown below as Table 2.2.   
 
 
Table 2.2 Distributional Preferences of the International Monetary Fund 
 
Six Dimensions of Financial Reforms Preferences of the IMF 
Privatization of Banks Support 
Enhancement of Banking Supervision Support 
Capital Account Liberalization Support 
Interest Rate Liberalization Support 
Elimination of Credit Controls Support 
Elimination of Entry Barriers Support 
 
 
Since the IMF prefers a minimum of government intervention in the market, the IMF 
supports financial reforms toward financial liberalization.  Namely, the IMF supports financial 
reforms in such areas as privatization of banks, capital account liberalization, interest rate 
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 liberalization, elimination of credit controls, and elimination of entry barriers.  The IMF supports 
privatization of banks because private banks can work more efficiently than state-owned banks.  
Also, the IMF prefers capital account liberalization because, by eliminating barriers against 
foreign direct investment, for instance, foreign firms and domestic firms can compete on equal 
ground (Williamson 1993, 1333), and capital account convertibility is an important policy goal 
of the IMF.  In addition, the IMF supports interest rate liberalization and elimination of credit 
controls because these reform measures enhance banks’ efficiency in channeling savings to 
investments and help to develop a country’s financial system.  In addition, the IMF supports 
elimination of entry barriers on banks because competition between domestic banks and foreign 
banks enhances the efficiency of domestic banks.   
With respect to enhancement of supervision over the banking sector, the IMF supports 
this measure though it means more government intervention in the market, because enhancement 
of banking supervision can be regarded as a necessary regulatory measure to prevent bank’s 
risky lending behavior in that it contributes to prevention of banking crises.  Thus, concerning 
the preferences of the IMF, the IMF supports all of the six dimensions of financial reforms, as 
shown in Table 2.2.   
As discussed above, I argue that the IMF faces uncertainty regarding the degree of a 
state’s commitment to financial reforms when the IMF negotiates the contents and the schedule 
of conditionality programs.  Hence, the IMF will try to facilitate a larger magnitude of financial 
reforms and will also try to bring forward the timing of financial reforms in all of the six 
dimesnsions.  Since the IMF supports all of the six dimensions of financial reforms, the IMF 
conditionality programs not only facilitate a larger magnitude but also quicken the pace of 
financial reforms if the country is under the IMF conditionality programs.   
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 Hence, though empirical results concerning the effectiveness of the Fund programs are 
controversial as discussed earlier, the IMF conditionality programs will result in facilitating a 
more “big bang” type of financial reforms and also bringing forward the timing of a country’s 
financial reforms.  I hypothesize as follows concerning the effect of the IMF on the magnitude of 
financial reforms as Hypothesis 1a and on the pace of financial reforms as Hypothesis 1b 
respectively: 
 
Hypothesis 1a. When a government is under the IMF conditionality programs, the 
country is more likely to engage in a larger magnitude of financial reforms.   
 
Hypothesis 1b. When a government is under IMF conditionality programs, a country is 
more likely to bring forward the timing of financial reforms in all six dimensions of financial 
reforms.   
 
However, this effect of the IMF as to facilitating financial reforms will vary, depending 
on the recipient country’s political conditions.  In the next section, this conditioning of the IMF’s 
effect by veto players will be discussed.   
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 2.3.2. Veto players: an explanation at the national level  
 
2.3.2.1. The effect of veto players in the past literature 
 
The concept of veto players is developed in Tsebelis (1995, 2002).  Veto players refer to 
“individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo” 
(Tsebelis 2002).  Each veto player has its own policy preference as regards each policy.  
Therefore, the number of veto players and each veto player’s policy preference determine the 
size of win sets or the set of points that can beat a policy status quo.  A larger win set means a 
higher likelihood of change in policy status quo.  The number of veto players, their policy 
preferences, and the distance of veto players’ preferences from the policy status quo are the 
factors which determine the size of win sets.  In general, as the number of veto players increases, 
policy stability is more likely to increase. 
The past literature on veto players reveals that veto players affect various economic 
policy outcomes in such areas as exchange rate regime (Hallerberg 2002), tax reforms (Basinger 
and Hallerberg 2004), regional trade integration (Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse 2006), 
pension privatization (Brooks 2005), trade liberalization (Henisz and Mansfield 2006; O’Reilly 
2005), policy responses to currency crises (Macintyre 2001, 2003; Hicken, Satyanath, and 
Sergenti 2005), and capital account liberalization (Kastner and Rector 2003).   
In these prior studies, the relationship between the number of veto players and policy 
outcomes shows diverse findings.  For example, Kastner and Rector (2003), Henisz and 
Mansfield (2006), O’Reilly (2005), and Henisz and Zalner (2006) confirm Tsebelis’s claim 
above.  Namely, as the number of veto players increases, a change in policy status quo is less 
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 likely to occur in policy arenas such as capital account liberalization (Kastner and Rector 2003), 
trade liberalization (Henisz and Mansfield 2006; O’Reilly 2005), and electric utilities’ 
infrastructure project (Henisz and Zelner 2006). 
On the other hand, Macintyre (2003, 2001) examines four Southeast Asian countries’ 
responses to the Asian crisis and argues that too small a number of veto players causes policy 
problems which are very volatile, while at the same time the presence of too many veto players 
causes policy problems which are too rigid.  Therefore, although his argument is consistent with 
Tsebelis’s theory of veto players, by reframing the dependent variable as a problem of 
governance, he argues that a curvilinear relationship exists between the number of veto players 
and the responses to currency crisis.  Satyanath (2006, 8) examines the relationship between the 
condition of banking regulations in 1997 and the number of veto players in six Asian countries.13  
He argues that lax banking regulations in a country with a larger number of veto players cannot 
be explained by the number of veto players but can be explained by signaling problems between 
chief executives and the central bank governor.  Further, Hicken, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2005) 
report that there is no systematic relationship between the number of veto players and the 
responses to currency crisis.   
Concerning the literature that looks at the relationship between the number of veto 
players and the IMF, by focusing on conditions to enter the IMF programs, Vreeland (2002) 
shows that as the number of veto players increases, a country is more likely to enter into 
agreement with the IMF because an executive leader can utilize the IMF programs as a device to 
push unpopular reforms when a leader cannot convince opposition parties to agree to pay the 
costs of reforms.  Hence, as the number of veto players increases, a country is more likely to 
                                                 
13 Satyanath (2006) uses Barth et al (2006)s’ data to examine the condition of banking 
regulations.   
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 enter into the IMF agreement.  However, on the other hand, the IMF is less likely to enter into an 
agreement with a country which has a higher number of veto players, anticipating that it will be 
difficult for a country to commit to reforms.  Thus, recent empirical studies show various 
possibilities concerning the relationship between the increase in the number of veto players and 
the changes in policy status quo.  Then, what role do veto players play in cases of financial 
reforms?   
 
2.3.2.2. The role of veto players in financial reforms: conditioning the IMF’s impact 
 
In this dissertation, I especially focus on the role of veto players in conditioning the 
effects of the IMF on the magnitude and the pace of financial reforms.  I argue that the effects of 
IMF programs on facilitating a larger magnitude of financial reforms and bringing forward the 
timing of the occurrence of financial reforms varies, depending on the number of veto players.  
Veto player theory predicts that the increase in the number of veto players will make a radical 
policy shift less likely to occur (Tsebelis 1995, 2002).  I argue that a country with a larger 
number of veto players tends to find it harder to commit to financial reforms; hence, the IMF 
effects of facilitating a larger magnitude of financial reforms and speeding up the pace of 
financial reforms will decrease as a country has more veto players.   
Financial policies such as interest rate liberalization, elimination of credit controls, and 
capital account liberalization are technically oriented policies.  Therefore, important information 
would be shared among cabinet members within the executive coalitions, these being technocrats 
such as central bankers, and bureaucrats like the Ministry of Finance.  Since financial policies 
are technically oriented policies, it is difficult for each political party within an executive 
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 coalition to estimate the net effects of financial reforms ex ante.  In this light, as shown by 
Fernandez and Rodrik (1991), even if aggregated outcomes of reforms are beneficial for a 
majority of the populace, the aggregate uncertainty about reform outcomes tends to produce a 
status quo bias.   
In this vein, I assume that it would be uncertain for each political party participating in an 
executive coalition to estimate the net outcomes of benefits and costs of financial reforms in 
negotiating the contents of the IMF conditionality programs.  Despite the technical difficulties in 
estimating these net benefits and costs, they would nonetheless need to take into account how 
each of the political parties is supported, not only by the manufacturing sector and the banking 
sector, but also by other sectors and the general populace.14  Further, even when political parties 
may agree to conduct financial reforms, they have to agree first on the extent to which financial 
reforms will be conducted at one time.  Due to the uncertainty of costs and benefits of financial 
reforms for each political party, each political party participating in an executive coalition tends 
to resist a large scale of financial reforms.  Therefore, concerning the magnitude of financial 
reforms, I assume that as the number of political parties within an executive coalition increases, 
the IMF’s effects on the magnitude of financial reforms will decrease.   
Concerning the pace of financial reforms, as well as the magnitude of financial reforms, 
even when political parties may agree to conduct financial reforms such as privatization of banks, 
for instance, they need to further decide which banks should be privatized first and how and 
when they will be privatized by anticipating who will be likely to buy banks at which prices.  
                                                 
14 In this vein, each political party is seen to work as an agent that represents societal interests 
(Bearce 2003).  Though political parties may not necessarily work as partisan agents due to a 
lack of strong party consolidation in developing countries compared with developed countries, I 
assume that political parties have policy preferences concerning whether they support neoliberal 
economic reforms. 
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 Hence, even though they may agree to financial reforms, it would still take time to reach 
agreement among political parties participating in an executive coalition in negotiating the 
contents of the IMF programs and in implementing the IMF programs.   
Moreover, although political parties within an executive coalition may agree to commit 
financial reforms in deciding to enter the IMF programs, once the loan is disbursed, each 
political party has an incentive to minimize the costs of reforms and/or to maximize the benefits 
of reforms depending on who supports each political party.  Also, a country has less incentive to 
conduct financial reforms in the implementation phase than in the initial entry agreement phase if 
a country has already survived an initial acute phase of crisis by receiving a certain amount of 
conditionality loan.  Now, in order to commit to financial reforms, each political party may have 
to reorganize vested interests and may have to pay costs.  Therefore, I argue uncertainty for each 
political party will cause delay in reaching the agreement with respect to the pace of each 
dimensions of financial reforms.   
Hence, this is what leads to the decrease in effects of the IMF programs on facilitating 
financial reforms as the number of political parties within an executive coalition increases.  
Conversely, as the number of veto players decreases, the IMF’s effect of bringing forward the 
timing of financial reforms is more likely to increase.  Hence, I posit the hypotheses concerning 
the intermediating effect of the number of veto players on the magnitude of financial reforms 
(Hypotheses 2a) and on the pace of financial reforms (Hypothesis 2b), respectively, as follows.   
 
Hypothesis 2a. The IMF’s influence on financial reforms is conditioned by the number of veto 
players.  As the number of veto players increases, the IMF’s effects on enhancing a larger 
magnitude of financial reforms are more likely to decrease. 
34 
 Hypothesis 2b. The IMF’s influence on the pace of financial reforms is conditioned by the 
number of veto players.  As the number of veto players increases, the IMF’s effects with regards 
to facilitating financial reforms are more likely to decrease. 
 
2.3.3. Interest group pressures: an explanation at the societal level  
 
Regarding the explanation at the societal level, I will examine two sectors’ impacts: the 
manufacturing sector and the banking sector.   
 
2.3.3.1. The manufacturing sector 
 
Concerning preferences of the manufacturing sector, the manufacturing sector will 
support financial reforms if the manufacturing sector can benefit from increased access to credit 
and/or access to better credit conditions as the results of financial reforms.   
In developing countries, in a country where the manufacturing sector is well developed, 
conglomerates often dominate the manufacturing sector.  In these cases, conglomerates tend to 
cultivate strong ties with political elites and political parties in democracies.  Further, in 
developing countries, conglomerates often possess both firms and banks, and banks tend to serve 
to provide group firms with credits.  In this bank practice, or connected lending, banks tend to 
provide credit for related firms without enough checking of loan risks.  If that is the case, the 
manufacturing sector’s preference will reflect predominantly the large firms’ preference, given 
the large political influence of conglomerates.  In addition, under these conditions, distributional 
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 preference of the manufacturing sector will prevail rather than that of the financial sector because 
banks will be subordinate to conglomerates’ firms. 
Specifically, I argue that the manufacturing sector will support reform measures in such 
areas as privatization of banks, capital account liberalization, elimination of interest rate controls, 
elimination of credit controls, and elimination of entry barriers.  The hypothesized distributional 
preference of the manufacturing sector is shown as Table 2.3. 
 
Table 2.3 Distributional Preferences of the Manufacturing Sector 
 
Six Dimensions of Financial Reforms Preferences of the Manufacturing  Sector 
Privatization of Banks Support 
Enhancement of Banking Supervision Oppose 
Capital Account Liberalization Support 
Interest Rate Liberalization Support 
Elimination of Credit Controls Support 
Elimination of Entry Barriers Support 
 
 
With respect to privatization of banks, as noticed before, politicians tend to hesitate to 
privatize banks because it will lead to the loss of their own influence over the banks.  However, 
when a government has to privatize banks, the easiest way to privatize banks is the case for the 
government to sell national banks to well-connected individuals or groups so that political elites 
will not lose their political influence over the banks.  In this vein, a conglomerate or business 
elites may buy a national bank.  If politicians obtain support from those business elites who aim 
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 to buy banks, politicians would welcome a privatization of banks.  Further, competitive firms 
will be able to obtain more loan opportunities and better loan conditions from privatized banks.  
Therefore, under these conditions, the manufacturing sector will support privatization of banks.   
However, the manufacturing sector will oppose the reform of enhancement of banking 
supervision.  These policy measures include policies such as increasing banks’ capital adequacy 
ratio, enhancing the independence of banking supervisory agencies, and strengthening the 
supervisory power of a banking supervisory agency, for example.  If these measures are taken for 
enhancing prudential regulations and banking supervision, banks need to refrain from risky 
lending behaviors and it would become harder for firms to gain access to credit.  Therefore, the 
manufacturing sector will oppose these policy measures.   
On the other hand, the manufacturing sector will support capital account liberalization.  
Export oriented firms will be able to increase their access to FDI as a result of capital account 
liberalization.  Moreover, even uncompetitive firms and domestic oriented firms can benefit from 
capital account liberalization because capital account liberalization results in an increase in 
capital inflow not only to firms but also to banks; therefore, small firms will also be able to 
increase their access to better credit conditions.  Hence, the manufacturing sector will support 
capital account liberalization.  
With respect to the dimension of interest rate liberalization, interest rate liberalization or 
liberalization of banks’ deposit rates and lending rates leads to lower lending rates and higher 
deposit rates.  Since firms will be able to take advantage of lowered lending rates, the 
manufacturing sector will support interest rate liberalization.  Hence, the manufacturing sector 
will support reform measures concerning interest rate liberalization.   
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 Concerning the elimination of credit controls, when firms are competitive enough, they 
will prefer the elimination for banks’ credit controls, since when banks become free from credit 
controls and restrictive reserve requirements, competitive firms can enjoy more expanded loan 
opportunities.  On the other hand, if the manufacturing sector is not competitive enough, they 
will oppose the elimination of credit controls because they may lose preferential credit allocation 
as part of a designated sector or they may lose access to credit at preferential interest rates, the 
manufacturing sector’s preferences with respect to the elimination of credit controls will be 
mixed.  Therefore, if large influential firms such as conglomerates are not beneficiaries from 
preferential credit allocations and if they want to expand loan opportunities, they will exert their 
political influence to eliminate credit controls.  While politicians may want to utilize credit 
controls as a policy tool to cultivate ties, when large influential firms such as conglomerates 
would like to eliminate credit controls, the politicians have to respond these demands. Therefore, 
a strong manufacturing sector will support the elimination of credit controls, though this will be 
conditioned by who are benefited by preferential credit allocation.   
In terms of the elimination of entry barriers on banks, the manufacturing sector will 
support these reform measures.  The manufacturing sector will be able to expand loan 
opportunities provided by banks as a result of policy measures to enhance competition among 
banks such as lowering entry barriers of domestic banks and foreign banks, eliminating 
branching restrictions of banks, and allowing a wider range of activities that banks can engage in.  
Consequently, in a country with a strong manufacturing sector, reform measures on elimination 
of entry barriers of banks will be supported.   
Given the distributional preferences of the manufacturing sector as discussed above, with 
respect to the preferences of the manufacturing sector on the magnitude of financial reforms, 
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 financial reforms such as privatization of banks, capital account liberalization, interest rate 
liberalization, elimination of credit controls, and elimination of entry barriers, for instance, will 
provide them with a better chance to access credits, so they will not resist radical financial 
reform measures, even if these reforms are conducted at one time.  Therefore, I assume that the 
manufacturing sector will support a wider range of financial reforms as the manufacturing sector 
will seek a wider variety of opportunities to access better credit conditions.  Thus, as to the 
effects of societal actors on the magnitude of financial reforms, I hypothesize as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 3a. A country where the manufacturing sector has a strong influence is more 
likely to engage in a larger magnitude of financial reforms. 
 
With respect to the influence of the manufacturing sector on the pace of financial reforms, 
I assume that when the manufacturing sector supports certain dimensions of financial reform 
measures, these dimensions of reforms will be accelerated, while when the manufacturing sector 
opposes a particular dimension, that dimension of reform will be delayed.  Therefore, a country 
with a strong manufacturing sector’s influence will bring forward the timing of reforms in such 
areas as privatization of banks, capital account liberalization, elimination of interest rate controls, 
elimination of credit controls, and elimination of entry barriers of banks.  On the other hand, a 
strong manufacturing sector’s influence will hinder financial reforms in the dimension of the 
enhancement of banking supervision.  The derivable hypothesis from the above discussion 
concerning the effects of the manufacturing sector on the pace of financial reforms is as follows: 
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 Hypothesis 3b.  In countries where the manufacturing sector has a strong influence, 
financial reforms are more likely to be hastened in such dimensions as privatization of banks, 
capital account liberalization, interest rate liberalization, elimination of credit controls, and 
elimination of entry barriers.  On the other hand, in this same type of situation, financial reform 
is more likely to be delayed in the dimension of enhancement of banking supervision. 
 
2.3.3.2. The banking sector 
 
The main theory of economic reform argues that the costs of reforms are concentrated 
and the benefits of reforms are widely dispersed.  Although financial reforms such as interest rate 
liberalization, elimination of credit controls, and the elimination of entry barriers on banks are 
technical policies, since the banking sector would be the one to be most likely affected, the 
banking sector would have the stake concerning these financial policy reforms.   
One point of view holds that these previously privileged actors who need to pay the costs 
of reform will engage in collective actions, which would impede economic reforms.  Following 
this logic, domestic financial banks are expected to oppose financial reforms (Lukauskas 2002).  
Also, in examining the impact of the banking sector’s influence on exchange rate regimes, Hall 
(2005) argues that the banking sector’s influence is particularly strong when banks dominate a 
financial system, and they will engage in collective action.  Another point of view looks at banks 
as long-term efficiency maximizers, and as such, expects that domestic banks should support 
financial reforms because they can anticipate future benefits and can bear short-term costs 
(Haggard and Maxfield 1996).   
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 Although whether the banking sector opposes or supports financial reforms is 
controversial in prior research, I assume that banks are not necessarily long-term efficiency 
maximizers.  In developing countries, banks dominate a country’s financial system, and they 
tend to be heavily protected without competition.  Therefore, they will not want to endure short-
term costs for the sake of long-term benefits.  Hence, in general, I believe the banking sector is 
likely to oppose financial reforms.  Hypothesized distributional preferences of the banking sector 
in each of the six dimensions of financial reforms are shown below as Table 2.4. 
 
 
Table 2.4 Distributional Preferences of the Banking Sector 
 
 
Six Dimensions of Financial Reforms Preferences of the Banking Sector 
Privatization of Banks Oppose 
Enhancement of Banking Supervision Oppose 
Capital Account Liberalization Oppose 
Interest Rate Liberalization Oppose 
Elimination of Credit Controls Oppose 
Elimination of Entry Barriers Oppose 
 
 
 
With respect to the preferences of the banking sector, the banking sector will oppose all 
six dimensions of financial reforms.  State banks do not want to be privatized since they enjoy a 
more heavily protected status than private banks.  Also, private banks do not want other publicly-
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 owned banks privatized since then they would need to face heavier competition with other banks.  
Hence, the banking sector will oppose privatization of banks.  With respect to enhancement of 
banking supervision, since banks prefer that the banking supervisory agency not check their real 
balance sheets and not intervene in their banking business, they will oppose the enhancement of 
banking supervision.   
In terms of capital account liberalization, by liberalizing capital accounts, banks will be 
able to borrow money from abroad in capital markets; however, firms also will be able to borrow 
necessary money from abroad, which may reduce domestic banks’ opportunities to lend money.  
Also, banks will need to set interest rates closer to the world interest rate if capital is mobile, 
which may lower banks’ revenues from loan payments. Therefore, although preferences of the 
banking sector may be mixed, in general, the banking sector will oppose financial liberalization.   
Concerning interest rate liberalization, banks would have to face severe competition 
among banks if banks’ deposit rates and lending rates were liberalized by offering higher deposit 
rates and lower lending rates to clients.  Hence, the banking sector will oppose interest rate 
liberalization; therefore, in a country with a strong banking sector, interest rate liberalization will 
be delayed.   
With respect to the elimination of credit controls, banks would be allowed to determine 
credit allocation by themselves as a result of these financial reform measures; however, credit 
allocations can be an important political tool for banks to make strong ties between politicians.  
Hence, knowing that credit allocations can be politically important tools, banks would like to 
preserve their politically special status as providers of preferential credits.  Also, banks will not 
want to face more competitive pressures to earn profits, which is another result of the elimination 
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 of credit controls.  Therefore, I assume that the banking sector will oppose the elimination of 
credit controls. 
In regards to the last dimension, the elimination of entry barriers into the domestic market, 
the banking sector will also oppose these financial reform measures.  Elimination of entry 
barriers or allowing entry of new domestic banks and/or foreign banks into the domestic market, 
for example, will increase competitive pressures among banks.  Therefore, I assume that the 
banking sector will oppose the dimension of the elimination of entry barriers.   
Based on hypothesized distributional preferences of the banking sector discussed above, 
concerning the banking sector’s influence on the magnitude of financial reforms, contrary to the 
manufacturing sector, I assume that the banking sector will oppose a wider range of financial 
reforms since the banking sector does not prefer all six dimensions of financial reforms.  Also, as 
discussed before, the banking sector is the sector most likely to be affected by various financial 
policy reforms.  The banking sector tends to be heavily protected and sheltered from competition 
in developing countries.  Therefore, the banking sector will resist radical financial reform 
measures at one time.  Hence, a country with a stronger banking sector will be more likely to 
engage in a smaller magnitude of financial reforms.  
 
 
Hypothesis 4a. A country where the banking sector has a stronger influence is more 
likely to engage in a smaller magnitude of financial reforms.   
 
In terms of the influence of the banking sector on the pace of financial reforms, the 
banking sector will oppose all six dimensions of financial reforms.  Hence, a banking sector with 
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 stronger influence will result in delay in each of the six dimensions of financial reforms.  Hence, 
I posit the following hypothesis concerning the effects of the banking sector on the pace of each 
of the six dimensions of financial reforms.   
 
 
Hypothesis 4b.  In a country where the banking sector has a strong political influence, 
financial reforms in such dimensions as privatization of banks, enhancement of banking 
supervision, capital account liberalization, interest rate liberalization, elimination of credit 
controls, and elimination of entry barriers are more likely to be delayed.   
 
 
2.4. RECAPITULATION 
 
In this chapter, I have laid out the main hypotheses for predicting both the magnitude of and the 
pace of financial reforms in developing countries.  As shown below as Figure 2.1, I argue that 
both the magnitude of and the pace of financial reform outcomes are dependent upon state 
responses to the IMF at the international level, and veto players plays the role in a way that 
conditions the IMF effects.  Also, financial reform outcomes are state responses to societal 
pressures, especially from the manufacturing sector and the banking sector.   
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Government  
Conditioning the IMF’s 
Effects (Veto Players) 
 
Respond to Societal 
Pressures 
Manufacturing Sector  Banking Sector  
International Monetary Fund 
  
Outcomes of Financial Reforms 
 
Magnitude 
Larger Magnitude vs. Smaller 
Magnitude 
 
Pace 
1) Privatization of Banks 
2) Enhancement of Banking Supervision  
3) Capital Account Liberalization 
4) Interest Rate Liberalization 
5) Elimination of Credit Controls 
6) Elimination of Entry Barriers on 
Banks
 
Figure 2.1 Hypothesized Determinants of Financial Reforms  
 
  
Hypotheses for predicting the magnitude of financial reforms are summarized as 
Table 2.5 below.  A plus sign indicates the expected effects of predictors in facilitating a larger 
magnitude of facilitating financial reforms and minus sign indicates those effects causing a 
smaller magnitude of financial reforms.   
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 Table 2.5 Hypotheses Predicting the Magnitude of Financial Reforms in Developing 
Countries 
 
Predictors  Magnitude of Financial 
Reforms 
IMF  + 
Conditioning Effects of Veto 
Players for the IMF (as the number 
of veto player increases) 
_ 
Strong Manufacturing Sector’s 
influence + 
Strong Banking Sector’s influence _ 
 
 
As shown above, while the IMF conditionality programs will facilitate a larger magnitude 
of financial reform (Hypothesis 1a), as the number of veto players increases in a country, the 
effects of these programs decreases (Hypothesis 2a).  Also, a stronger influence of the 
manufacturing sector will support a larger magnitude of financial reforms (Hypothesis 3a), 
whereas a stronger influence of the banking sector will result in more gradual reforms or a 
smaller magnitude of financial reforms (Hypothesis 4a).   
I also hypothesized determinants of the pace of each of the six dimensions of financial 
reforms and the hypotheses are summarized as Table 2.6 shown below.  A plus sign indicates the 
expected effects of predictors in speeding up the pace of facilitating financial reforms and minus 
sign indicates those delaying effects of the pace of financial reforms in developing countries. 
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 Table 2.6 Hypotheses Predicting the Pace of Financial Reforms in Developing Countries 
 
 Privatization 
of Banks 
Enhancement 
of Banking 
Supervision 
Capital 
Account 
Liberalization 
Interest Rate 
Liberalization 
Eliminatio
n of Credit 
Controls 
Elimination 
of Entry 
Barriers 
IMF  
 
+ + + + + + 
Conditioning 
Effects of 
Veto Players 
for the IMF 
(as the 
number of 
veto player 
increases) 
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ 
Strong 
Manufacturin
g Sector’s 
influence 
+ _ + + + + 
Strong 
Banking 
Sector’s 
influence 
_ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
 
As discussed before, the IMF will have the effect of bringing forward the timing of 
financial reforms (Hypothesis 1b).  However, this IMF’s effects on facilitating financial reforms 
will be intermediated by the number of veto players.  Namely, as the number of veto players 
increases, the IMF’s effects on facilitating reforms will be likely to decrease (Hypothesis 2b).   
On the other hand, if financial reforms are the state’s response to societal pressures by 
interest groups, the manufacturing sector or the banking sector’s preferences as shown below 
will be reflected as policy outcomes.  A country with a strong manufacturing sector will facilitate 
financial reforms in such areas as privatization of banks, capital account liberalization, interest 
rate liberalization, elimination of credit controls, and elimination of entry barriers, and will delay 
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 the enhancement of banking supervision (Hypothesis 3b).  On the other hand, if the banking 
sector has stronger influence, it will cause to delay the timing of financial reforms in all six 
dimensions (Hypothesis 4b).  
Concerning the dimension of banking supervision, I assume that both the manufacturing 
sector and the banking sector oppose it.  Then, who will support stricter banking supervision?  
Economic technocrats such as central bankers and bureaucrats of the banking supervisory 
authority can be the supporters for neoliberal economic reforms.  However, not all staff of 
central banks or banking supervisory agencies are neoliberal-minded economic technocrats, 
especially in the cases of developing countries.  Also, the central banks and the banking 
supervisory agency rarely can be regarded as politically independent in many circumstances.  
Moreover, although independent neoliberal-minded economic ministers can be promoters of the 
enhancement of banking supervision, these economic ministers need to be backed by political 
leaders.  Therefore, unless political leaders support the enhancement of banking supervision or 
unless political leaders are pushed toward these reform measures by international financial 
institutions such as the IMF, it would be difficult for economic technocrats to enhance banking 
supervision over the banking sector.15   
In terms of the relationship between the magnitude and the pace of financial reforms, in 
general, when a state conducts a larger magnitude of financial reform, a state may not conduct 
                                                 
15 Concerning other societal influence besides the manufacturing sector and the banking 
sector, the influence of the agricultural sector may be important in shaping the pace of the 
elimination of credit controls.  The agricultural sector will oppose the elimination of credit 
controls since the agricultural sector is often a primary protected and benefited sector from 
preferential credit allocations with subsidized interest rates in developing countries.  Therefore, I 
will take the agricultural sector into account in the dimension of the elimination of credit controls 
and will conduct an additional quantitative examination later.  However, for other dimensions of 
financial reforms, the agricultural sector will not be directly affected and will not organize 
themselves to influence financial reform outcomes.  Therefore, I examine the impact of the 
agricultural sector only in the dimension of elimination of credit controls.   
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 another round of reforms.  Also, a state may conduct reforms gradually but many times over the 
years at a faster pace.  However, in the cases of developing countries, although a state may 
conduct a larger scale of financial reforms at one time, the state may take a large reversal of 
policy measures toward financial repression.  If that is the case, a state determines when and the 
extent to which financial reforms should be conducted again and a state may conduct a large 
scale of reforms again.   
When and why do financial reforms occur?  Do states choose financial reforms as a 
response to strong international pressures to liberalize their domestic financial systems?  Or do 
veto players play a role in determining the outcome, facilitating or hindering financial reforms?  
Or rather, should financial reforms be understood as the states’ responses to societal pressures?  
In the following chapter, Chapter 3, I quantitatively examine predictors of the magnitude of 
financial reforms employing ordinal logit regressions in order to answer these questions.  Also, 
hypotheses for predicting the pace of each of the six financial reforms are examined employing 
duration models.   
49 
 3.0  DETERMINANTS OF FINANCIAL REFORMS: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter quantitatively assesses political determinants of the magnitude and the pace of 
financial reforms.  The magnitude of financial reforms refers to the degree to which a country is 
likely to engage in a wider range of financial reforms at one given time such as with a big-bang 
type of reform.  “What makes a country pursue a larger scale of financial reform at one time?”  
This is the first central question that I try to answer in this chapter.  In prior research, economists 
have lively debated whether a country should conduct a large scale of economic reforms at one 
time, a so called “big-bang” approach or “shock therapy,” or whether a country should conduct 
economic reforms in a gradual manner.16  While economists tend to discuss whether a country 
should conduct economic reforms on a larger scale at one time or in a gradual manner from a 
normative viewpoint, this study takes a different stance.  This study aims to empirically specify 
under which conditions a country is more likely to engage in a larger magnitude of financial 
reforms or a smaller magnitude of financial reforms.   
In addition, I further analyze political determinants with respect to the pace of financial 
reforms.  “What makes a country conduct financial reforms at a faster pace?”  This is the second 
central question that I try to answer in this chapter.  Since the Financial Reform Database 
                                                 
16 In addition to these theoretical studies, as another strand of research, economists also report 
policy outcomes of financial reforms such as big-bang reforms versus gradual reforms in their 
case studies (for example see De Brouwer with Pupphavesa (1999)).  However, in these 
studies, economists hardly ask the question why some countries take a big-bang type of path 
of financial reforms while others take a gradual path or of financial reforms.  
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 developed by the Research Department of the IMF has allowed me to examine six dimensions of 
financial reforms, I have been able to quantitatively explore this issue.   
As stated in the previous chapter, I look at the relative importance of the following 
factors on three levels as determinants of financial reforms: 1) international pressures by the IMF 
as an explanation at the international level, 2) veto players as an explanation at the national level, 
and 3) interest group pressures as an explanation at the societal level.  In particular, by 
interacting the IMF impact and the number of veto players, I examine how the IMF’s impact on 
financial reforms is conditioned by the number of veto players.   
This chapter is organized as follows.  In the next section, I review past relevant literature 
on the magnitude of financial reforms.  Also, I reiterate hypotheses concerning political 
determinants for predicting both the magnitude and the pace of financial reforms.  In the third 
section, I explain the dataset used to perform quantitative analysis.  In the fourth section, I 
describe the Financial Reform Database developed by the Research Department of the IMF, 
which serves dependent variables in quantitative analyses in this chapter.17  Using this dataset, I 
also present a brief outlook of the magnitude and the pace of financial reforms in thirty 
developing countries.  In the fifth and the sixth sections, I describe the operationalization of 
variables — independent variables and control variables, respectively.  In the seventh section, I 
explain the methodology used: ordinal logit regression for exploring determinants of the 
magnitude of financial reforms and event history analysis for the pace of financial reforms.  In 
the eighth section, results concerning the predictors of the magnitude of financial reforms are 
presented.  In the ninth section, results on the predictors of the pace of financial reforms are 
presented.  In the last section, the tenth, I discuss findings and conclude.   
                                                 
17 I obtained the authorization of the access to the database from the Research Department of the 
IMF.  However, this database is not yet publicly available.   
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 3.2. PAST RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES 
 
In past literature, economists have engaged in lively debates over whether a country should 
engage in a big-bang type manner of reform or in a more gradual manner in order to overcome 
resistance to reforms.   
As a proponent of “big-bang” reforms, Roland and Verdier (1994) argue that in the cases 
of the East European countries, a big-bang type reform is desirable, because a big-bang type will 
create a “critical mass,” which will support economic reforms, thereby ensuring economic 
reforms by reducing resistance to reforms.  As the other rationale for big-bang reform in general, 
Martinelli and Tommasi (1997) show that in a gradual approach, if one big group who possess a 
strong veto power can block economic reforms, another group will not agree to initiate a reform 
knowing that the strong group will not agree economic reforms later.  Hence, a big-bang 
approach is a viable option for a government to propose economic reforms.   
As a proponent of gradual economic reform, Ronald (1994) argues that the aggregate 
uncertainty of a big-bang reform strategy can result in the inhibiting of economic reforms under 
the existence of political constraints; in these cases, a gradual economic reform is a more feasible 
strategy because implementing only a subset of economic reforms will reduce aggregate 
uncertainty and will therefore be more likely to be supported by a majority.  Dewatripoint and 
Roland (1992) also point out that if one has to compensate for a group of losers as a result of 
reforms, the costs of reforms will be lower in a gradual reform than a big-bang approach.  
Therefore, they claim a gradual reform will be more likely to be feasible under budget 
constraints.  Wei (1997) also argues that although a big-bang reform is preferable, a gradual 
reform is more feasible under political constraints because it can divide resistant forces who 
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 oppose economic reforms.  Thus, economists argue which approach is optimal by comparing the 
gradual approach and the big-bang approach.     
However, in this chapter, rather than arguing an optimal magnitude of reforms 
normatively, I aim to contribute to the IPE literature by empirically specifying under which 
conditions financial reforms are more likely to be implemented in a larger scale at one time.  To 
account for causal determinants of the magnitude of financial reforms, I posited four hypotheses 
in Chapter 2.  These four hypotheses posited in the previous chapter are restated as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 4a. A country where the banking sector has a stronger 
influence is more likely to engage in a smaller magnitude of financial 
reforms.   
 
Hypothesis 3a. A country where the manufacturing sector has a strong 
influence is more likely to engage in a larger magnitude of financial 
reforms. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: The IMF’s influence on financial reforms is conditioned 
by the number of veto players.  As the number of veto player increases, the 
IMF’s effects on enhancing a larger magnitude of financial reforms are 
more likely to decrease. 
 
Hypothesis 1a. When a government is under the IMF conditionality 
programs, the country is more likely to engage in a larger magnitude of 
financial reforms.   
 
Four Hypotheses Predicting the Magnitude of Financial Reforms 
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 Next, to account for causal determinants of the pace of financial reforms, I also posited 
four hypotheses in Chapter 2.  These four hypotheses are reiterated as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 4b. In a country where the banking sector has a strong 
influence, all six dimensions of financial reforms — privatization of 
banks, enhancement of banking supervision, capital account 
liberalization, interest rate liberalization, elimination of credit controls, 
and elimination of entry barriers — are more likely to be delayed.   
 
Hypothesis 3b. In countries where the manufacturing sector has a 
strong influence, financial reforms are more likely to be hastened in 
such dimensions as privatization of banks, capital account 
liberalization, interest rate liberalization, elimination of credit 
controls, and elimination of entry barriers.  On the other hand, in this 
same type of situation, financial reform is more likely to be delayed in 
a dimension of enhancement of banking supervision. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: The IMF’s influence on the pace of financial reforms 
is conditioned by the number of veto players.  As the number of veto 
players increases, the IMF’s effects on bringing forward the timing of 
financial reforms are more likely to decrease. 
  
 
Four Hypotheses Predicting the Pace of Financial Reforms 
 
Hypothesis 1b: When a government is under IMF conditionality 
programs, a country is more likely to bring forward the timing of 
financial reforms.  
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 To quantitatively assess these hypotheses, in the next section, I explain the database that I 
use in this chapter.   
 
 
3.3. DATASET 
 
In this section, I explain the dataset, which I constructed, covers thirty developing countries from 
1973 to 2002.  The thirty developing countries covered in this dataset are shown below as 
Table 3.1.   
 
Table 3.1 Thirty Countries in the Dataset  
 
 
Caribbean and Latin American countries (13) 
 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela 
 
Asian countries (11) 
 
Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, Sri Lanka 
 
Middle Eastern and African countries (6) 
 
Egypt, Ghana, Morocco, Turkey, South Africa, Zimbabwe 
 
 
 
As shown above, this dataset covers major Latin American and Asian countries, while it 
does not cover many African and Middle Eastern countries.  Also, it does not cover East 
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 European countries, either.  The quality and availability of the data before the 1990s tend to be 
limited in these countries that are not covered in this dataset.  Therefore, it can be said that this 
dataset sacrifices the number of countries for the sake of long year coverage.18  
 
 
3.4.  DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
In this section, I first introduce the Financial Reform Database, which served as dependent 
variables in quantitative examination in this chapter.  Second, I describe how the dependent 
variables were constructed to measure the magnitude of financial reforms and also present an 
overview of the actual patterns of magnitude of financial reforms in thirty developing countries.  
Third, I explain how the pace of financial reforms was measured as dependent variables and also 
present an overview of the pace of financial reforms in each of the six dimensions. 
 
3.4.1. Financial reform database 
 
As discussed above, causal determinants of financial reforms other than capital account 
liberalization have been neglected in conventional literature.  Hence, I look at the following six 
dimensions of financial reforms: 1) privatization of banks, 2) enhancement of banking 
supervision over the banking sector, 3) capital account liberalization, 4) interest rate 
                                                 
18 Many East European countries and China lacked economic data before 1990s.  Therefore, this 
dataset does not include these countries.  Also, the African countries in this dataset — Egypt, 
Ghana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe — tended to be major and economically well developed 
countries relative to other countries in the region.  In this vein, this data may be more biased 
towards countries where there are more financial reforms.  However, this limitation is partially 
compensated for by the long coverage of years, though it may not be fully remedied.   
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 liberalization of banks’ deposits and credits, 5) elimination of credit controls, and 6) elimination 
of entry barriers on banks.   
The data have been taken from the Financial Reform Database developed by the 
Research Department of the IMF, the original data coverage of which I expanded and also 
assisted to refine and revise.19  Out of the six dimensions, five of them —privatization of banks, 
enhancement of banking supervision, interest rate liberalization, eliminations of credit controls 
over the banking sector, and elimination of entry barriers on banks—focus on banking reforms.  
Also, out of the six dimensions, five dimensions look at financial reforms toward liberalization, 
where reforms occur in a way that states are less likely to intervene into markets.  Only one 
dimension —the enhancement of banking supervision over the banking sector— looks at the 
regulatory dimension of financial reforms, in which reforms are conducted in a way that states 
are more likely to intervene into markets for regulatory purposes.  A list of the coding rules for 
each dimension is appended as Appendix 3.A.20   
Each dimension is coded on a four point scale: 0 = Fully Repressed, 1 = Partially 
Repressed, 2 = Largely Liberalized, and 3 = Fully Liberalized.21  Correlations between each of 
the six dimensions using raw values and also differences are shown as Appendix 3.B and 
Appendix 3.C respectively.  Correlations of raw values between the dimension of privatization 
and any of the other dimensions tend to be lower (0.292–0.425) than correlations between any 
                                                 
19 For details of coding rules of the Financial Reform Database, see Omori (2006).  For details of 
the original dataset, see Abiad and Mody (2005).   
20 In the Financial Reform Database, the six dimensions used in this dissertation project are 
labeled respectively as follows: 1) State Ownership of Banks, 2) Entry Barriers, 3) Credit 
Controls and Reserve Requirements, 4) Interest Rate Controls, 5) Prudential Regulations and 
Banking Supervision over the Banking Sector, and 6) Capital Account Restrictions.  These labels 
are still tentative as of March 1, 2007.   
21  For the banking supervision dimension, 0 is Not Regulated, 1 is Less Regulated, 2 is Largely 
Regulated, and 3 is Highly Regulated.   
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 two of the other dimensions (0.462–0.672).  Overall, however, since correlations between 
dimensions are not particularly high, it can be said that each dimension captures a different 
aspect of financial reform.   
 
3.4.2. Overview of the magnitude of financial reforms  
 
In order to measure the magnitude of financial reforms, I created a change index for all six 
dimensions of financial reforms.  Since each of the six dimensions is coded zero (Fully 
Repressed), one (Partially Repressed), two (Largely Liberalized), to three (Fully Liberalized), I 
took the difference for each dimension and added these change values of the six dimensions, 
with the result that the additive change values of the six dimensions express the magnitude of 
financial reforms for each country in a given year.  These additive change scores serve as 
dependent variables to examine magnitude of financial reforms.  Larger values indicate a larger 
magnitude of reforms.  In this vein, I explore the magnitude of financial reforms to a relative 
degree, in which “big-bang” type of reforms can be the possible extreme end of policy outcomes.  
Using these scores, I present actual patterns of the magnitude of financial reforms in these thirty 
developing countries from 1973-2002, which are presented below as Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2.  
A longer positive line indicates a larger magnitude of financial reform, while a shorter positive 
line indicates a smaller magnitude of financial reform.  A negative line indicates a policy reversal 
to a more repressed financial system.   
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Figure 3.1 Magnitude of Financial Reforms of Thirty Developing Countries I 
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Figure 3.2 Magnitude of Financial Reforms of Thirty Developing Countries II 
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 Although New Zealand is a well-known example of big-bang type of financial reforms in 
developed countries,22 New Zealand is not the only case of big bang type of financial reforms.  
As seen above, some developing countries have also conducted a large magnitude or “big-bang” 
type of financial reform: Argentina in 1977, Colombia in 1991, Egypt in 1991, and Mexico in 
1989 as at the extreme end of outcomes of larger magnitude of reforms.  On the other hand, other 
countries have taken more gradual paths of financial reform, especially seen in the cases of 
Bangladesh, Costa Rica, and India.23  Thus, as can be observed in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2, the 
extent of the magnitude of financial reforms in developing countries has been very diverse.   
 
3.4.3. Overview of the pace of financial reforms 
 
Second, in order to quantitatively examine the pace of financial reforms I use the methodology of 
event history analysis, which I explain later in more detail in the methodology section.  Here I 
explain how I construct dependent variables.  In order to model what hinders and what facilitates 
financial reforms, how many years have passed until financial reforms occur is used as a 
dependent variable.  To know when financial reforms occur, I take the differences between year t 
and year t-1, and when values are changed positively, it is counted as an event occurring or 
financial reforms occurring.  Then I count the years until financial reforms occur.  If financial 
reforms never occur in a country, values range from 1 to 29.  In order to take into account 
                                                 
22 See Caprio et al. (1994), for example.  
23 The value of change in the additive index is eight in Argentina in 1977 and Colombia in 1991, 
six in Egypt in 1991, and six in Mexico in 1989.  The Financial Reform Database includes New 
Zealand, known as a famous case of a “big-bang” type of financial reforms, as one of nine highly 
developed countries and its change value was six in 1984.  On the other hand, in the cases of 
Bangladesh, Costa Rica, and India, the maximum value of change in additive index is two for 
thirty years.  
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 repeatability of financial reforms, as discussed later, when a second reform occurs, coding begins 
at 1 again.24   
The average of the years until financial reform occurs and the standard deviation of the 
time in each dimension is presented as Table 3.2 below.  In this table, the average number of 
times financial reform occurs and the standard deviation of the number of times are also 
presented.   
 
 
Table 3.2 Average Time until Financial Reform Occurs and Average Number of Financial 
Reform Occurring 
 Privatization of Banks 
Enhancement 
of Banking 
Supervision 
Capital 
Account 
Liberalization 
Interest Rate 
Liberalization 
Elimination 
of Credit 
Controls 
Elimination 
of Entry 
Barriers 
Mean Time 
until Financial 
Reform 
Occurs  
10.100 9.867 6.644 6.734 6.885 7.264 
SD of Mean 
Years  7.168 7.056 5.072 4.766 5.129 5.186 
Mean No. of 
Financial 
Reform 
Occurring  
0.377 0.318 1.226 1.240 1.108 0.971 
SD of Mean 
No.  0.660 0.587 1.271 1.146 1.139 1.045 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 For details of data construction for conditional time gap model, see Cleves (1999).  
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 It appears that it takes a longer time for financial reforms to occur in such dimensions as 
privatization of banks and enhancement of banking supervision.  It also seems that reforms in 
dimensions of privatization of banks and enhancement of banking supervision occur less often 
relative to the other dimensions of financial reforms.  Nonetheless, these values look relatively 
similar across dimensions.  However, when I examine the correlations between the average years 
until financial reform occurs across dimensions (appended as Appendix 3.D), the correlations 
take values from 0.424 to 0.672.  Therefore, it can be said that each dimension measures 
different timing.  Also, the correlations between the average numbers of failures across each 
dimension vary from 0.133 to 0.466, which is also fairly low (appended as Appendix 3.E).  
Therefore, even if a country conducts a particular dimension of reforms many times, this does 
not necessarily mean that the country also conducts other dimensions of financial reforms.   
Further, the correlations between the pace of financial reforms in each of dimensions and 
the magnitude of financial reforms (additive change scores) and also additive level scores are 
appended as Appendix 3.F.  The correlations vary within a range between 0.003 and 0.164 with 
the magnitude of reforms.  Therefore, the correlations between the two aspects of financial 
reforms, the magnitude and the pace, are fairly low.25   
In order to account for political determinants of the magnitude and the pace of financial 
reforms in the thirty developing countries, in the next section, I explain operationalization of 
independent variables to test the hypotheses listed earlier. 
 
 
                                                 
25 The correlations between the magnitude and the additive level scores range from -0.042 to 
0.228.   
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 3.5. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
3.5.1. International pressures: the IMF’s influence 
 
As stated in Hypotheses 1a and 1b, the IMF’s conditionality programs are assumed to have the 
impact of facilitating a larger magnitude of financial reforms and bring forward the timing of 
financial reforms.  To examine these effects of the Fund’s conditionality programs, the ideal 
indicator would be one which identifies whether financial sector reforms are included in the 
Fund’s conditionality programs; however, this information is compiled as a dataset only after 
1993 even by the IMF itself, and furthermore, these data are not publicly available.26  Therefore, 
given the data availability limitations, I take the “use of IMF credits” as an indicator of the IMF’s 
influence at facilitating a larger magnitude of financial reforms and labeled this as IMF.  The 
data were obtained from World Development Indicators.  I divide these values by total 
population, adjusting for each country’s size, in order to take into account the amount of impact 
of the IMF.27   
 
3.5.2. Political institutions: veto players  
 
Relating to Hypotheses 2a and 2b, in order to examine the conditional effects of veto players or 
how the effects of the IMF in facilitating a larger magnitude of financial reforms and speeding up 
financial reforms in each of the six dimensions is intermediated by the number of veto players, I 
created the variable of Veto Players.  Veto Players are counted as the number of political parties 
                                                 
26 The IMF’s MONA database, the database of the IMF’s conditionality programs, starts from 
1993. 
27  The unit is expressed as the use of IMF credits per 10 populations. 
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 within the executive coalition based on the cabinet portfolio allocation.  The number of veto 
players is based on the situation as of January 1 for each year so that causal direction of the 
occurring of financial reforms during a year is not be reversed.  The information on cabinet 
portfolio was obtained from Political Handbook of the World (various years) and Keesing’s 
Contemporary Archives: Record of World Events (various years).  Values are coded as 0 in cases 
of non-democratic governments, which represents the conceptual notion that an executive leader 
is not constrained by other veto players.28   
By interacting IMF and Veto Players and by accurately estimating conditional 
coefficients, I can explore conditional effects for the IMF given the number of veto players.  I 
assume that as the number of veto players increases, the IMF’s effects on facilitating a larger 
magnitude of financial reforms and speeding up financial reforms decreases.  On the other hand, 
results of the IMF represent the IMF impact when the number of veto players is zero.   
Ideological preferences of veto players, as well as preferential distances from the status 
quo policy are difficult to grasp in the case of developing countries since the data on political 
parties’ ideologies are not available.  Therefore, in order to capture changes in preferences of the 
status quo, I created a dichotomous variable of Alteration of Executives.  Alteration of Executives 
is assigned as one if 1) regime transition such as from a democracy to a non-democracy or a 
democratic breakdown occurs and/or 2) regime transition from a non-democracy to a democracy 
                                                 
28 I used Przeworski et al. (2000)’s coding rules for classifying regime type based on a 
dichotomous variable called REG.  Because the dataset by the Przeworski et al. (2000) only 
covers to 1990, I expanded the year coverage to 2002.  I slightly modified these dummy 
variables by taking into account military influence.  Even if executives are elected by popular 
elections, when an elected executive leader is under strong military influence or one of the 
houses is under strong military influence, the country is coded as a non-democracy; namely, the 
number of veto players is zero.  Coding decisions are also made based on consultation with 
country experts.  This modification does not alter the results.  How regime type is classified for 
the thirty countries from 1973-2002 is appended as Appendix 3.G.   
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 occurs.  Also, when changes in executive leaders’ political parties took place in cases of 
democratic governments, values are also coded as one and are coded as zero otherwise.  Coding 
is based on the situation as of January 1 for each year.   
Data were compiled based on information from Political Handbook of the World (various 
years) and Keesing’s Contemporary Archives: Record of World Events (various years). 
 
3.5.3. Societal factors: the manufacturing sector and the banking sector 
 
To empirically assess the influence of the manufacturing sector on the magnitude and the pace of 
financial reforms, with the expectation that a larger manufacturing sector’s influence facilitates a 
larger magnitude of financial reform (Hypothesis 3a) and brings forward the timing of financial 
reforms (Hypothesis 3b), the ideal indicator would be an indicator to measure the amount of 
political influence.  For example, the industrial concentration ratio that measures the degree to 
which a certain number of firms account for the percentage of industrial output can be a good 
indicator.  However, these data are not available for the thirty countries throughout all thirty 
years.  Therefore, in this study, the influence of the manufacturing sector is operationalized as 
manufacturing sector output as a percentage of GDP, labeled as Manufacturing Sector.  Data 
were obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  Though this is not the 
best indicator to measure the influence of the manufacturing sector, this measurement is widely 
used in conventional studies in the cases of developing countries.29  
Concerning the banking sector’s effects on the magnitude and the pace of financial 
reforms, I hypothesize that as the influence of the banking sector increases, a country is more 
                                                 
29 For example, see Frieden et al. (2001).   
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 likely to conduct a smaller magnitude of financial reforms (Hypothesis 4a) and more likely to 
delay financial reforms (Hypothesis 4b).  To investigate the influence of the Banking Sector, the 
most desirable indicators would be the one to measure political influence.  One good indicator 
can be the bank concentration ratio, which measures the degree to which a certain number of 
banks accounts for banks’ total assets.  However, since the data for bank concentration ratios for 
the thirty developing countries are only available after 1997, I cannot estimate the model for a 
long enough time-period.  Another alternative indicator can be the amount of lobbying 
contributions by the banking sector to political parties or politicians.30  However, these data are 
not available for the countries in this dataset.   
Therefore, I use claims on the government provided by the depository money banks as an 
indicator.31  Claims on the government measures how much money banks lent to governments, 
which is used as a proxy for the banking sector’s influence on governments.  I assume when 
banks lend more money to governments, the banking sector will have a stronger influence over 
the government: hence, banks and governments will collude and will resist to radical financial 
reforms.  Data were obtained from the International Financial Statistics, line 22a.  Values are 
expressed as a percentage of GDP.  To ensure a causal impact of societal sectors on financial 
reforms, one-year lagged values are used for both the Manufacturing Sector and the Banking 
Sector. 
 
 
                                                 
30 Broz (2005) uses this measure, campaign contributions from money center bank political 
action committees (PAC), in examining the influence of U.S. banking sector on the US Congress.   
31 Deposit money banks refer to commercial banks and other financial institutions which accept 
transferable deposits (International Monetary Fund).  
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 3.6. CONTROL VARIABLES 
 
3.6.1. Level of democracy 
 
The first variable to serve as one of the control variables is the effect of the level of democracy 
on the magnitude of financial reforms: namely, whether a less democratic government is more 
likely to facilitating a larger magnitude of financial reforms than a more democratic government 
ceteris paribus.  Regime impact on economic performance has been a central concern for both 
comparativists and IPE scholars.  In the literature of comparative politics, conventional wisdom 
in Latin America suggests that authoritarian governments can produce better economic 
performance such as anti-inflation measures, implying that non-democratic governments are 
more likely to commit to economic reforms than democratic governments (O’Donnell 1973; 
Skidmore 1977; Kaufmann and Stalling 1991).32   
On the other hand, quantitative studies in international political economy provide support 
for the liberal argument, i.e., democratic regimes are more likely to engage in economic 
liberalization than non-democratic regimes.  IPE scholars find that democratic regimes are more 
likely to engage in economic liberalization than non-democratic counterparts in such areas as 
trade (Milner 2005; Frye and Mansfield 2004) and capital account liberalization (Quinn 2000).   
                                                 
32 According to O’Donnell (1973)’s well-known arguments concerning bureaucratic-
authoritarianism, the populist governments in Brazil and Argentina engaged in redistributive 
policies in order to respond to popular sectors’ demands.  However, in the mid-1960s, facing 
economic, political, and social turmoil due to a financial crisis, populist regimes could not take 
effective measures.  Bureaucratic-authoritarianism was a solution for both the military and 
technocrats to help restore political order and redress economic deterioration effectively and 
efficiently.  Thus, conventional wisdom in Latin America suggests that non-democratic 
governments are more likely to commit to neoliberal economic reforms than democratic 
governments.   
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 Yet, interestingly enough, contrary to these studies of the regime impact on economic 
reforms conducted by IPE scholars, which use a large number of states as cases, comparative 
political economists have demonstrated that regime effects on economic policy outcomes is in 
fact nil with respect to economic growth (Przeworski et al. 2000) and tax extraction capability in 
quantitative studies (Cheibub 1998), for example.   
A non-democratic government may be more likely to adopt a larger scale of reforms at 
one time than a democratic government because political leaders of non-democratic governments 
do not necessarily have to obtain majority support to conduct a large magnitude of reforms.  If 
financial reforms are perceived to be indispensable for leaders in a non-democratic country, the 
absence of a legislative body or the presence of a mere puppet-like legislature will make it easier 
for leaders of non-democratic governments than democratic governments to conduct a larger 
magnitude of financial reforms.  In a democratic country, on the other hand, constituency support 
and legislature consent are necessary to conduct a large scale of financial reforms.  Therefore, 
even if a government perceives a necessity to conduct radical financial reforms, it would be more 
difficult for a democratic government to conduct a large scale of financial reforms at one time 
than a non-democratic government.  Hence, I examine the impact of Level of Democracy with 
the expectation that a less democratic government may engage in a big bang type of financial 
reform.   
Concerning the effect of level of democracy on the pace of financial reforms, I examine 
whether a less democratic government is more likely to bring forward the timing of financial 
reforms than a more democratic government ceteris paribus.  A non-democratic government can 
affect reform in two ways.  It can commit financial reforms at a faster pace by suppressing 
popular sector demands, or a non-democratic government may delay financial reforms by 
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 maintaining repressive financial policies if political elites continuously collude with particular 
sectors who oppose financial reform measures.  A democratic government, on the other hand, 
has a system with checks and balances, a democracy will reduce the discretionary power of 
political elites.  In addition, politicians in a democratic country will likely be vulnerable to 
societal pressures in order to maximize political tenure; hence, financial reforms can be delayed.  
Therefore, I examine whether level of democracy matters in terms of the pace of financial 
reforms by holding other conditions constant.   
In order to measure regime impact, I use Freedom House’s indicator, a continuous 
variable measuring Level of Democracy.33  I added the scores for political rights and civil rights, 
and reversed the coding direction, which resulted in continuous scores from two (least 
democratic) to fourteen (most democratic).  A larger value indicates a more democratic 
country.34  The correlation between Veto Players and Level of Democracy is 0.405.35 
                                                
 
3.6.2. US aid 
 
Another possible international factor that may shape the magnitude and the pace of financial 
reforms in developing countries is the influence of the United States, namely the effects of US 
Aid.  Stone (2002) reports a large impact of US aid on macroeconomic outcomes in East 
European countries independent from the impact of the IMF.  If a country benefits from official 
 
33  Data is downloadable from the Freedom House website at http://www.freedomhouse.org, 
accessed on March 21, 2007.  
34 Originally, scores of the Political Rights and the Civil Liberty are coded from one (most 
democratic) to seven (least democratic) in each dimension.  I reversed the coding direction.  
35 Correlation between Veto Players and Przeworski et al. (2000)’s extended dichotomous REG 
variable is 0.689.  The use of REG variable instead of Level of Democracy does not alter the 
main results in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.   
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 development assistance from the US in a targeted policy area, a country may engage in financial 
reforms.  Therefore, I examine the effects of US aid targeted on the financial sector and the 
business sector on financial reforms since I am interested in both the manufacturing sector and 
the banking sector.  I assume that as a state receives a larger amount of the US aid for the 
financial sector and the manufacturing sector, a state will encourage a larger scale of financial 
reforms at one time and will quicken the pace of financial reforms.  In this vein, US aid may 
have an effect as another source of external factors to encourage a larger scale of financial 
reforms at one time.  For coding US Aid, data are taken from the International Development 
Statistics (IDS) Online Databases on aid and other resource flows.36  Values are expressed in 
$1000 and deflated based on the year 2002. 
  
3.6.3.  Macroeconomic factors 
 
To account for other factors which may affect the occurrence of financial reforms, various 
macroeconomic conditions are also considered as control variables to account for financial 
reforms.  The first variable is Currency Crisis.  Abiad and Mody (2005) report that currency 
crises are the main determinants to shape financial reforms.  Also, other economists (Rodrik 
1994; Krueger 1993) have argued that currency crises are the main facilitator of economic 
reforms or currency-induced economic reforms.  Hence, as a control variable, a dummy variable 
of currency crises is included.  Dummy variables of currency crises were created based on the 
market pressure index, which is calculated based on the change in exchange rates and the change 
                                                 
36 Available at www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline, access on March 21, 2007.  
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 in foreign reserves.  Data are taken from Cerra and Saxena (2005).37  As currency crises may 
cause reversal of financial reforms in the short run (Abiad and Mody 2005), but in the long run 
may facilitate financial reforms, current values, one-year lagged values, and two-year lagged 
values are used to take into account both the short-term and long-term impact of currency crises 
on financial reforms.  Although Currency Crisis will be more likely to cause the reversal toward 
a repressed financial system in the short run (t), in the long run (t-1 and t-2), I expect that 
currency crises will cause a larger scale and faster pace of financial reforms.   
Also, economic growth, a country’s level of economic development and a country’s 
market size are considered to be control variables.  The role of economic growth on financial 
reforms is arguable.  Regarding GDP growth, states may induce a larger scale and a faster pace 
of financial reforms in good macroeconomic conditions since it will be easier to pay the costs of 
reforms, but states may also conduct a larger scale and a faster pace of reforms under recession, 
facing the pressing need to earn domestic and foreign capitals.  Economic growth, labeled as 
GDP Growth, is operationalized as real economic growth rate.   
With respect to the level of economic development, labeled as GDP per capita, a more 
developed country will induce a larger scale and a faster pace of financial reforms than a less 
developed country.  A country’s economic development is operationalized as logged GDP per 
capita, expressed in the unit of $1000 US.  With respect to a country’s market size, labeled as 
Country Size, a state with a smaller domestic market size will be more likely to induce a larger 
scale and a faster pace of financial reforms than a state with a larger domestic market, since a 
small state needs to earn capital by liberalizing its domestic market.  Country Size is captured by 
using the logged values of GDP expressed in current US million dollars.  Data for GDP per 
                                                 
37 I thank Sweta Saxena for providing me with the dataset.  For details of coding scheme for 
dummy variables of currency crises, see Cerra and Saxena (2005).   
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 capita, real economic growth, and GDP were obtained from World Development Indicators.  
One-year lagged variables are used in each case to avoid endogeneity problem.   
 
3.6.4. Other factors 
 
In addition to these macroeconomic factors, the total number of seats in the lower house of the 
legislative body is taken into account as a control variable.  If a country has a larger number of 
seats, a country tends to have a greater number of parties, whereas if a country has a smaller 
number of seats, a country tends to have a smaller number of parties.  Hence, in order to avoid 
the inflated estimates of the impact of the number of political parties within cabinets, the total 
seats of the lower house, labeled as Total Seats, is also included as a control variable.   
Data are based on the situation as of January 1 for each year, and the information was 
obtained from Raga and Pérez-Liñán’s dataset, Legislatures in Latin America (1945-2001), for 
Latin American countries and from Political Handbook of the World (various years) for other 
countries.38  
Further, lagged level scores of financial reforms are also entered, with the expectation 
that a country with a higher previous level of financial reforms is less likely to conduct financial 
reforms.   
 
 
 
                                                 
38 I thank Anibal Pérez-Liñán for providing me with this dataset.   
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 3.7. METHODOLOGY 
 
First, in order to statistically explore determinants of the magnitude of financial reforms, I 
employ ordinal logit regressions.  As dependent variables (the additive change score of six 
dimensions) are categorical variables that can be ranked, ordinal logit regression is the 
appropriate method to use.  A full statistical model is presented below in equation (1). 
 
Magnitude of financial reforms = β 0 + β 1*IMF+ β 2* IMF×veto players + β 3 *veto 
players+β 4 *alteration of executives +β 5* manufacturing sector + β 6* banking sector 
+ β 7* level of democracy+β 8* US aid+ β 9* currency crises +β 10* currency crises (t-1) 
+ β 11* currency crises (t-2) +β 12*GDP growth + β 13*GDP per capita + β 14* country 
size + β 15* total seats   (1) 
 
Using time-series-cross-section data with a categorical dependent variable causes a 
violation against the assumption of time independent observations in logit regression models.  
Therefore, in order to correct for any time dependence problem, following a recommendation by 
Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998, 1271) and Beck (2001, 129), I estimate models with year dummy 
variables.  Also, the lagged level values of dependent variables are included to further correct for 
any temporal dependent problems.  In addition, in order to account for heteroskedasticity 
problems, statistical estimations are clustered by country, and Huber (robust) standard errors are 
used to estimate statistical significance.  Results are presented in the eighth section. 
Second, in order to analyze the political determinants of the pace of financial reforms, the 
methodology that I employ is event history analysis.  Event history analysis makes it possible to 
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 examine what factors facilitate or hinder financial reforms by directly modeling the duration of 
times until financial reforms occur, as opposed to a cross sectional time series analysis, where 
temporal structures of an event occurring are often ignored (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997).  
While various ways of modeling event history are possible, in this study I use the Cox model.  
Since the relationship between covariates and hazard rates (when a country is likely to conduct 
financial reform while other countries are not) is my interest rather than predicting when a 
reform is adopted within a legislative session, the discrete time method using Cox models is a 
suitable methodology to employ rather than a continuous time method (Box-Steffensmeier and 
Jones 1997, 1424).  The hazard rate is defined as the probability of an event occurring given the 
event has not occurred yet, and the hazard rate for the “i” th country is defined as exponents of 
coefficients as follows (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).   
)'exp()()( XXithothi β=   
In the Cox model, h0(t) is not parameterized.  The advantage of using a Cox model over 
other parametric models of event history analysis and logit estimates is that a Cox model does 
not have to make any assumptions about any specific forms of baseline hazard function (Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez 2002).39 
                                                 
39 In a Cox model, the hazard ratio of two the hazards is fixed, expressed as follows: 
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Hence, if we take the log, we obtain the following expression and as seen, the Cox model 
does not have an intercept, since the baseline hazard is unspecified.   
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The Cox partial likelihood function is obtained by taking the product of the conditional 
probability of an event occurring at time t, given the number of cases facing an event risk at time 
t.  We can obtain coefficient estimates by maximizing the log of the partial likelihood function 
(Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). 
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 I model financial reforms as repeated events using a conditional risk gap time model.  
Financial reforms are not a single event.  For example, in time t1, a country may allow foreign 
banks entry in a limited manner by allowing 49% of bank shares’ ownership.  Then, in time t2, 
this country may fully liberalize foreign bank entry by allowing 100% bank shares’ ownership.  
Also, privatization of banks may occur many times.  Thus, a country may commit to financial 
reforms many times.  In this vein, the usual event history analysis in which the event occurring 
(failure) is modeled as a single event is not a suitable strategy for modeling financial reforms.  
Rather, it is reasonable to think that financial reforms may occur many times over years.  Thus, 
the advantage of the use of a conditional risk gap time model is that it can take into account 
repeatability of financial reforms.  Namely, the second financial reform is conditioned upon the 
first financial reform.  Without the first financial reform, the second financial reform will not 
happen.  Specifically, I use a conditional risk gap model in which the “gap” refers to the time 
interval between successive financial reforms (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).  The hazard 
rate for “k” th financial reforms clustered in “i” th country and also stratified by the number of 
financial reforms is expressed as follows:  
  Xkiokk thth 'exp)()( β=
In the conditional gap model, the hazard rates are allowed to differ by the number of 
events occurring (financial reforms).  The Cox model is used to estimate the conditional gap time 
model.  Results are presented in the ninth section. 
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 3.8. RESULTS: MAGNITUDE OF FINANCIAL REFORMS 
 
In the first section, the results for determinants of magnitude of financial reforms after 
employing ordinal logit regressions are presented.  In the second section, I discuss findings on 
the magnitude of financial reforms.   
 
3.8.1. Results 
 
Table 3.3, presented below, reports the results of predictors of the magnitude of financial reforms 
employing ordinal regressions.   
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 Table 3.3 Predictors of Magnitude of Financial Reforms 
 
Variables  Model 1.  Model 2.  Model 3. 
IMF 0.071**(0.032) 0.060**(0.030) 0.063**(0.029) 
Veto Player x IMF  -0.045**(0.023) -0.042**(0.021) -0.043**(0.020) 
 
Veto Player  
 
0.067 (0.064) 
 
0.083 (0.066) 
 
0.065 (0.062) 
Alteration of Executive  0.192 (0.231) 0.118 (0.244) 0.118 (0.243) 
    
Manufacturing Sector  0.040**(0.013) 0.041**(0.014) 0.038**(0.013) 
Banking Sector  0.010 (0.011) 0.007 (0.013) 0.012 (0.011) 
    
Level of Democracy -0.081** (0.037) -0.082** (0.034) -0.080** (0.035) 
US Aid  0.002 (0.001)  
Currency Crisis  -0.328** (0.140) -0.326** (0.146) 
Currency Crisis (t-1)  0.333** (0.162) 0.354** (0.171) 
Currency Crisis (t-2)  0.337** (0.155) 0.351**(0.159) 
GDP growth   -0.013 (0.020)  
GDP per capita  0.019 (0.019)  
Country Size  -0.041 (0.042)  
Total Seats  0.00006 (0.0005)  
Lagged Level of 
Reforms -0.113***(0.019) -0.115***(0.021) -0.108***(0.020) 
        
No. of observations 830 830 830 
Log Pseudo-
Likelihood -985.839 -978.776 -979.880 
 Pseudo R Square 0.047 0.0538 0.0528 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; and *p<0.10.  Entries are coefficients and robust standard errors are in 
parentheses.  Significance is based on 2-tailed tests.  Coefficients of year dummies and cut 
points are not reported.   
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 Model 1 represents the result for the major variables that I am interested in as well as the 
level of democracy and the lagged level of reforms.  With respect to the impact of the IMF, IMF 
represents the impact of the IMF when the number of veto players is zero.  A country under IMF 
influence with no constraints by veto players is prone to engage in a larger magnitude of 
financial reforms, which is statistically significant, as can be seen in Model 1.   
In addition, concerning the interaction effects between the IMF and Veto Players, as 
hypothesized, the IMF’s effects on facilitating a larger magnitude of financial reforms are 
contingent upon the number of veto players.  Conditional odds ratios for the IMF given the 
number of veto players, estimating the interaction effects between Veto Players and IMF on the 
magnitude of financial reforms, are displayed below as Figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.3 Magnitude of Financial Reforms: Conditional Odds Ratio for the IMF Given the 
Number of Veto Players (Model 1) 
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 These conditional effects for the IMF given the number of veto players show statistical 
significance when the number of veto players is zero (two tailed significance at a 0.05 level), one 
(two tailed significance at a 0.1 level), three (one tailed significance), and from four to nine (two 
tailed significance at a 0.1 level).  As the number of veto players increases, the IMF’s effect on 
inducing a wider range of financial reforms decreases.  As to societal pressures, an impact of the 
Banking Sector cannot be observed.  However, with respect to the impact of the Manufacturing 
Sector, as predicted, a country which has a stronger manufacturing sector tends to undertake a 
larger magnitude of financial reform.   
Model 2 shows the results for the full model with control variables.  In model 2, like in 
Model 1, IMF, which represents the IMF’s effects in the case when the number of veto players is 
zero, shows significant impact.  With respect to the interaction term between IMF and Veto 
Players, Figure 3.4, shown below, displays the conditional odds ratios for the IMF given the 
number of veto players in Model 2.  
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Figure 3.4 Magnitude of Financial Reforms: Conditional Odds Ratio for the IMF Given the 
Number of Veto Players (Model 2) 
 
 
After entering control variables, statistical significance improved compared with Model 1.  
As shown above, the conditional effects for the IMF show statistical significance when the 
number of veto players is one and two (one tailed significance), from three to four (two tailed 
significance at a 0.1 level), and from five to nine (two tailed significance at a 0.05 level).  In 
terms of the interaction effects between IMF and Veto Players, as the number of veto players 
increases, the IMF’s influence on facilitating a larger magnitude of reform is more likely to 
decrease, which provide supports for Hypothesis 2a.  Thus, the influence of the IMF in 
facilitating a larger scale of financial reforms is conditioned by number of veto players.  With 
respect to societal actors’ influences, while the Banking Sector does not have a significant impact 
in determining magnitude of financial reforms, the Manufacturing Sector has a significant effect 
 as hypothesized.  For a standard deviation increase in the Manufacturing Sector, the odds of 
having a greater magnitude of financial reforms are 1.28 times greater, holding all other variables 
constant. 
With respect to the influence of the control variable, Level of Democracy, looking at 
whether the degree of democracy matters in determining the magnitude of financial reforms 
holding other conditions constant, the results indicate that a more democratic government is less 
likely to conduct a larger scale of financial reforms at one time, holding other variables constant.  
For every standard deviation decrease in the score of Level of Democracy, meaning that a 
country is moving toward a less democratic condition, the odds of having a larger magnitude of 
financial reforms are 1.25 times greater, holding other variables constant. 
Concerning the effects of another control variable, US Aid, examining with an 
expectation that a country which receives a greater amount of US aid in the financial sector and 
the business sector is more likely to engage in a larger magnitude of financial reforms, is only 
significant at a one-tailed level.  With respect to macroeconomic factors, Currency Crisis affects 
the magnitude of financial reforms.  As expected, a Currency Crisis in a concurrent year 
significantly reduces the magnitude of financial reforms, while a Currency Crisis in the previous 
year increases it.  A two-year prior Currency Crisis is also likely to increase the magnitude of 
financial reforms, which is statistically significant at a 0.05 level.   
 In Model 3, insignificant control variables are dropped from the full model, and it shows 
results that are similar to those in Model 2.  The conditional odds ratios, which again shows how 
the IMF’s effects are intermediated by the number of veto players, are statistically significant 
when the number of veto players is zero (two tailed significance at a 0.05 level), one (one tailed 
significance), three to five (two tailed significance at a 0.1 level), and from six to nine (two tailed 
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 significance at a 0.05 level) as shown below as Figure 3.5.  Thus, the conditional effects show 
statistical significance and the results remains intact. 
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Figure 3.5 Magnitude of Financial Reforms: Conditional Odds Ratio for the IMF Given 
the Number of Veto Players (Model 3) 
 
 
 Next, using Model 2, I calculate predicted probability of the financial reform where the 
values of additive change index equal five for interested variables of the IMF and the 
Manufacturing Sector, and the other significant control variable, Level of Democracy, shown as 
Table 3.4 below. 
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 Table 3.4 Predicted Probability of Financial Reforms  
Variables Predicted Probability  
 Minimum Value Maximum Value 
IMF 0.003 0.062 
Manufacturing Sector 0.002 0.008 
Level of Democracy 0.006 0.002 
 
 
The results for the IMF show the effects of the IMF when the number of veto players is 
zero.  When there is no IMF effect, which is shown as the minimum value, predicted probability 
of financial reform with change score five is 0.003, holding all other variables constant at their 
means.  When the IMF has the maximum value, predicted probability is 0.062, holding all other 
variables constant at their means.  Concerning the impact of the Manufacturing Sector, when the 
manufacturing sector moves from the minimum value to the maximum value, predicted 
probability changes from 0.002 to 0.008, holding other variables constant at their means.  In 
terms of Level of Democracy, when the level of democracy moves from the least democratic to 
the most democratic, predicted probability decreases from 0.006 to 0.002.  Though these 
predicted probabilities seem small, the effects of these variables are substantive.  When I 
calculate the ratio of change, by moving from the minimum value to the maximum value of each 
variable, results yield the numbers 19.7, 3, -0.67 respectively.   
 
3.8.2. Discussion 
 
This section presents the results concerning under which conditions a country is more likely to 
engage in a larger magnitude of financial reforms at one time.  As discussed before, previous 
research on financial reforms remains scarce except in regards to capital account liberalization.  
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 Results demonstrate that as I hypothesized, even rigorously controlling the impact of currency 
crises, a country is more likely to engage in a larger magnitude of financial reform when a 
country is under the IMF programs.  However, while participation in the Fund conditionality 
programs increases the likelihood of a government conducting a larger scale of financial reforms, 
this effect of the IMF is contingent upon the number of veto players.  As the number of veto 
players increases, the IMF’s influence on a country to engage in a wider range of reforms tends 
to decrease.  Hence, although the IMF’s influence plays the leading role in explaining the 
magnitude of financial reforms in developing countries, domestic political factors, the number of 
veto players, also matter in that they intermediate the effects of the IMF.  
Concerning societal pressures, while there is no impact of the banking sector, a country 
which has a stronger manufacturing sector tends to be more prone to engage in a wider range of 
financial reforms at the same time.  Therefore, with respect to societal factors, a country which 
has a stronger manufacturing sector is likely to engage in a greater magnitude of financial 
reforms.  However, there is no significant effect of the banking sector in shaping the magnitude 
of financial reforms.  Therefore, results concerning the banking sector are disappointing.  Thus, 
the evidence of the impact of societal pressures is mixed.   
Although regime type per se is not a main interest in this study, a less democratic 
government is more likely to take a path of larger magnitude of reforms than a more democratic 
government ceteris paribus.  While New Zealand is held up as an example of a “big-bang” type 
of financial reform in highly developed countries, in the case of developing countries, a political 
leader in a non-democratic country is more likely to take more drastic measures than a 
democratic government when necessary.  However, since this study uses only thirty cases, this 
finding cannot be called generalizable enough.  Further studies will be needed to explore the 
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 relationship between regime type and the magnitude of financial reforms in order to decisively 
conclude the impact of regime type per se.  In the next section, I turn to the results of the pace of 
financial reforms.   
 
 
3.9.  RESULTS: PACE OF FINANCIAL REFORMS 
 
In this section, I present the results concerning the predictors of the pace of financial reforms in 
each of the six dimensions of financial reforms, respectively.  Before presenting the full results, I 
present the summary of findings in the next sub-section, 3.9.1.  Third, I present the detailed 
results in each of the six dimensions of financial reforms.  Fourth, I present the results using an 
alternative indicator of veto players, POLCONIII (Henisz 2002).  This measurement, 
POLCONIII, takes into accounts both partisan veto players and institutional veto players.40 
 
3.9.1. Summary of findings 
 
This section presents the summary of findings before turning to the detailed results in each of the 
six dimensions in the subsequent section.  I especially present findings by focusing on the 
interaction effects between the IMF programs and the number of veto players.  Table 3.5, 
displayed below, exhibits the degree to which the hypothesized conditional effects for the IMF 
given the number of veto players are upheld by statistical analyses.   
                                                 
40  This measure, POLCONIII, takes into account the number of independent branches of 
government (i.e., executive, lower and upper legislative chambers) as well as the party 
composition of the executive and legislative branches.  
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 Table 3.5 Summary of Findings: Conditional Effects for the IMF Given the Number of 
Veto Players in Six Dimensions of Financial Reforms 
 
  Privatization of Banks Enhancement of Banking Supervision 
Capital Account 
Liberalization 
Measurement 
of veto players  All cases  Democracy All cases Democracy All cases Democracy 
Number of 
political parties 
within an 
executive 
coalition 
_ _ _ _ _ _ 
POLCONIII _ _ _ _ _ _ 
        
  Interest Rate Liberalization 
Elimination of Credit 
Controls 
Elimination of Entry 
Barriers 
Measurement 
of veto players  All cases  Democracy All cases Democracy All cases Democracy 
Number of 
political parties 
within an 
executive 
coalition 
_ _ _ _   
POLCONIII  _    _ 
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 Since I test the hypothesis 2b using two measurements for the number of veto players, the 
number of political parties within an executive coalition and POLCONIII, in both using all cases 
and democratic cases respectively, results are summarized accordingly.  Bold minus signs show 
statistically significant results for the hypothesis, whereas blank cells show no significance.  
When the number of political parties within an executive coalition is used as an indicator of veto 
players, results show that the hypothesis was confirmed in five dimensions (privatization of 
banks, enhancement of banking supervision, capital account liberalization, interest rate 
liberalization, and elimination of credit controls) ,excluding only the dimension of elimination of 
entry barriers on banks.   
Also, when POLCONIII is used in estimating models, results support the conditional 
effects for the IMF intermediated by the number of veto players in three dimensions 
(privatization of banks, enhancement of banking supervision, and capital account liberalization) 
when using all cases, and five dimensions (privatization of banks, enhancement of banking 
supervision, capital account liberalization, interest rate liberalization, and elimination of entry 
barriers on banks) when using democratic cases, respectively.   Hence, the results show that the 
IMF effects on accelerating the pace of financial reforms decrease as the number of veto players 
increases, which is well supported by quantitative analysis.   
Beside the findings on the interaction effects between the IMF and the number of veto 
players, concerning the societal impacts on the pace of financial reforms, results with respect to 
the manufacturing sector are also well supported in four dimensions out of six (privatization of 
banks, capital account liberalization, interest rate liberalization, and elimination of entry barriers), 
especially when using all cases.  However, concerning the results for the banking sector, I was 
not able to obtain statistically significant effects in most dimensions.  In the subsequent sub-
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 sections, I present the results of statistical analysis in each of the six dimensions in more detail. 
To do so, as discussed in the seventh section, the conditional risk gap time model, using a Cox 
model, is employed for assessing the impact of the IMF, the number of veto players, and interest 
groups on the pace of financial reforms.  Estimates are clustered by country, and Huber (robust) 
standard errors are used in order to take into account any temporal dependence of time varying 
covariates.  Efron methods are used in order to handle tied events.  Estimates are stratified 
according to the number of financial reforms in order to take into account financial reforms 
occurring multiple times.   
 
3.9.2. Privatization of banks 
 
Table 3.6, shown below, reports the results of predictors of the pace of privatization of banks 
estimated by the conditional risk gap time model.   
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 Table 3.6 Conditional Gap Time Model: Predictors of Privatization of Banks, 1974-2002 
Variables 
Model (1-1) 
Privatization of 
Banks           
(All Cases) 
Model (1-2) 
Privatization of 
Banks          
(All Cases) 
Model (1-3) 
Privatization of 
Banks         
(Democracy) 
Model (1-4) 
Privatization 
of Banks       
(Democracy) 
IMF  0.074** (0.054) 0.090** (0.045)  0.137** (0.063)  0.113** (0.047) 
Veto Player x IMF -0.004 (0.003) -0.016 (0.026) -0.024 (0.028) -0.023 (0.023) 
     
Veto Player  -0.062 (0.205) -0.099 (0.166) 0.009 (0.216) -0.095 (0.158) 
Alteration of Executive  -0.203 (0.491) -0.225 (0.474) -0.327 (0.500) -0.300 (0.511) 
     
Manufacturing Sector  0.147***(0.041) 0.144***(0.039) 0.183***(0.051) 0.130***(0.040) 
Banking Sector 0.024 (0.042) 0.008 (0.041) 0.003 (0.006) 0.055 (0.056) 
     
Level of Democracy  -0.098 (0.108)  -0.279* (0.162) -0.082 (0.133) 
US Aid -0.007 (0.005)  0.003 (0.006)  
Currency Crisis 0.125 (0.426)  -0.057 (0.415)  
Currency Crisis (t-1) 0.554* (0.323) 0.524* (0.275) 0.344 (0.394)  
Currency Crisis (t-2) 0.781 (0.514) 0.875** (0.370)  1.348** (0.582)  1.238** (0.565) 
GDP growth 0.018 (0.050)  0.063 (0.055)  
GDP per capita  -0.339** (0.144) -0.368** (0.123) -0.461**(0.189) -0.399** (0.152)
Country Size 0.091 (0.228)  0.100 (0.268)  
Total Seats -0.002 (0.002)  -0.005 (0.003)  
Lagged Level of Reforms -0.633** (0.306) -0.560** (0.275) - 0.546 (0.630) - 0.601 (0.546) 
          
No. of observations 830 830 433 433 
No. of failures 35 35 23 23 
Time at Risk 8511 8511 4744 4744 
Log Pseudo-Likelihood  -136.09 -138.24 -76.084 -79.406 
Wald Chi Square 133.36 53.27 103.25 37.77 
Prob.> Chi Square 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; and *p<0.10.  Entries are coefficients and robust standard errors are in 
parentheses.  Significance is based on 2-tailed tests. 
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 Model 1-1 represents the results of the pace of privatization of banks for all cases, 
including all cases.  Model 1-2 shows the results where insignificant control variables in Model 
1-1 are dropped.  Model 1-3 exhibits the results using only democratic cases with all main and 
control variables, and Model 1-4 shows the results for democratic cases where insignificant 
control variables in Model 1-3 are dropped.  In all of the models, the IMF represents the impact 
of the IMF on the pace of privatization of banks when the number of veto players is zero.  In all 
four models, IMF is statistically significant at a 0.05 level.  Hence, the IMF tends to facilitate the 
privatization of banks when the number of veto players is zero.   
Concerning the interaction term between the IMF and Veto Players, when the conditional 
hazard ratio for the IMF given the number of veto players is calculated, significant effects are 
uncovered.  Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7 display how the effects of the IMF on bringing forward the 
timing of privatization of banks is conditioned upon the number of veto players in Model 1-1 and 
in Model 1-3, respectively.   
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Figure 3.6 Privatization of Banks: Conditional Hazard Ratio for the IMF Given the 
Number of Veto Players (Model 1-1: All Cases) 
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Figure 3.7 Privatization of Banks: Conditional Hazard Ratio for the IMF Given the 
Number of Veto Players (Model 1-3: Democracy Only) 
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 In both Model 1-1 and Model 1-3, as the number of veto players increases, the IMF’s 
influence in setting the pace of privatization of banks tends to decrease, which is statistically 
significant when the number of veto players is zero, one, and two in both Model 1-1 and Model 
1-3.  Though the results of Model 1-2 and Model 1-4 are not reported here, the results remain the 
same.  Thus, the IMF’s effect in accelerating the privatization of banks tends to be decreased as 
the number of veto players increases.   
With respect to the influence of interest groups, while there is no significant impact of the 
Banking Sector, the Manufacturing Sector tends to have a significant impact on facilitating 
privatization of banks in all four models as hypothesized.  A one percent increase in the 
manufacturing sector increases the hazard by 15.8 % in Model 1-1 and by 20.1 % in Model 1-3.  
As expected, a country which has a stronger Manufacturing Sector tends to privatize banks at a 
faster pace because privatization of banks will provide better credit conditions to the 
manufacturing sector.  
Besides these key variables, as expected, Currency Crisis also significantly affects the 
pace of privatization of banks.  A previous year Currency Crisis facilitates privatization of banks 
in Model 1-1 and Model 1-2.  Also, in Model 1-2, Model 1-3, and Model 1-4, the currency crisis 
the year before that significantly facilitated privatization of banks, which suggests currency crisis 
induces reform in the long-run.  Also, results of GDP per capita suggest that a country tends to 
delay privatization of banks when the level of economic development is high.   
 
3.9.3. Banking supervision 
 
Table 3.7 presents estimated results of predictors of the pace of the enhancement of banking 
supervision over the banking sector, employing a conditional gap time model.   
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 Table 3.7 Conditional Gap Time Model: Predictors of Banking Supervision 
 
Variables 
 Model (2-1) 
Banking 
Supervision      
(All Cases) 
Model (2-2)  
Banking 
Supervision      
(All Cases) 
Model (2-3)  
Banking 
Supervision      
(Democracy) 
 Model (2-4) 
Banking 
Supervision      
(Democracy) 
IMF 0.135**(0.061) 0.124**(0.060) 0.180* (0.099) 0.167** (0.067) 
Veto Player x IMF  -0.048 (0.036) -0.046 (0.036) -0.061 (0.052) -0.070* (0.036) 
     
Veto Player  0.169 (0.108) 0.144 (0.118) 0.081 (0.204) 0.165 (0.155) 
Alteration of Executive   -0.006 (0.376)  -0.120 (0.397)   0.148 (0.393)   0.182 (0.357) 
     
Manufacturing Sector 0.068 (0.048) 0.061* (0.035) 0.138* (0.078)    0.082* (0.047)    
Banking Sector 0.032 (0.056) 0.041 (0.046)  0.027 (0.092)  0.022 (0.098) 
     
Level of Democracy 0.029 (0.117)  -0.094 (0.239)  
US Aid 0.003 (0.003)  -0.003 (0.011)  
Currency Crisis -0.800* (0.422) -0.806* (0.427) -0.395 (0.476)  
Currency Crisis (t-1) 0.560* (0.317) 0.600* (0.324)  0.538 (0.434)    
Currency Crisis (t-2) 0.179 (0.304)     0.659** (0.316)    0.433 (0.368)   
GDP growth 0.020 (0.042)   0.089 (0.088)   
GDP per capita   -0.077* (0.045)  -0.067** (0.030) -0.123 (0.180)  
Country Size 0.068 (0.268)  -0.263 (0.394)  
Total Seats -0.001 (0.002)  0.001 (0.002)  
Lagged Level of 
Reforms 
 -4.381*** 
(0.866)   
 -4.421*** 
(0.753)   
 - 4.546** 
(1.610)   
-4.830*** 
( 1.132)   
No. of observations 830 830 433 433 
No. of failures 45 45 33 33 
Time at Risk 8234 8234 4663 4663 
Log  Pseudo-Likelihood -156.222 -157.233 -95.284 -98.872 
Wald Chi Square 183.72 109.29 250.25 35.69 
Prob.> Chi Square 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; and *p<0.10.  Entries are coefficients and robust standard errors are in 
parentheses.  Significance is based on 2-tailed tests. 
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 Model 2-1 represents results for all cases, and as with the first set of models, Model 2-2 
represents the results of all cases in which insignificant control variables are dropped from 
Model 2-1.  Model 2-3 is the result for only democratic cases and in Model 2-4, insignificant 
control variables are dropped from Model 2-3.   
Concerning the IMF variables, the hazard of occurrence of enhancement of the banking 
supervision over the banking sector is 1.14 times greater in Model 2-1 and 1.13 times greater in 
Model 2-2, meaning that IMF influence speeds up the enhancement of banking supervision over 
the banking sector when the number of veto player is zero.  This suggests that the IMF’s 
conditionality programs are the major source for facilitating the enhancement of banking 
supervision.  
Figures 3.8 and Figure 3.9 illustrate how the IMF effects on the pace of the enhancement 
of banking supervision over the banking sector is conditioned upon the number of veto players 
using all cases (Model 2-1) and only democratic cases (Model 2-3), respectively.   
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Figure 3.8 Banking Supervision: Conditional Hazard Ratio for the IMF Given the umber 
of Veto Players (Model 2-1: All Cases) 
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Figure 3.9 Banking Supervision: Conditional Hazard Ratio for the IMF Given the Number 
of Veto Players (Model 2-3: Democracy Only) 
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 As shown above, the IMF’s significant impact on the enhancement of banking 
supervision is intermediated by the number of veto players as well as by the dimension of 
privatization of banks.  As the number of veto players increases, the IMF’s role in facilitating the 
enhancement of banking supervision tends to decrease, which is significant when the number of 
veto players is zero, one, and two in both Model 2-1 (Figure 3.8) and Model 2-3 (Figure 3.9).  
These results also hold for Model 2-2 and Model 2-4.   
Concerning the societal impacts of the Manufacturing Sector and the Banking Sector, I 
assumed both sectors would oppose the enhancement of banking supervision because both 
sectors would like to engage in lending and credit activities without intervention by a banking 
supervisory agency.  However, contrary to expectations, results from Models 2-2 to Model 2-4 
indicate that an increase in the influence of the manufacturing sector tends to facilitate the 
enhancement of banking supervision, though it is not significant in Model 2-1.  It may be related 
to the fact that a stronger manufacturing sector may mean a country has enough technological 
and human capacity for enhancing banking supervision.  In regard to the Banking Sector, I was 
not able to obtain expected results as well for the dimension of privatization of banks. 
Concerning macroeconomic factors, Currency Crisis shapes the pace of the enhancement 
of banking supervision.  A current year currency crisis delays enhancement of banking 
supervision while a previous year crisis facilitates these reforms, as shown in Model 2-1 and 
Model 2-2.  However, in Model 2-3, using only democratic cases, 2-year lagged currency crisis 
facilitates the enhancement of banking supervision, though this is not robust when other control 
variables are dropped from the model, seen as Model 2-4.   
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 3.9.4. Capital account liberalization 
 
Results concerning predictors of the pace of capital account liberalization, which most 
conventional studies have concentrated on, are presented above as Table 3.8.  Model 3-1 shows 
results using all cases and Model 3-2 shows results using all cases without insignificant control 
variables.  Model 3-3 and Model 3-4 display the results using only democratic cases.  In Model 
3-4, insignificant control variables are dropped from Model 3-3.   
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 Table 3.8 Conditional Gap Time Model: Predictors of Capital Account Liberalization 
Variables  
(Model 3-1) 
Capital Account 
Liberalization (All 
Cases) 
(Model 3-2) 
Capital Account 
Liberalization (All 
Cases) 
(Model 3-3)  
Capital Account 
Liberalization 
(Democracy) 
(Model 3-4)  
Capital Account 
Liberalization 
(Democracy) 
IMF 0.085** (0.040) 0.072* (0.041) 0.090 (0.060) 0.094* (0.053) 
Veto Player x IMF  -0.052** (0.026) -0.057** (0.027) -0.074*(0.038) -0.070* (0.037) 
     
Veto Player  0.143 (0.092) 0.070 (0.092)  0.150 (0.126)  0.159 (0.129) 
Alteration of Executive  0.921***(0.290) 0.950**(0.351) 0.873** (0.536) 0.780** (0.342) 
     
Manufacturing Sector  0.074** (0.028) 0.051** (0.027) -0.002 (0.052) 0.001 (0.034) 
Banking Sector 0.030 (0.029) 0.016 (0.030) 0.037 (0.044) 0.023 (0.046) 
     
US Aid 0.001 (0.003)  0.018** (0.005) 0.013** (0.005) 
Level of Democracy 0.107 (0.079)  -0.042 (0.196)  
Currency Crisis -0.373 (0.346)  -0.330 (0.357)  
Currency Crisis (t-1) -0.693** (0.351) -0.667** (0.329) -0.308 (0.416)  
Currency Crisis (t-2) -0.628 (0.375) -0.577* (0.341)  -0.919 (0.621)  
GDP growth  -0.024 (0.019)  -0.038 (0.039)  
GDP per capita -0.085 (0.053)  0.141 (0.125)  
Country Size 0.163* (0.094) 0.082 (0.090) 0.122 (0.107)  
Total Seats -0.002**(0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.002)  
Lagged Level of Reforms -0.927*** (0.145) -1.018*** (0.153) -1.103*** (0.274) -0.881** (0.293) 
          
No. of observations 830 830 433 433 
No. of failures 79 79 47 47 
Time at Risk 5557 5557 2766 2766 
Log  Pseudo-Likelihood -281.998 -287.356 -132.619 -138.087 
Wald Chi Square 144.70 83.61 87.42 23.65 
Prob.> Chi Square 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; and *p<0.10.  Entries are coefficients and robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Significance is based on 2-tailed tests. 
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 As can be seen in Model 3-1, as expected, the IMF accelerates capital account 
liberalization in cases where the number of veto players is zero and accelerates the enhancement 
of banking supervision as well.  The hazard is 1.09 times greater under the IMF’s influence when 
the number of veto players is zero, as seen in Model 3-1, and 1.07 times greater in Model 3-2.  
Conditional effects of the IMF on capital account liberalization given the number of veto players 
are displayed below as Figure 3.10 (Model 3-1) and Figure 3.11 (Model 3-3).  In both Model 3-1 
and Model 3-3, significant conditional effects for the IMF are obtained when the number of veto 
players is from two to four (one-tailed significance), and four to nine (two-tailed significance at a 
0.1 level) as seen in Figure 3.10, and also when the number of veto players is two (one-tailed 
significance), and from three to nine (two-tailed significance at a 0.1 level) as seen in 
Figure 3.11.  Thus, as the number of veto players increases, the effects of the IMF on 
accelerating capital account liberalization decreases.   
99 
  
1.1 
1.2 
0.9 
1 Hazard 
Ratio 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Veto Players
 
Figure 3.10 Capital Account Liberalization: Conditional Hazard Ratio for the IMF Given 
the Number of Veto Players (Model 3-1: All Cases) 
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Figure 3.11 Capital Account Liberalization: Conditional Hazard Ratio for the IMF Given 
the Number of Veto Players (Model 3-3: Democracy Only) 
100 
 With respect to Alteration of Executives, aiming to capture the changes in preferences of 
policy status quo, it shows significant impact on the liberalization of capital accounts.  When 
there is an alteration of an executive leader’s political party and/or a regime transition, the hazard 
is 2.511 times greater in Model 3-1 and 2.587 times greater in Model 3-3, compared to a case 
when there is no alteration of executives.  The findings for the Manufacturing Sector partially 
confirm my expectation, seen as Model 3-1 and Model 3-2.  When the manufacturing sector 
becomes stronger by one percent, the hazard is increased by 7.7 percent in Model 3-1, suggesting 
that the manufacturing sector supports an increase to gain access to foreign capital.  But in 
Model 3-3, the Manufacturing Sector does not show significant effects.   
In terms of the Banking Sector, though I hypothesized that the banking sector would 
prefer not to open capital accounts since banks dislike pressure to lower lending rates by 
increasing access to foreign capital, contrary to my expectations, it had no significant effects in 
determining the pace of capital account liberalization.   
With respect to control variables, in Model 3-3 and Model 3-4, where only democratic 
cases are used, US aid significantly increases the likelihood of opening capital accounts.  As 
Stiglitz (2002) argues, these results may suggest that the US preference for opening capital 
accounts is an important political determinant for promoting an integration of the global financial 
market.  In regard to macroeconomic variables, one-year lagged Currency Crisis deters capital 
account liberalization as seen in Model 3-1 and Model 3-2, though these effects of currency 
crises are not observed when using only democratic cases.   
Also, similarly, Country Size and Total Seats have an effect on shaping the pace of 
capital account liberalization, though these variables are not significant if we estimate the models 
using only democratic cases.  Last year’s level of capital account liberalization significantly 
101 
 shapes the pace of capital account liberalization.  As the previous level of capital account 
liberalization is lower, a country has more room to induce reforms on capital account 
liberalization.  This is significant in all models.   
 
3.9.5. Interest rate liberalization 
 
Table 3.9, shown below, displays the results for predictors of the pace of liberalization of banks’ 
deposit rates and lending rates.  Model 4-1 reports the results of all cases.  Model 4-2 drops the 
insignificant control variables from Model 4-1.  Model 4-3 reports the results of only democratic 
cases and Model 4-4 shows the results in which the insignificant control variables are dropped 
from Model 4-3.   
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 Table 3.9 Conditional Gap Time Model: Predictors of Interest Rate Liberalization 
Variables  
Model (4-1) 
Interest Rate 
Liberalization     
(All Cases) 
Model (4-2) 
Interest Rate 
Liberalization     
(All Cases) 
Model (4-3) 
Interest Rate 
Liberalization 
(Democracy) 
Model (4-4) 
Interest Rate 
Liberalization 
(Democracy) 
IMF  0.080* (0.048) 0.063 (0.053) 0.325*** (0.096) 0.334*** (0.097) 
Veto Player x IMF  -0.032 (0.038) -0.031 (0.042) -0.188** (0.075) -0.197** (0.076) 
     
Veto Player  0.097 (0.135) 0.053 (0.132)  0.376 (0.284)  -0.367 (0.249) 
Alteration of Executive  0.203 (0.363) 0.243(0.366) -0.538 (0.576) -0.316 (0.591) 
     
Manufacturing Sector  0.088** (0.030) 0.067** (0.029) 0.048 (0.042) 0.041 (0.049) 
Banking Sector -0.019 (0.042) -0.037 (0.037) -0.281** (0.127) -0.306***(0.086)
     
Level of Democracy 0.100 (0.083)  0.225 (0.154)  
US Aid 0.002 (0.003)  -0.129 (0.134)  
Currency Crisis -0.255 (0.322)  -0.256 (0.509)  
Currency Crisis (t-1) 0.123 (0.319)  -1.021 (0.654) -1.158* (0.589) 
Currency Crisis (t-2) 0.174 (0.260)   0.890*(0.471)  0.966**(0.400) 
GDP growth  0.040 (0.029)  0.068 (0.042) 0.077**(0.032) 
GDP per capita  -0.068 (0.047)  -0.185 (0.217)  
Country Size 0.067 (0.071)  0.043 (0.079)  
Total Seats -0.003** (0.001) -0.002** (0.001) -0.001 (0.003)  
Lagged Level of 
Reforms -1.107***(0.187) -1.104***(0.186)
-1.815*** 
(0.486) 
-1.764*** 
(0.404) 
          
No. of observations 830 830 433 433 
No. of failures 67 67 34 34 
Time at Risk 5645 5645 3082 3082 
Log  Pseudo-Likelihood -250.525 -254.249 -82.441 -85.847 
Wald Chi Square 221.93 77.04 232.24 78.01 
Prob.> Chi Square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; and *p<0.10.  Entries are coefficients and robust standard errors are in 
parentheses.  Significance is based on 2-tailed tests. 
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 In Model 4-1, as seen in Figure 3.12 below, the IMF’s effects on accelerating the pace of 
interest rate liberalization is decreased as the number of veto players increases, which is 
statistically significant when the number of veto players is zero and one (two-tailed significance 
at a 0.1 level and at a 0.05 level respectively) using all cases.   
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Figure 3.12 Interest Rate Liberalization: Conditional Hazard Ratio for the IMF Given the 
Number of Veto Players (Model 4-1: All Cases) 
 
 
When a model is estimated using only democratic cases, as expected, the IMF effects on 
accelerating the pace of interest rate liberalization also decrease as the number of veto players 
increases.  In Model 4-3, this is statistically significant when the number of veto players is zero 
and one (two-tailed significance at a 0.001 level), and from three to nine (two-tailed significance 
at a 0.1 level), presented below as Figure 3.13. 
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Figure 3.13 Interest Rate Liberalization: Conditional Hazard Ratio for the IMF Given the 
Number of Veto Players (Model 4-3: Democracy Only) 
 
 
Concerning the societal impact, the Manufacturing Sector significantly affects shaping of 
the pace of interest rate liberalization.  A one percent increase in the influence of the 
manufacturing sector raises the likelihood of the occurrence of interest rate liberalization by 
9.2% in Model 4-1 and 6.9% in Model 4-2, which are both significant at a 0.05 level.  However, 
this significant effect cannot be observed when only democratic cases are used.  Hence, though 
the impacts are only observed when using all cases, as the influence of the Manufacturing Sector 
increases, a country is more likely to facilitate interest rate liberalization because the 
manufacturing sector is likely to support these reforms in order to enhance access to favorable 
credit conditions.   
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 Concerning the effects of the Banking Sector, as seen in Model 4-3 and Model 4-4, a 
country which has a stronger connection between banks and the government significantly delays 
interest rate liberalization.  The banking sector opposes interest rate liberalization because they 
do not prefer the competition among banks which results from liberalized interest rates.   
In addition to these main variables, macroeconomic factors also shape the pace of interest 
rate liberalization.  Among macroeconomic variables and other control variables, only the 
number of Total Seats in the lower house shows statistical significance as seen in Model 4-1 and 
in Model 4-2.  In Model 4-4, one-year lagged currency crises deter financial reforms, while two-
year lagged currency crises facilitate interest rate liberalization.  Also, a country accelerates 
interest rate liberalization when GDP growth is high.  In addition, as with the models presented 
earlier, if the previous level of interest rate liberalization is lower, a country has more room to 
conduct reforms, which is significant in all models.   
 
3.9.6. Elimination of credit controls 
 
Table 3.10, shown below, displays the results of predictors of the pace of elimination of credit 
controls.  Model 5-1 reports the results using all cases, and Model 5-2 represents the results when 
insignificant control variables are dropped from Model 5-1.  Model 5-3 reports the results using 
only democratic cases, and Model 5-4 shows the results when insignificant control variables in 
Model 5-3 are dropped from the model.   
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 Table 3.10 Conditional Gap Time Model: Predictors of Elimination of Credit Controls 
 
Variable  
Model (5-1) 
Elimination of 
Credit Controls 
(All Cases) 
Model (5-2) 
Elimination of 
Credit Controls 
(All Cases) 
Model (5-3)      
Elimination of 
Credit Controls 
(Democracy) 
Model (5-4) 
Elimination of 
Credit Controls 
(Democracy) 
     
IMF  0.063 (0.046) 0.057 (0.048) 0.215** (0.083) 0.190** (0.080) 
Veto Player x IMF -0.029 (0.035) -0.033 (0.044) -0.152** (0.071) -0.132** (0.060) 
     
Veto Player  0.029 (0.224) -0.058 (0.224) 0.200 (0.272) 0.137 (0.270) 
Alteration of Executive  -0.163 (0.284) -0.131 (0.250) -0.137 (0.340) -0.182 (0.316) 
     
Manufacturing Sector  0.034 (0.033) 0.022 (0.026) -0.006 (0.076) -0.061 (0.050) 
Banking Sector -0.080* (0.044) -0.067* (0.037) -0.071 (0.080) -0.087 (0.056) 
     
Level of Democracy -0.117 (0.099)  -0.077 (0.221)  
US Aid 0.003 (0.002)  -0.030 (0.022)  
Currency Crisis 0.079 (0.293)  0.242 (0.425)  
Currency Crisis (t-1) 0.353 (0.258)  -0.078 (0.434)  
Currency Crisis (t-2) -0.060 (0.258)   0.072 (0.321)  
GDP growth  -0.003 (0.026)  -0.046 (0.040)  
GDP per capita 0.027 (0.062)  -0.116 (0.208)  
Country Size -0.361* (0.209) -0.264** (0.119) -0.086 (0.210)  
Total Seats 0.001 (0.001)  -0.002 (0.003)  
Lagged Level of Reforms -0.433* (0.244) -0.425* (0.218) -0.672* (0.342) -0.893** (0.284) 
          
No. of observations 830 830 433 433 
No. of failures 68 68 37 37 
Time at Risk 5729 5729 3317 3317 
Log  Pseudo-Likelihood -282.285 -285.493 -121.674 -124.950 
Wald Chi Square 57.47 33.87 99.2 21.57 
Prob.> Chi Square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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 Concerning the conditional effects for the IMF, significant conditional effects for the 
IMF are obtained in Model 5-1 when the number of veto players is zero and one (two-tailed 
significance), presented as Figure 3.14 below.  Also, in Model 5-3 and Model 5-4, significant 
conditional effects for the IMF are obtained.  In the case of Model 5-3, as displayed below in 
Figure 3.15, the IMF’s role in facilitating the pace of elimination of credit controls is 
intermediated by the number of veto players.  Significant effects are obtained when the number 
of veto players is zero and one (one-tailed significance), from three to five (two-tailed 
significance at a 0.1 level), and from six to nine (two-tailed significance at a 0.05 level).  Similar 
to with other dimensions presented such as privatization of banks, enhancement of banking 
supervision, capital account liberalization, and interest rate liberalization, as the number of veto 
players increases, the IMF effects on speeding up the pace of the elimination of credit controls 
decrease.   
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Figure 3.14 Elimination of Credit Controls: Conditional Hazard Ratio for the IMF Given 
the Number of Veto Players (Model 5-1: All Cases) 
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Figure 3.15 Elimination of Credit Controls: Conditional Hazard Ratio for the IMF Given 
the Number of Veto Players (Model 5-3: Democracy Only) 
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 However, the impact of the manufacturing sector is insignificant when looking at all 
cases.  With respect to the impact of the banking sector, it shows significant effects at a 0.1 level 
in an expected direction in both Model 5-1 and Model 5-2.  Results suggest that as the banking 
sector and the government collude more, the elimination of credit controls tend to be delayed.   
However, in Model 5-3 and Model 5-4, significant results are not obtained for these main 
variables.  Contrary to expectations, the manufacturing sector, which is assumed to support 
reforms to enhance the access to credit, and the banking sector, which is assumed to oppose the 
elimination of credit controls to resist competitions among banks, do not affect the pace of 
elimination of credit controls. 
The lagged value affects the pace of the elimination of credit controls.  A higher degree of 
credit controls in the previous year provides room for a country to engage in reforms concerning 
the elimination of credit controls, as seen in Model 5-2, Model 5-3, and Model 5-4.   
Concerning the societal factors’ influence in addition to the manufacturing sector and the 
banking sector, the influence of the agricultural sector may be important in shaping the pace of 
the elimination of credit controls.  The agricultural sector will oppose the elimination of credit 
controls since the agricultural sector often benefits from preferential credit allocations with 
subsidized interest rates in developing countries.  Therefore, I examined the effects of the 
agricultural sector measured as a percentage of GDP.  Results are appended as Appendix 3.H.   
A larger influence of the agricultural sector does in fact delay the pace of the elimination of 
credit controls in a model using all cases, but this influence cannot be observed in a model using 
only democratic cases.  In both models, other variables remain significant.    
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 3.9.7. Elimination of entry barriers 
 
Table 3.11 Conditional Gap Time Model: Predictors of Elimination of Entry Barriers 
Variable  
Model (6-1) 
Elimination of 
Entry Barriers    
(All Cases) 
Model (6-2) 
Elimination of 
Entry Barriers     
(All Cases) 
 Model (6-3) 
Elimination of 
Entry Barriers 
(Democracy ) 
 Model (6-4) 
Elimination of 
Entry Barriers 
(Democracy) 
     
IMF  0.006 (0.053) -0.004 (0.055) -0.037 (0.058) -0.086** (0.041) 
Veto Player x IMF  0.012 (0.034) 0.010 (0.039) 0.052* (0.031) 0.059** (0.026) 
     
Veto Player  0.039  (0.102) -0.075  (0.088) -0.023 (0.137) 0.096 (0.128) 
Alteration of Executive  0.732** (0.294) 0.703** (0.258) 0.596 (0.470) 0.728 (0.354) 
     
Manufacturing Sector 0.091*** (0.027)   0.076*** (0.022)   0.187**(0.064) 0.108**(0.041) 
Banking Sector  0.031 (0.030)  0.021 (0.033) -0.092 (0.078) -0.087 (0.054) 
     
Level of Democracy -0.133 (0.075)  0.002 (0.150)  
US Aid 0.006** (0.003) 0.005** (0.002) -0.013 (0.016)  
Currency Crisis 0.104 (0.248)  -0.207 (0.329)  
Currency Crisis (t-1) 0.061 (0.257)  0.176 (0.376)  
Currency Crisis (t-2)  -0.131 (0.325)     -0.222 (0.465)    
GDP growth 0.055** (0.026)  0.049** (0.024)  0.072 (0.073)   
GDP per capita (Lagged)  -0.128** (0.046)  -0.123** (0.041) -0.392 (0.308)  
Country Size -0.062 (0.147)  -0.206 (0.163)  
Total Seats -0.001 (0.001)  0.001 (0.002)  
Lagged Level of Reforms  -0.710** (0.351)   -0.817** (0.308)   -0.719** (0.359)   -0.861** (0.867)  
          
No. of observations 829 830 433 433 
No. of failures 64 64 30 30 
Time at Risk 6093 6097 3436 3436 
Log  Pseudo-Likelihood -242.196 -245.953  -79.151  -83.872 
Wald Chi Square 109.9 70.49 224.36 70.4 
Prob.> Chi Square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; and *p<0.10.  Entries are coefficients and robust standard errors are in 
parentheses.  Significance is based on 2-tailed tests. 
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 Table 3.11, shown above, reports results for predictors of the pace of elimination of entry 
barriers.  Model 6-1 reports the results using all cases and Model 6-2 presents the results when 
insignificant variables are dropped from the Model 6-1.  Model 6-3 exhibits the results for the 
full model using only democratic cases.  Model 6-4 reports the results for when insignificant 
control variables are dropped from Model 6-3.   
Conditional effects of the IMF on the pace of elimination of entry barriers have no 
significant impact when looking at all cases, as is shown in Model 6-1 and Model 6-2.  On the 
other hand, when only democratic cases are looked at, the relationship between the number of 
veto players and the IMF works in an opposite direction.  Contrary to expectations, as the 
number of veto players increases, the conditional effects of the IMF on the pace of elimination of 
entry barriers increase, seen below as Figure 3.16.   
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Figure 3.16 Elimination of Entry Barriers: Conditional Hazard Ratio for the IMF Given 
the Number of Veto Players (Model 6-3: Democracy Only) 
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  This unexpected impact may come from the fact that each political party would like to 
obtain rents by licensing powers.  Or other factors may have an effect on determining the pace of 
the elimination of entry barriers against banks.  For example, an executive leader may have 
constitutionally defined legislative powers such as constitutional decree authority, which may 
allow an executive leader to lift entry barriers on new banks, even if a leader faces opposition 
from coalition partners.41   
Alteration of Executives speeds up the pace of elimination of entry barriers as seen in 
Model 6-1 and Model 6-2.  When there is a change in preferences of the status quo, the 
likelihood of reform occurring is 2.08 times greater in Model 6-1 and 2.02 times greater in 
Model 6-2 compared to when there is no alteration of executives.  With respect to interest 
groups, as expected, a stronger influence of the manufacturing sector facilitates the elimination 
of banks’ entry barriers in both models.  A one percent increase in the manufacturing sector 
increases the hazard by 9.5 % in Model 6-1 and by 20.6% in Model 6-3.   
Concerning US Aid, larger amounts of US aid targeted at both the financial sector and the 
business sector significantly speed up the elimination of entry barriers, though this effect is only 
seen when using all cases.  As to macroeconomic factors, better economic conditions facilitate 
the elimination of entry barriers while a more developed country is more likely to delay the 
elimination of entry barriers of banks.  However, these macroeconomic factors are also only 
significant for the models using all cases. 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 Though I wanted to examine the impact of an executive leader’s legislative power, I was not 
able to obtain the constitutional information for all countries throughout the entire period. 
113 
 114 
                                                
3.9.8. Alternative measurement of veto players 
 
In this section, I also estimate the Cox models using an alternative indicator of veto players, 
POLCONIII (Henisz 2002).42  This measure, POLCONIII, takes into account the number of 
independent branches of government (i.e., executive, lower and upper legislative chambers) as 
well as the party composition of the executive and legislative branches.  Therefore, this measure 
counts not only the partisan veto players but also the institutional veto players whereas the 
number of political parties within the executive coalition counts only partisan veto players.  This 
measurement is used in conventional studies to measure the number of veto players (Henisz and 
Zalner 2006; Henisz and Mansfield 2006).  The correlation between the number of political 
parties within an executive coalition and POLCONIII is 0.506.   
The results of the full models for each of the six dimensions using all cases are shown 
below as Table 3.12, and the results of the full models for each dimension using only democratic 
cases are shown below as Table 3.13.43   
 
 
42 Data are taken from the POLCON 2005, available at the website (http://www-
management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/ ), accessed on November 22, 2006. 
43 In previous models, using the number of political parties within an executive coalition as the 
Veto Players indicator, the number of veto players is coded as zero when a case is classified as 
dictatorship.  Hence, the variable IMF shows the IMF’s effects in cases of non-democratic 
governments.  However, in Table 3.13, the results of the IMF represent the impact of the IMF 
conditionality programs when POLCONIII is zero, which does not exactly match the cases of 
non-democratic governments in previous models.   
 Table 3.12 Alternative Measurement: POLCONIII (All Cases)  
 
Variables Privatization of Banks            
 Banking 
Supervision       
Capital Account 
Liberalization      
Interest Rate 
Liberalization      
Elimination of     
Credit Controls     
Elimination of     
Entry Barriers      
 IMF 0.145 (0.088) 0.131 (0.094) 0.108** (0.037) -0.029 (0.048) -0.023 (0.077) 0.072 (0.089)
Veto Player x IMF -0.151 (0.217)  -0.165 (0.196) -0.299** (0.144) 0.205 (0.121)  0.138 (0.183) -0.147 (0.208)
Veto Player  2.178 (1.760) 3.253** (1.142) 0.778 (0.952) -3.069** (1.140) -1.904* (1.088) -1.000  (0.957)
Alteration of Executive -0.192 (0.503)  -0.027 (0.325) 0.965***(0.285) 0.267 (0.275) -0.236 (0.311) 0.784** (0.326)
Manufacturing Sector 0.157***(0.047) 0.071* (0.043) 0.072** (0.029) 0.110*** (0.029) 0.047 (0.031) 0.089*** (0.027)   
Banking Sector 0.021 (0.051) 0.030 (0.052) 0.019 (0.027) 0.008 (0.031) -0.076* (0.041)  0.033 (0.031)
Level of Democracy   -1.186 (0.212) -0.082 (0.094) -0.104 (0.086)  -0.006 (0.087) -0.074 (0.094)  -0.074 (0.081)
US Aid -0.007 (0.005) 0.003 (0.002) 0.0003 (0.003) -0.0005 (0.002) 0.002 (0.003) 0.006** (0.003)
Currency Crisis 0.078 (0.436) -0.847** (0.420) -0.326 (0.367) -0.350 (0.325) 0.031 (0.305) 0.091 (0.245)
Currency Crisis (t-1) 0.499* (0.292) 0.564* (0.321) -0.671* (0.362) 0.017 (0.315) 0.332 (0.264) -0.024 (0.275)
Currency Crisis (t-2) 0.727 (0.520) 0.134 (0.309)  -0.581 (0.372) 0.133 (0.265) -0.083 (0.257)  -0.194 (0.325)  
GDP growth 0.019 (0.049) 0.039 (0.039) -0.029 (0.021) 0.043 (0.032) -0.003 (0.029) 0.063** (0.028) 
GDP per capita -0.369** (0.159)  -0.038 (0.044) -0.071 (0.053) -0.131** (0.050) -0.004 (0.062)  -0.134** (0.049)
Country Size 0.125 (0.235) -0.116 (0.277) 0.139 (0.095) 0.040 (0.075) -0.340** (0.168) -0.034 (0.123)
Total Seats -0.003 (0.003) -0.0002 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) -0.002** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001)
Lagged Level of Reforms -0.623** (0.305)  -4.408*** (0.861)  -0.915*** (0.142) -1.067***(0.161) -0.457* (0.261)  -0.733** (0.349)  
No. of observations 828 828 828 828 828 828
No. of failures 35 45 79 67 68 64
Time at Risk 8502 8225 5548 5636 5720 6088
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -135.132 -154.146 -282.658 -246.077 -280.26 -240.964
Wald Chi Square 102.77 277.99 165.44 223.16 106.14 90.35
Prob.> Chi Square 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; and *p<0.10.  Entries are coefficients and robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Significance is based on 2-tailed tests.
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Table 3.13 Alternative Measurement: POLCONIII (Democracy Only) 
 
Variables Privatization of Banks         
 Banking 
Supervision      
Capital Account 
Liberalization 
Interest Rate 
Liberalization 
Elimination of   
Credit Controls 
 Elimination of   
Entry Barriers 
IMF  0.206* (0.110) 0.220 (0.171) 0.138* (0.081)  0.138 (0.115) 0.044 (0.067) 0.128 (0.163)
Veto Player x IMF Credit -0.248 (0.247) -0.316 (0.354) -0.502*(0.297) -0.155 (0.255) -0.028 (0.193) -0.189 (0.411)
Veto Player 0.778 (2.870) 2.024 (1.740)  0.143  (1.671)  -1.997 (3.378) -2.445 (1.682) -1.500 (2.419)
Alteration of Executive -0.307 (0.515)   0.096 (0.401) 0.848** (0.325) -0.422 (0.373) -0.232 (0.409) 0.746 (0.508)
Manufacturing Sector 0.177*** (0.054) 0.134*(0.074)    -0.0004 (0.054) 0.042 (0.046) 0.018 (0.080) 0.198**(0.065)
Banking Sector 0.078 (0.069)  0.024 (0.081) 0.026 (0.044) -0.237 (0.152) -0.096 (0.086) -0.108 (0.082)
Level of Democracy -0.294* (0.170) -0.098 (0.226) -0.051 (0.192)  0.268** (0.129) -0.065 (0.200) 0.045 (0.144)
US Aid 0.002 (0.006) -0.002 (0.009) 0.016** (0.006) -0.166 (0.140) -0.040 (0.027) -0.015 (0.019)
Currency Crisis -0.053 (0.398) -0.480 (0.502) -0.242 (0.389) -0.300 (0.514) 0.119 (0.422) -0.185 (0.408)
Currency Crisis (t-1) 0.373 (0.383)  0.612 (0.426)  -0.348 (0.409) -1.026 (0.634)  -0.175 (0.443) -0.001 (0.375)
Currency Crisis (t-2)  1.283** (0.592)  0.600**(0.298)   -0.830 (0.594)  0.810* (0.457) 0.033 (0.350)  -0.316 (0.428)  
GDP growth 0.066 (0.053) 0.112 (0.094) -0.037 (0.037) 0.080**(0.030) -0.019 (0.052) 0.068 (0.070) 
GDP per capita -0.424 ** (0.182) -0.076 (0.159) 0.176 (0.134) -0.075 (0.195) -0.076 (0.202) -0.414 (0.283)
Country Size 0.111 (0.259) -0.374 (0.451) 0.090 (0.103) -0.108 (0.103) -0.181 (0.179) -0.187 (0.132)
Total Seats -0.005 (0.003) 0.001 (0.002) 0.0001 (0.002)  0.0003 (0.003) -0.0004 (0.003) 0.002 (0.002)
Lagged Level of Reforms - 0.463 (0.636)  - 
4 488***(1 396)
-1.057*** (0.266) -1.456*** (0.454) -0.714** (0.304)  -0.763* (0.412)  
No. of observations 432 432 432 432 432 432
No. of failures 23 33 47 34 37 30
Time at Risk 4743 4662 2765 3081 3316 3435
Log Pseudo-Likelihood -75.935 -95.590 -132.403 -84.412 -122.808  -79.063
Wald Chi Square 64.92 372.28 132.83 918.34 44.55 301.28
Prob.> Chi Square 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; and *p<0.10.  Entries are coefficients and robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Significance is based on 2-tailed 
tests.
  
As demonstrated above, even when I use the alternative measurement for the number of 
veto players, POLCONIII, the results largely confirm the findings of the previous results.  
Concerning the societal impacts, an increase in the Manufacturing Sector’s influence 
significantly raises the likelihood of reform occurrences in such areas as privatization of banks, 
capital account liberalization, interest rate liberalization, and elimination of entry barriers in 
models using all cases.  However, effects of the banking sector are not observed except for credit 
controls, similar to previous models.   
Regarding the interaction terms between the IMF and the number of Veto Players 
(POLCONIII), point estimates of conditional effects for the IMF given the values of POLCONIII 
are displayed below as Table 3.14 for models using all cases and Table 3.15 models for using 
only democratic cases.  The point estimates are presented at the values of the sample mean of 
POLCONIII, at the values of plus and minus of standard deviation from the sample mean, and at 
the minimum and the maximum values of POLCONIII.44   
 
                                                 
able 3.15). 
44 The sample mean is 0.278 and standard deviation is 0.209 for models using all cases 
(Table 3.14).  The sample mean is 0.402 and standard deviation is 0.144 for models using 
democratic cases (T
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 Table 3.14 Point Estimates of Conditional Effects for the IMF Given the Values of 
POLCONIII (All Cases) 
  
Value of 
POLCONIII 
Privatization 
of Banks      
 Banking 
Supervision    
 Capital 
Account 
Liberalization  
    
Minimum 1.156 1.140 1.114** 
    
Mean - 1SD 1.144* 1.127 1.091** 
    
Mean  1.109** 1.088** 1.025 
    
Mean +1SD 1.074** 1.051*** 0.963 
    
Maximum 1.042 1.017 0.907 
    
***p<0.001(2-tailed tests); **p<0.05 (2-tailed tests); *p<0.10 (2-
tailed tests); and italics is based on one-tailed tests.  SD is standard 
deviation. 
 
 
Table 3.15 Point Estimates of Conditional Effects for the IMF Given the Values of 
POLCONIII (Democracy Only) 
  
Value of 
POLCONIII 
Privatization 
of Banks      
 Banking 
Supervision    
 Capital 
Account 
Liberalization  
Interest Rate 
Liberalization  
Elimination 
of Entry 
Barriers  
      
Minimum 1.229* 1.246 1.148* 1.148 1.137 
      
Mean - 1SD 1.153** 1.149* 1.009 1.136 1.122 
      
Mean  1.112* 1.097** 0.938 1.100* 1.078 
      
Mean +1SD 1.073 1.049 0.873 1.065 1.036 
      
Maximum 1.035 1.002 0.812 1.032 0.997 
            
**p<0.05 (2-tailed tests); *p<0.10 (2-tailed tests); and italics is based on one-tailed tests.  SD is 
standard deviation. 
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 As shown above in Table 3.14, in three dimensions out of six significant conditional 
effects for the IMF given the values of POLCONIII are observed, similar to previous results.  As 
the number of veto players increases, the IMF’s effects on bringing forward the timing of 
financial reforms tends to decrease in such dimensions as privatization of banks, enhancement of 
banking supervision, and capital account liberalization when all cases are used to estimate 
models.  In models using only democratic cases, shown as Table 3.15, conditional effects are 
significant in such dimensions as privatization of banks, enhancement of banking supervision, 
capital account liberalization, interest rate liberalization, and elimination of entry barriers.   
In the previous section, as observed in Figure 3.16, for the dimension of the elimination 
of entry barriers, the conditioning effects of veto players for the IMF were in an opposite 
direction.  However, when using POLCONIII as an alternative veto player’s measurement, here 
seen as Table 3.15, results confirm the expected direction, contrary to previous findings.  
However, I cannot observe significant conditional effects for the IMF in the dimension of 
elimination of credit controls when I use POLCONIII, though I previously observed the expected 
finding.   
In addition, concerning the effects under the label of Veto Players, which indicates the 
effects of the number of veto players per se when there is no impact of the IMF, while I do not 
observe any significant effects in previous models for any of the six dimensions, when I use 
POLCONIII, I observe significant effects in the dimensions of the enhancement of banking 
supervision, interest rate liberalization, and elimination of credit controls.  For the dimensions of 
interest rate liberalization and the elimination of credit controls, Tsebelis’s theory of veto players 
is confirmed: an increase in the number of veto players delays interest rate liberalization and 
elimination of credit controls when there is no effect of the IMF conditionality programs.  On the 
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 other hand, for the dimension of enhancement of banking supervision, the opposite finding is 
observed, i.e., as the number of veto player increases, banking supervision tends to be facilitated 
under the lack of the IMF’s pressures.45   
However, despite the differences described immediately above, by looking at the 
interaction effects between the IMF and Veto Players, the same results are obtained in three 
dimensions for all cases, shown as Table 3.14, and in five dimensions for democratic cases, 
shown as Table 3.15 using alternative veto player measurements.  Hence, findings of this chapter 
concerning the relationship between the IMF programs and the number of veto players as well as 
the societal impacts can be said to be largely robust.   
 
 
3.10.  DISCUSSION 
 
By explicitly modeling the impact of the IMF, veto players, and interest groups as determinants 
of financial reforms, this chapter aims to quantitatively explore political determinants to account 
for the pace of not only capital account liberalization, but also other various dimensions of 
banking reforms in developing countries, where conventional studies are lacking. 
Since the IMF’s impact may be overlapped with effects of currency crises, it would be 
difficult to obtain separate significant results.  Further, as discussed before, previous empirical 
                                                 
45 This may come from the fact that since enhancement of banking supervision means 
strengthened government intervention into the market, contrary to with the other five dimensions 
of financial reforms, the increase in the number of veto players and the resulted rigid policy 
outcomes may lead governments to choose a more independent banking supervisory agency and 
other measures of strengthened banking supervisory power as literature on central bank 
independence assumes (for example, see Bernhard (2002)).  However, since this effect is not 
observed in models including the number of political parties within an executive coalition, 
further analysis is necessary.    
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 research shows that the Fund’s conditionality programs suffer from low implementation rates.  
Once a country has successfully borrowed money from the IMF, a country may not commit to 
reforms expecting that the IMF will bail out.  In this vein, the IMF’s conditionality programs 
tend to be criticized because of this moral hazard problem.46  However, despite these critiques 
against the Fund conditionality programs, even rigorously controlling for the effects of currency 
crises, significant effects of the IMF in facilitating the pace of financial reforms can be observed 
in the issue areas of financial reforms where the IMF’s core competence lies.  Therefore, IMF 
programs not only facilitate a larger magnitude of financial reforms but also accelerate the pace 
of financial reforms.  The IMF demands a country facilitate financial reforms not only because of 
the necessity of reforms given deteriorated economic conditions due to currency crises, but also 
because of the uncertainty over whether a country has the will to commit to financial reforms 
given its low implementation rates of conditionality programs.   
Especially concerning the interaction effects between the IMF and the number of Veto 
Players, results demonstrate that the conditional effects for the IMF on the pace of financial 
reforms is contingent upon the number of veto players, similar to the results observed for the 
effects on the magnitude of financial reforms.  Measuring the number of veto players as the 
number of political parties within an executive coalition, significant conditional effects on the 
pace of financial reforms are obtained in the following five out of the six dimensions in both 
models using all cases and only democratic cases: privatization of banks, the enhancement of 
banking supervision over the banking sector, capital account liberalization, interest rate 
liberalization, and elimination of credit controls.  That is to say, the IMF’s effect in accelerating 
                                                 
46 Concerning the literature on the IMF’s moral hazard problems, see International Financial 
Institution Advisory Commission (2000) which is known as the Meltzer Commission Report, for 
example. 
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 the pace of financial reforms decreases as the number of veto players increases.  In the first three 
dimensions — privatization of banks, the enhancement of the banking supervision over the 
banking sector, and capital account liberalization — statistical significance is also obtained in 
both models using all cases and only democratic cases by using POLICONIII as an alternative 
indicator, which takes into account not only partisan veto players but also institutional veto 
players.  In other two dimensions, interest rate liberalization and elimination of entry barriers on 
banks, statistical significance is obtained only in only democratic cases by using POLICONIII.  
Thus, in democratic cases, the hypotheses concerning interaction effects between the IMF and 
the number of veto players (hypotheses 4b) are upheld in five out of the six dimensions in both 
measurements of the number of veto players.   
In this vein, although existing findings in quantitative studies show diverse findings in 
terms of the relationship between the increase in the number of veto players and the change in 
policy status quo as discussed before — negative relationship (Tsebelis 2002; Basinger and 
Hallerberg 2004; Kastner and Rector 2003; Henisz and Mansfield 2006), positive relationship 
(Frye and Mansfield 2004), curvilinear relationship (Macintyre 2003, 2001), and no relationship 
at all (Hicken, Styanath, and Sergenti 2005) — as far as financial reforms are concerned, 
empirical findings of this study confirm Tsebelis’s claims: When a country has a large number of 
veto players, the IMF’s effects in facilitating financial reforms tend to be weakened, as 
hypothesized.  However, the number of veto players works in such a way that intermediates the 
effects of the Fund conditionality programs in setting the pace of financial reforms rather than 
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 the number of veto players per se working independently as well as cases of the magnitude of 
financial reforms.47   
Alteration of Executives shows a significant impact with respect to bringing forward the 
timing of financial reforms in the dimensions of capital account liberalization and the elimination 
of entry barriers of banks.  In both dimensions, when there is alteration of executives, the hazards 
becomes significantly greater compared to a case when there is no alteration of executives.  
Since Alteration of Executives captures regime changes or changes in the executive leader’s 
political party in an attempt to capture the changes in preferences of the status quo, conventional 
qualitative studies are right; when there is a change in political leadership, a new government is 
more likely to accelerate financial reforms, though this is only observed in the areas of capital 
account liberalization (Models 3-1–3-4) and in the elimination of entry barriers (Models 6-1 and 
6-2).   
With respect to the Manufacturing Sector, when the influence of the manufacturing 
sector increases, a country tends to commit to privatization of banks (Models 1-1–1-4), capital 
account liberalization (Model 3-1 and 3-2), interest rate liberalization (Models 4-1 and 4-2), and 
elimination of entry barriers of banks (Models 6-1–6-4).  The manufacturing sector seeks an 
increase in access to better credit conditions.  Privatization of banks, liberalized capital flows, 
liberalized banks’ deposit rates and lending rates, and a more competitive environment for banks 
by eliminating entry barriers increase opportunities for access to credit for the manufacturing 
                                                 
47 In the dimension of the elimination of entry barriers, conditional impact of the IMF works in 
an opposite direction by using the number of political parties within an executive coalition: as 
the number of veto player increases, the IMF’s impact on eliminating entry barriers increases, 
though this opposite impact is not observed when I use an alternative measurement of the 
number of veto players, POLCONIII.  This opposite impact may come from the fact that each 
political party would like to obtain rents by obtaining licensing powers as discussed before. 
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 sector.  Hence, the strong influence of the manufacturing sector contributes to facilitate financial 
reforms in these dimensions.  The findings for the Manufacturing Sector largely confirm my 
hypotheses.  However, there is no significant effect of the manufacturing sector in the dimension 
of the elimination of credit controls.  Also, in terms of the enhancement of banking supervision 
over the banking sector, contrary to my expectations, there is a weak significance in increasing 
the hazard of enhancement of the banking sector (Models 2-2–2-4).  Since it is necessary for a 
country to have the technological capacity to enhance banking supervision, this result may 
suggest that a country with a strong manufacturing sector has the technological capacity to 
enhance banking supervision.   
Concerning the Banking Sector’s influence, the dimensions that meet my expectations are 
interest rate liberalization (Model 4-3 and Model 4-4) and elimination of credit controls (Model 
5-1 and model 5-2).  A strong connection between the banking sector and the government 
significantly hinders interest rate liberalization and elimination of credit controls.  However, for 
other dimensions, contrary to my expectations, there are no significant effects on the pace of 
financial reforms and these results are disappointing.  These results may be a result of data 
limitations with respect to available indicators as discussed before.  Given the limitation of data 
availability, the influence of the banking sector may not be able to be observed.   
In this chapter, political determinants of the magnitude and the pace of financial reforms 
are examined.  The most important predictor is the external pressures by the IMF, despite 
controversies surrounding the Fund conditionality programs.  However, these IMF effects are 
conditioned by political institution or veto players.  Thus, veto players work in a way that 
intermediate the effects of the Fund conditionality programs.  With respect to the societal actors, 
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 while I confirm the effects of the manufacturing sector, significant effects of the banking sector 
cannot be obtained except two dimensions.   
It is disappointing that the banking sector has a significant impact in only two dimensions 
quantitatively.  However, it may come from the fact that quantitative examination has certain 
limits in measuring the influence of the banking sector given the limits of the data discussed 
before.  It may also come from the fact that in the cases of developing countries, when 
conglomerates own both firms and banks, firms’ interests may dominate and banks may become 
subordinate to the firms’ interests as a part of the conglomerate.  Therefore, I further explore the 
impact of societal factors in the following case study chapters.   
In Chapters 4 and Chapter 5, I further examine how the IMF and a country’s interaction 
shape financial reform outcomes in more detailed case studies of three countries: Indonesia, 
Korea, and Thailand.  In the next chapter, I focus on the case of Indonesia by examining 
financial reforms from 1965 to 2003, which allows me to examine the financial reform outcomes 
in Indonesia with a temporal variation concerning the effects of the IMF, veto players, and 
societal actors in Indonesia. 
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 Appendix 3.A. Coding Rules of the Financial Reform Database 
 
 
 
 
1) Privatization of Banks 
 
FL: Fully Liberalized if no state banks exist or state-owned banks do not constitute any 
significant portion of banks and/or the percentage of public bank assets is less than 10 %. 
LL: Largely Liberalized if most banks are privately owned and/or the percentage of public bank 
assets is from 10% to 25%. 
PR: Partially Repressed if many banks are privately owned but major banks are still state-owned 
and/or the percentage of public bank assets is 25%- 50%. 
FR: Fully Repressed if major banks are all state-owned banks and/or the percentage of public 
bank assets is from 50% to 100%.  
 
2) Enhancement of Banking Supervision over the Banking Sector 
 
1) Does a country adopt a capital adequacy ratio based on the Basle standard? (0/1)  
 
2) Does a banking supervisory agency become independent from the executives’ influence? 
(0/1/2)  
 
0 = when the banking supervisory agency does not have an adequate legal framework to 
promptly intervene in banks’ activities and/or when there is lack of a legal framework for the 
independence of the supervisory agency such as the appointment and removal of the head of the 
banking supervisory agency; or the ultimate jurisdiction of the banking supervision is under the 
MOF; or when a frequent turnover of the head of the supervisory agency is experienced.   
 
1 = an objective supervisory agency is clearly defined and an adequate legal framework to 
resolve banking problems is provided (the revocation and the suspension of authorization of 
banks, liquidation of banks, and the removal of banks’ executives etc.), but potential problems 
remain concerning the independence of the banking supervisory agency (for example, the board 
of the banking supervisory agency board is chaired by the MOF, although the fixed term of the 
board is ensured by law); or although clear legal objectives and legal independence are observed, 
an adequate legal framework for resolving problems is not well articulated.   
 
2 = if a legal framework for the objectives and the resolution of troubled banks is set up and if 
the banking supervisory agency is legally independent from the executive branch and actually 
not interfered with by the executive branch.   
 
3) Does a banking supervisory agency conduct effective supervisions through on-site and off-site 
examinations (0/1/2)?48  
                                                 
48 When information concerning on-site and off-site information is not available, I substitute this 
factor for whether banks are required to report their balance sheets on a consolidated basis, 
126 
  
0 = when a country has no legal framework and practices of on-site and off-site examinations are 
not provided or when no on-site and off-site examinations are conducted.   
1 = a legal framework for on-site and off-site examinations is set up and the banking supervision 
agency has conducted examinations but in an ineffective or insufficient manner. 
2 = the banking supervisory agency conducts effective and sophisticated examinations.   
 
4) Does a country’s banking supervisory agency expand the coverage all financial institutions 
without exception from supervisory oversight? (0/1) 
 
0 = if some kinds of financial institutions are not exclusively supervised by the banking 
supervisory agency or are excluded from banking supervisory agency’s oversights.   
1 = if all banks are under supervision by supervisory agencies without exception.   
 
After summing up these four dimensions, scores are assigned as follows: 
Highly Regulated = [6], Largely Regulated = [4-5], Less Regulated = [2-3], Not Regulated = 
[0-1] 
 
3) Capital Account Liberalization 
 
1) Is the exchange rate system unified? (0/1) 
0 = if a special exchange rate regime for either capital or current account transactions exists. 
1 = if the exchange rate system is unified.   
 
2) Does a country remove restrictions on capital inflow controls?  (0/1) 
0 = banks are not allowed to borrow from abroad freely.   
1 =banks are allowed to borrow from abroad freely without restrictions.  
 
3) Does a country remove restrictions on capital outflow control? (0/1) 
0 = restrictions on the repatriation of capital, dividends, and interests exist. 
1 =the repatriation of capital, dividends, and interests is allowed without any restrictions. 
 
After adding these three items, the countries are categorized as follows: 
Fully Liberalized = [3], Largely Liberalized = [2], Partially Repressed = [1], Fully 
Repressed= [0] 
 
4) Interest Rate Liberalization 
 
Deposit rates and lending rates are coded respectively as follows: 
 
<Deposit rates> <Lending rates> 
 
0 = ceilings/floors of interest rates are set, or interest rates are determined by the central bank.  
                                                                                                                                                             
meaning whether banks are obliged to report accountings based on a bank group as a whole, 
including subsidiaries and related companies, to avoid a loophole, or on an individual bank. 
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 1 = interest rates are allowed to float within a band or are partially liberalized.  
Partial liberalization means that only some kinds of deposit rates (loan rates) are determined by 
market rates, while other deposit rates (loan rates) are still subject to controls.49     
2 = interest rates are at market rates.  
 
The dimension of interest rate liberalization is coded by adding these scores for deposit rates and 
lending rates. 
 
FL= 4 [2, 2] 
Fully Liberalized if both deposit interest rates and lending interest rates are determined at market 
rates.  
 
LL= 3 [2, 1]  
Largely Liberalized if either deposit rates or lending rates are freed but the other rates are subject 
to band or only a part of interest rates are determined at market rates. 
 
PR= 2/1 [2, 0] [1, 1] [1, 0]  
Partially Repressed if either deposit rates or lending rates are freed but the other interest rates are 
set by the government or subject to ceiling/floor; or both deposit rates and lending rates are 
subject to band or partially liberalized; or either deposit rates or lending rates are subject to band 
or partially liberalized. 
 
FR= 0 [0, 0] 
Fully Repressed if both deposit rates and lending rates are set by the government or subject to 
ceiling/floor.  
 
5) Elimination of Credit Controls  
 
1) Does the government reduce reserve requirements? 
<Reserve requirements> 
 
0 = reserve requirement is more than 20%. 
1 =reserve requirements reduced to less than 20% or complicated rules to set reserve 
requirements are simplified as a step toward reducing reserve requirements.   
 
2) Does the government eliminate preferential credit allocation to certain sectors? 
<Elimination of credit controls to allocated credit to certain sectors> 
 
0 = credit allocations are determined by a central bank or mandatory credit allocations to certain 
sectors exist. 
                                                 
49 For example, in the Philippines in 1981, short-term deposits were subject to controls while 
long-term deposits were freed.  On other occasions, interest rate liberalization may be adopted 
formally, while in fact, reference rates implicitly work to set interest rates.  For example, in Sri 
Lanka, two dominant national banks functioned as pacemakers until 1997 in setting interest rates, 
despite the fact that interest rate liberalization had been formally announced in 1991. 
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 1 = mandatory credit allocations to certain sectors are eliminated or do not exist. 
 
3) Does the government eliminate preferential credit allocation at subsidized rates? 
<Credit supply at subsidized interest rates> 
 
0 = banks have to supply credits at subsidized rates to certain sectors. 
1 = the mandatory requirement of credit allocation at subsidized rates is eliminated or banks do 
not have to supply credits at subsidized rates. 
 
These three questions’ scores are summed and coded as follows: 
 
Fully Liberalized = [3], Largely Liberalized = [2], Partially Repressed = [1], Fully 
Repressed= [0] 
 
6) Elimination of Entry Barriers on Banks 
 
1) Does the government eliminate restrictions against foreign banks to enter into a domestic 
market?   
 
0 = no entry of foreign banks is allowed, or restrictions on the opening of new foreign banks are 
strictly regulated. 
1 = foreign bank entry is allowed, and/or less than 50% equity share by nonresidents allowed. 
2 = the majority of share of equity ownership of domestic banks by nonresidents is allowed; or 
equal treatment is ensured for both foreign banks and domestic banks; or an unlimited number of 
branching is allowed for foreign banks. 
 
2) Does the government eliminate restrictions on the entry of new domestic banks or ease 
branching restrictions? 
 
0 = the entry of new domestic banks is not allowed or strictly regulated. 
1 = the entry of new domestic banks or other financial institutions is allowed into the domestic 
market, and/or branching restrictions of domestic banks are eased.   
 
3) Does the government allow banks to engage in a wider rage of activities? (0/1) 
 
0 = the range of activities that banks can participate in consists of only banking activities. 
1 = banks are allowed to become universal banks, or specialization among banks is simplified.   
 
The elimination of entry barriers is coded by adding the scores for these three questions. 
Fully Liberalized= 4, Largely Liberalized= 3, Partially Repressed= 1 or 2, Fully Repressed 
= 0  
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 Appendix 3.B. Correlations of Each of the Six Dimensions（Original Values） 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Privatization 
of Banks 
Enhancement 
of Banking 
Supervision 
Capital 
Account 
Liberalization
Interest Rate 
Liberalization 
Elimination 
of Credit 
Controls 
Elimination 
of Entry 
Barriers 
Privatization of 
Banks 1.000      
Enhancement of 
Banking 
Supervision 
0.334 1.000     
Capital Account 
Liberalization 0.425 0.462 1.000    
Interest Rate 
Liberalization 0.384 0.526 0.579 1.000   
Elimination of 
Credit Controls 0.400 0.558 0.506 0.639 1.000  
Elimination of 
Entry Barriers 0.292 0.602 0.555 0.672 0.599 1.000 
Note: Each dimension is coded from zero to three. Unit is country-year. (900 observations) 
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 Appendix 3.C. Correlations of Each of the Six Dimensions（Differences） 
 
 
 
 
 
Privatization 
of Banks 
Enhancement 
of Banking 
Supervision 
Capital 
Account 
Liberalization
Interest Rate 
Liberalization 
Elimination 
of Credit 
Controls 
Elimination 
of Entry 
Barriers 
Privatization of 
Banks 1.000      
Enhancement of 
Banking 
Supervision 
0.027 1.000     
Capital Account 
Liberalization 0.132 0.024 1.000    
Interest Rate 
Liberalization 0.126 -0.021 0.162 1.000   
Elimination of 
Credit Controls -0.026 0.092 0.075 0.154 1.000  
Elimination of 
Entry Barriers -0.005 0.121 0.112 0.008 0.066 1.000 
Note: Differences are taken between year t and year t-1 for each country-year observation. (870 
observations) 
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 Appendix 3.D Correlations between Years Until First Financial Reforms Occur 
 
 
 
   
Privatization 
of Banks 
Enhancement 
of Banking 
Supervision 
Capital 
Account 
Liberalization
Interest Rate 
Liberalization
Elimination 
of Credit 
Controls 
Elimination 
of Entry 
Barriers 
Privatization 
of Banks 1.000           
Enhancement 
of Banking 
Supervision 
0.523 1.000         
Capital 
Account 
Liberalization 
0.495 0.426 1.000       
Interest Rate 
Liberalization 0.532 0.424 0.649 1.000     
Elimination 
of Credit 
Controls 
0.525 0.473 0.629 0.578 1.000   
Elimination 
of Entry 
Barriers 
0.583 0.480 0.602 0.672 0.665 1.000 
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 Appendix 3.E Correlations between the Number of Reforms 
 
 
 
 
   
Privatization 
of Banks 
Enhancement 
of Banking 
Supervision 
Capital 
Account 
Liberalization
Interest Rate 
Liberalization
Elimination 
of Credit 
Controls 
Elimination 
of Entry 
Barriers 
Privatization 
of Banks 1.000           
Enhancement 
of Banking 
Supervision 
0.319 1.000         
Capital 
Account 
Liberalization 
0.344 0.180 1.000       
Interest Rate 
Liberalization 0.275 0.133 0.421 1.000     
Elimination 
of Credit 
Controls 
 0.299 0.150 0.305 0.274 1.000   
Elimination 
of Entry 
Barriers 
0.373 0.297 0.466 0.287 0.288 1.000 
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 Appendix 3.F Correlations between Magnitude and Pace of Financial Reforms 
 
 
 
 
   Privatization of Banks 
Enhancement 
of Banking 
Supervision 
Capital 
Account 
Liberalization
Interest Rate 
Liberalization 
Elimination 
of Credit 
Controls 
Elimination 
of Entry 
Barriers 
Magnitude 
of Reforms 
(additive 
change 
values) 
0.092 0.164 0.058 0.003 0.072 0.104 
Level of 
Reforms 
(additive 
level 
values) 
0.110 -0.042 0.033 0.228 0.024 -0.041 
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 Appendix 3.G Regime Type 
 
 
 
 
Country  Democracy (450 obs) Non-democracy (420 obs) 
Argentina  1974-1976: 1984-2002 1977-1983 
Bangladesh 1974: 1980-1982: 1992-
2002 
1975-1979: 1983-1991  
Bolivia 1980: 1983-2002 1974-1979: 1981-1982:  
Brazil 1986-2002 1974-1985 
Chile 1991-2002 1974-1990 
Colombia 1974-2002   
Costa Rica 1974-2002   
Ecuador 1980-2002 1974-1979 
Egypt   1974-2002 
Ghana 1980-1981: 1998-2002 1974-1979: 1982-1997 
Guatemala 1974-1982: 1986-2002 1983- 1985 
India 1974-2002   
Indonesia 2000-2002 1974-1999 
Jamaica 1974-2002   
Korea (South Korea) 1989-2002 1974-1988 
Malaysia   1974-2002 
Mexico 1995-2002 1974-1994 
Morocco   1974-2002 
Nepal 1992-2002 1974-1991 
Pakistan 1974-1977: 1989-1999 1978-1988: 2000-2002 
Peru 1981-1992: 2002 1974-1980: 1993-2001 
Philippines 1987-2002 1974- 1986 
Singapore   1974-2002 
South Africa 1995-2002 1974-1994 
Sri Lanka 1974-1982: 1988-2002 1983-1987 
Thailand 1976: 1989-1991: 1993-
2002 
1974-1975: 1977-1988: 
1992 
Turkey 1974-1980: 1992-2002 1981-1991 
Uruguay 1986-2002 1974-1985 
Venezuela 1974-2002   
Zimbabwe   1974-2002 
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 Appendix 3.H Conditional Gap Time Model: Predictors of Elimination of Credit Controls 
(with the Agricultural Sector Variable) 
 
 
 
 
Variable  
Model  
 Elimination of Credit Controls  
(All Cases) 
Model  
 Elimination of Credit Controls  
(Democracy) 
IMF  0.050 (0.046) 0.185* (0.107) 
Veto Player x IMF -0.030 (0.038) -0.143** (0.083) 
Veto Player  0.027 (0.230) 0.145 (0.364) 
Alteration of 
Executive  -0.088 (0.296) -0.118 (0.352) 
Manufacturing Sector  -0.017 (0.034) -0.026 (0.077) 
Financial Sector -0.095* (0.057) -0.080 (0.096) 
Agriculture Sector -0.054** (0.023) -0.043 (0.051) 
Level of Democracy -0.132 (0.105) -0.096 (0.228) 
US Aid 0.003 (0.003) -0.031 (0.034) 
Currency Crisis 0.104 (0.293) 0.228 (0.411) 
Currency Crisis (t-1) 0.359 (0.249) -0.046 (0.433) 
Currency Crisis (t-2) -0.033 (0.257)  0.065 (0.313) 
GDP growth  0.011 (0.026) -0.028 (0.038) 
GDP per capita 0.008 (0.064) -0.153 (0.229) 
Country Size -0.445** (0.195) -0.190 (0.264) 
Total Seats 0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.003) 
Lagged Level of 
Reforms -0.434** (0.213) -0.624* (0.365) 
      
No. of observations 830 433 
No. of failures 68 37 
Time at Risk 5729 3317 
Log  Pseudo-
Likelihood -277.945 -120.729 
Wald Chi Square 71.8 103.05 
Prob.> Chi Square 0.000 0.000 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; and *p<0.10.  Entries are coefficients and robust standard errors are in 
parentheses.  Significance is based on 2-tailed tests. 
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 4.0  FINANCIAL REFORMS IN INDONESIA 
 
 
4.1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Based on the findings of the preceding chapters, theoretical arguments are assessed in Chapter 4 
and Chapter 5 employing case studies.  I conduct case studies of the following three countries: 
Indonesia in this chapter and Thailand and Korea in Chapter 5.  Indonesia, Thailand, and Korea 
were all hit by the Asian financial crisis.  All three countries asked for IMF rescue packages and 
all these countries aimed at conducting banking reforms under the IMF conditionality programs 
after the Asian financial crisis.  However, despite these similarities, the outcomes of the banking 
reforms for these countries showed differences.  Hence, I assume that not only IMF influence as 
an international pressure but also the number of veto players and their preferences would explain 
the difference in outcomes of the financial reforms.  In addition, I look at how interest groups 
such as the banking sector and the manufacturing sector exert influence by putting pressures on 
governments and sometimes by colluding with politicians.  I hypothesized that the 
manufacturing sector supports financial reforms in such dimensions as privatization of banks, 
capital account liberalization, interest rate liberalization, elimination of credit controls, and 
elimination of entry barriers while the manufacturing sector opposes financial reforms in the 
dimension of enhancement of banking supervision.  Concerning the banking sector, I 
hypothesize that the banking sector is likely to oppose financial reforms in all six dimensions.  
Therefore, I closely examine how the interactions between the IMF, policy makers, and interest 
groups shape the outcomes of financial reforms.   
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 Quantitative studies cannot reveal the dynamics concerning how key players such as the 
IMF, economic policy makers, politicians, and interest groups interact.  Therefore, by conducting 
case studies, I could closely examine how these key actors’ preferences and interactions shape 
financial reform outcomes.  Further, in quantitative analysis, expected results were not obtained 
concerning the impact of the banking sector.  Therefore, by conducting case studies in this 
chapter and subsequent chapter, I could more thoroughly examine the effects of the banking 
sector in case studies.   
In the case of Indonesia, I examine financial reforms from 1965 to 2003 chronologically, 
starting from the beginning of the Suharto regime to graduation from the IMF programs.  I 
especially focus on how the six dimensions of financial reforms were facilitated or hindered as a 
result of interactions between politicians, banks, and conglomerates representing the interests of 
the manufacturing sector.  In the following section, Indonesia is illustrated as a case in which the 
collusion between politicians and conglomerates and banks shapes the outcomes of financial 
reforms.  In the third section, I conclude. 
 
 
4.2.  FINANCIAL REFORMS IN INDONESIA 
 
Indonesia, once praised as one of the countries that achieved the Asian miracle of economic 
growth (World Bank 1993), was the hardest hit by the Asian financial crisis.  The currency crisis 
together with the banking crisis had a devastating impact on Indonesia’s whole economy.  Also, 
Indonesia is the only country that had experienced democratization during the turmoil of the 
Asian financial crisis.  During the years from 1965 to 1998, Indonesia was a centralized, one 
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 party dominant authoritarian country led by Suharto.  Suharto, the military, and the one dominant 
political party, Golkar, were the central political players.  Only two other political parties were 
allowed to exist and due to the penetration of the military and Golkar through the state apparatus 
of bureaucracy, although there were elections in order to elect members of the House of 
Representatives, the Dewan Peruwakilan Rakyat (DPR), in fact, Golkar’s unbeatable winning 
had not given any room for the other two existing political parties to alter the tenure of President 
Suharto.  Thus, Suharto maintained a highly centralized political system during his presidency 
over thirty years.  It is argued that the Suharto regime transformed from a hierarchical military 
regime (1965-74), to bureaucratic authoritarianism (1975-88), and finally to a sultanistic regime 
(1989-98) (Chandra and Kammen 2002).   
After the installation of his own government, Suharto maintained Indonesia’s repressed 
financial system in which state banks had played a dominant role.  This repressed financial 
system during the 1960s and the 1970s was successfully reformed into a more liberalized 
financial system, and private banks became more important during the 1980s.  However, as a 
result of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, state banks became dominant again.  After the Asian 
financial crisis, moral hazard problems and the collusion between politicians and the banking 
sector in Indonesia were argued as one of the causes of the Asian financial crisis (Haggard 2000).  
After democratization, new fragile democratic governments had to implement financial reforms 
as a part of the IMF conditionality programs.   
How have Indonesia’s financial reforms evolved and why?  How does politics relate to 
financial reform outcomes?  Are macroeconomic conditions and the IMF programs the only 
factors which can explain financial reform outcomes in Indonesia?  Have the banking sector and 
the manufacturing sector played important roles in explaining financial reforms in Indonesia?  
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 How has the newly democratized government committed to financial reforms?  In the following 
sub-sections, I examine financial reforms in Indonesia from 1965 to 2003, from the beginning of 
the Suharto regime to its graduation from the IMF programs.  The years are divided into the five 
periods: 1) 1965–1982, 2) 1982–1996, 3) 1997–1998, 4) 1998–1999, and 5) 1999–2003.   
Indonesia experienced four presidents from 1997 to 2003, when Indonesia was under the 
Fund conditionality programs.  Despite that Indonesia was under IMF pressures to facilitate 
financial reforms, commitment to financial reforms varied from a government to a government.  
By examining temporal variation, I illustrate not only the IMF programs but the number of veto 
players and societal pressures matter in shaping financial reform outcomes.  Also, I illustrate 
which dimensions of financial reforms were facilitated or hindered was also conditioned upon 
not only IMF programs but also domestic political factors such as the number of veto players and 
interest group pressures. 
 
4.2.1. State controls over the banking sector via state banks: 1965–1982 
 
At the time when General Suharto took office following a failed coup attempt in 1965, inflation 
reached 600% because of the former President Sukarno’s populist stance.  During the Sukarno 
era, foreign banks were nationalized, state banks financed government debts, and the state banks 
were amalgamated into one huge state bank, Bank Nagara Indonesia (Rosser 2002, 53).  The 
Suharto government had to ask for the IMF’s assistance in 1966.  Contrary to the pro-communist 
stance of Sukarno, the anti-communist stance of the Suharto government enhanced their 
credibility to commit to conditionality programs.  Under the IMF’s influence, the government 
adopted stabilization policies and also financial reforms.  In 1967, a foreign investment code was 
adopted to attract foreign capital and controls on foreign exchange were removed (MacIntyre 
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 1993).  Further, a series of new banking laws in 1967 and 1968 dismantled Bank Nagata 
Indonesia into six separated state banks.  Then, in 1969, foreign banks were permitted to enter 
the Indonesian financial market and allowed to operate banks in Jakarta.  The IMF was 
influential in facilitating stabilization programs, opening foreign capital account, and facilitating 
banking reforms to some extent.   
However, with regard to banking reforms, the impact of international financial 
institutions was limited.  Indeed, Indonesia maintained a repressed financial system where state 
banks dominated its financial system from the 1960s on (Sato 2005; Hamada 2003).  Figure 4.1, 
shown below, displays the lending ratio according to type of commercial banks: state owned 
banks, private banks, and foreign banks.   
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Figure 4.1 Lending Ratio by Type of Commercial Banks in Indonesia 
Sources: Hamada (2003), Indonesian Financial Statistics (Bank Indonesia, various years), and the central 
bank’s website, http://www.bi.go.id/web/en/Data+Statistik/, accessed on January 10, 2007.   
 
 
As shown above, state banks were dominant from 1965 to 1982 and the lending ratio of 
state banks increased during the late 1960s and the 1970s.  President Suharto increased control 
over state banks during this period.  Direct and indirect credits were allocated through the central 
bank and state banks to farmers, indigenous firms, the manufacturing sector, and mid-term 
investment credits, for instance (MacIntyre 1993, 149).  Moreover, facing opposition from 
domestic banks concerning the allowance of the new entry of foreign banks into the Indonesian 
financial market, new entry of foreign banks was not in fact permitted (Rosser 2002, 55).   
During the 1970s Indonesia enjoyed an economic boom as an oil producing country.  
Backed by the increase in oil revenues, the government increased credit allocation with 
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 subsidized interest rates to specific sectors (Sato 2005).  Especially in 1974, after the Malari 
incident in which an anti-Japanese prime minister student demonstration triggered massive anti-
foreign and anti-Chinese street riots, the government introduced preferential credits for pribumi, 
or the Malay people.  Also in 1974 investment guidelines which favored pribumi business were 
issued.50   Further, in 1979, President Suharto issued a decree that stated preferential credit 
allocation would be given to pribumi in government projects.   
The Chinese businessmen lobbied the government not to apply the above investment 
guidelines (Sato 2003).  As a result, even though it looked like the government favored pribumi 
business and not Chinese business using preferential credit allocation, in fact, these guidelines 
against Chinese business were never strictly enforced (Sato 2003, MacIntyre 1993, 152).  On the 
contrary, during the 1970s, Chinese businesses grew as conglomerates based on their close 
connection with Suharto.  Therefore, by expanding these preferential credit allocations via state 
banks, state bank officials, politicians, and bureaucrats nurtured ties not only with state 
corporations but also with business associates, mainly with Chinese businessmen (Rosser 2002, 
58). 51   Thus, the government strengthened its control over state banks during this period.  
Preferential credit allocation created political opportunities for the president and politico 
                                                 
50 Investment guideline stated as follows; 1) foreign companies were able to set up joint ventures 
only with pribumi companies, 2) Existing foreign companies that had Chinese business as 
partners had to give majority ownership of shares to pribumi, or sell their shares on the stock 
market and 3) Companies owned by non-pribumi owned companies had to transfer majority 
shares to pribumi or sell their shares on the stock market (Sato 2003). 
51 According to MacIntyre (1993), they were Liem Sioe Liong, Bob Hassan, and William 
Soeryadjaya, for example (152).  Liem Soie Liong was the owner of the largest conglomerates in 
Southeast Asia, the Salim Group, and also owned the Bank Central Asia.  Mohamad Hassan was 
the owner of the Bob Hasan Group, and William Soeryadjaya was the owner of Astra Group 
(Sato 1993, 409).  For details of the Salim Group, see Sato (1993).  Suharto’s daughter, Tutut, 
and a son of Suharto had already become 30% shareholders in Liem Soie Liong’s Bank Central 
Asia in the 1970s (Robinson and Hadiz 2004, 58).   
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 bureaucrats, allowing them to allocate subsidized credits and business opportunities to connected 
individuals and growing Chinese conglomerates.   
 
4.2.2.  The first and the second financial liberalization: 1983–1996 
 
The first wave of financial reform started in 1983.  The collapse of oil prices in 1982 caused 
balance of payment problems.  The government had to ask for IMF assistance and the Indonesian 
government implemented a reform package that included full interest rate liberalization for both 
deposit and lending rates in June, 1983 (Sato 2005, 98).  Conglomerates supported these reform 
measures.  Elimination of interest rate controls would make state banks less competitive so that 
conglomerates’ private banks would be able to expand their business opportunities in the 
banking sector.  However, with respect to the dimension of the elimination of credit controls, 
although the reform package included the scaling down of preferential credit allocation, these 
reforms did not progress much.  The major reason for delaying reforms was opposition from 
state bank officials and indigenous business firms (Rosser 2002, 61-62).  The President himself 
also opposed the elimination of credit controls because it meant that the government would lose 
important policy tools to favor close individuals (MacIntyre 1993, 159). 
In October, 1988, after the second collapse of oil prices in 1986, the second financial 
reform package, PACT 88, was announced.  PACT 88 included financial reform measures 
concerning the elimination of entry barriers on banks: 1) elimination of entry barriers against 
domestic banks, 2) elimination of entry barriers against foreign banks, 3) easing of branching 
restrictions, and 4) abolishment of functional specialization of banks (Sato 2005, 99; Sharma 
2001, 86; Hamada 2003, 12–13).  Furthermore, in November 1989, the ceiling of offshore 
144 
 borrowing for banks was abolished and replaced by a net open position system and the limits on 
FDI inflow were abolished (United Nations 1999, 43). 
As to more concrete policy measures, as a result of these reforms, new domestic banks 
could be set up by holding paid-up capital of 10 billion rupiah.  Also, domestic banks could open 
branches all over Indonesia and foreign banks could open branches outside Jakarta.  However, 
entry of foreign banks was only allowed through either the establishment of a joint venture with 
local banks or the acquisition of shares of domestic banks via capital markets (United Nations 
1999, 40).  With respect to the abolishment of functional specialization of banks, now private 
banks can establish development banks and also existing savings banks can become commercial 
banks (Hamada 2003, 12).   
Table 4.1 shown below displays the number of commercial banks and the number of 
branches of commercial banks.   
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 Table 4.1 The Number of Commercial Banks and Commercial Bank Offices 
 State Banks Regional Government Banks 
Private National 
Banks 
Foreign and Joint 
Banks 
 
Number 
of 
Banks 
Number 
of 
Offices 
Number 
of 
Banks 
Number 
of 
Offices 
Number 
of 
Banks 
Number 
of 
Offices 
Number 
of 
Banks 
Number 
of 
Offices 
1985 7 783 27 201 69 390 11 21 
1986 7 798 27 215 68 431 11 21 
1987 7 817 27 228 65 464 11 21 
1988 7 835 27 238 64 512 11 21 
1989 7 860 27 269 63 644 11 21 
1990 7 940 27 326 91 1460 23 40 
1991 7 1044 27 408 129 2742 29 53 
1992 7 1066 27 425 144 2855 30 56 
1993 7 1076 27 426 161 3036 39 75 
1994 7 1171 27 431 166 3203 40 83 
1995 7 1301 27 446 165 3458 41 83 
1996 7 1379 27 490 164 3964 41 86 
1997 7 1527 27 541 144 4150 44 90 
1998 7 1602 27 555 130 3976 44 121 
1999 5 1579 27 554 92 3581 40 93 
2000 5 1506 26 550 81 3228 39 95 
2001 5 1522 26 574 80 3332 34 92 
2002 5 1574 26 562 77 3336 34 90 
2003 5 1669 26 613 76 3555 31 107 
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia for years from 1985 to 1992 (Badan Pusat Statistik 
various issues). Entries are as of March in each year.  Indonesian Financial Statistics from 
1993 to 2003 (Bank Indonesia various issues).   
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 As shown above, a rapid increase in the number of banks and the number of offices can 
be observed, especially in private national banks, as a result of the reforms in 1989.  In 1989, the 
number of private national banks was 63 and the number of offices of private national banks was 
644, which increased to 144 and 4150, respectively in March, 1997, soon before the onset of the 
Asian financial crisis.  Also, as can be seen in Figure 4.1 in the previous sub-section, the lending 
ratio of private banks rapidly increased after 1988.  The average lending ratio of private banks 
rapidly increased from 18.1% during the period 1983 to 1987 to 37.5% from the period 1988 to 
1996.  In fact, in 1994, the lending ratio of private national banks (38%) surpassed that of state 
banks (35.3%).  Thus, the elimination of entry barriers in 1988 resulted in the development of 
private banks.  Conglomerates hurried to establish their own banks to finance their own projects 
(Sato 2003, 23).52  Each of the large conglomerates came to possess at least one bank (United 
Nations 1999, 40) and these business affiliated banks became the major players in the banking 
sector (Sato 2005, 100). 
The reason why these financial reforms concerning the elimination of the entry barriers 
on new banks and the easing branching restrictions were possible was precisely because these 
reforms were supported by conglomerates (Rosser 2002, 61).  The elimination of entry barriers 
and erasing of branching restrictions as well as the access to global financial market by 
liberalizing capital inflow provided new business opportunities for conglomerates to expand their 
business not only to telecommunications, public utilities, and transportation but also into the 
banking industry.  Thus, conglomerates came into the banking sector, which provided them with 
lucrative opportunities to finance mega projects in the area of infrastructure as well as the 
                                                 
52 For example, the Sampoerna cigarette manufacturing group established Bank Sampoerna, a 
medium size bank, in August 1989 to finance other within-group firms.  After the Asian financial 
crisis, Bank Sampoera was taken over by Bank Danamon (Rosser 2002, 73). 
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 manufacturing sector (Robinson and Hadiz 2004, 73).  In fact, the Suharto family linked with 
Chinese conglomerates in running mega projects.  Under these circumstances, concerning 
mandatory preferential credit allocation to specific sectors, except subsidized credits to the 
agricultural sector, mandatory preferential credit allocation was eliminated in 1990 and strict 
state controls over the banking sector in terms of credit allocation ended (Sato 2005).53   
In 1992, the Banking Law was amended with the aim of enhancing banking supervision 
over the banking sector.  The amended 1992 Banking Law included the following reform 
measures: 1) the restriction of the aggregate amount of group lending to 20% of bank capital, 2) 
a tripled minimum capital for giving licenses to banks in order to engage in foreign exchanges, 
3) an increase in capital adequacy ratio from 8% to 12%, and 4) the introduction of the CAMEL 
system for monitoring banks’ risks including on-site examination (Sharma 2001, 89).54   
However, despite these legal amendments, which met with international standards 
concerning banking supervision, the inter-connected lending within the group firms did not halt.  
Given the high stakes for the Suharto family, state bank officials, and conglomerates, they 
strongly opposed these regulatory reform measures and so reforms on the enhancement of 
banking supervision were not effectively enforced (Robinson and Hadiz 2006, 121).  The central 
bank was also institutionally dependent on the government, which made supervision 
                                                 
53 Nonetheless, it is worth noting that state banks also continuously played a role in providing 
credits, even with the development of private banks.  Especially state banks funded a series of 
mega projects related to the Suharto family including automobiles and petrochemicals (Robinson 
and Hadiz 2004, 80).   
54 CAMEL was developed to objectively evaluate banks’ risks when supervisors conduct on-site 
examinations.  CAMEL refers to Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, Management, Earnings, and 
Liquidity.  CAMEL was originated from the methods of US banking supervision and is now 
regarded as the international standard to objectively monitor banks’ risks.  For a detailed 
explanation of the CAMEL rating system, see Yokoi-Arai (2002, 30–43). 
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 implementation harder, despite its neoliberal economic orientation. 55   As a result, the 
implementation of these measures was quite lax.   
Before the Asian financial crisis, it was already recognized that the bank problems caused 
by inter-connected lending behavior had reached an unacceptable level.  Private banks owned by 
major business figures such as Tutut, Bob Hasan, Ibnu Sutowo, Prajogo Pangestu, and Liem Sioe 
Liong, and Sudwikatmono held an excess amount of inter-connected loans beyond the 1995 legal 
targets (Rosser 2002, 75).  However, while Bank Summa, owned by Soeryadjaya, the eldest son 
of the largest automaker Astra Group, was closed due to bad loans accumulated because of inter-
connected lending, Bank Duta was rescued because Bank Duta was owned by foundations that 
were well-connected with Suharto (Sato 2005, 101-102).   
In the cases of state banks, the problems were the lack of repayment by borrowers.  State 
banks also had problems of non-performing loans caused by risky lending behavior.  Because of 
the collusion between state bank officials and borrowers, well-connected borrowers did not pay 
back their debts.  For example, a leading textile manufacturing firm, Dritex, failed to pay back its 
debts to state banks (Rosser 2002, 80).56  The risky lending behavior of Indonesian state banks 
and private banks in addition to inconsistent the bailing out practices by the Indonesian 
government mentioned above made up the Indonesia’s moral hazard problem, which were 
blamed as one of the major causes of the Asian financial crisis.  
Thus, under the highly centralized Suharto authoritarian regime, the pace of financial 
reforms or which dimension of financial reforms had been facilitated or delayed, was determined 
                                                 
55 In fact, although lower ranking central bank officials were promoted based on merits, high 
ranking central bank officials were dependent on Suharto’s order in deciding economic policy in 
a critical moment (interview with the Bank Indonesia’s central banker, Wimboh Santoso, on 
March 2005).  
56 Concerning other examples of bank problems before the crisis, see Pangestu and Habir (2002).   
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 depending upon whether financial reforms fit the vested interests centered on Suharto, which 
included state bank officials and Chinese conglomerates as well as pribumi (indigenous) 
conglomerates.   
Overall, the dimensions of capital account liberalization, interest rate liberalization, 
elimination of credit controls, and elimination of entry barriers were accelerated dimensions 
supported by conglomerates, in which the manufacturing sector’s interests were represented as 
major conglomerates’ activities.  Conglomerates wanted to expand their access to credits by 
liberalizing interest rates, eliminating credit controls, and capital accounts.  Also, they welcomed 
the move toward the elimination of entry barriers that provided them with a chance to set up new 
banks to enhance access to credits for related groups.  On the other hand, the dimension of the 
enhancement of banking supervision was the delayed dimension facing opposition.  The 
enhancement of banking supervision was opposed by the conglomerates as well as both private 
banks and state banks.  Despite the mounting problems of banks, the Suharto government, 
backed by colluding banks and firms, did not undertake effective measures on banking 
supervision to handle these problems but rather postponed taking necessary measures.   
 
4.2.3. The Asian financial crisis and the demise of the Suharto regime: 1997–1998 
 
The Asian financial crisis started in Thailand in July, 1997 had spread into neighboring countries 
including Korea and Indonesia.  Following Thailand’s move that allowed the Thai baht to float 
on July 2, 1997, Indonesian rupiah faced foreign currency pressures.  The early move of the 
Indonesian government to abandon the pegged exchange rate regime on August 14, 1997 was 
initially welcomed by the IMF in an issued statement (IMF 1997a).  However, the crisis did not 
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 stop.  Banks were not able to fully repay their unhedged liabilities in foreign currency due to the 
rupiah depreciation.  High interest rates worsened banks’ liabilities and corporate distress 
worsened banks’ asset values (Pangestu and Habir 2002, 16).  These banking problems soon 
resulted in a systemic banking crisis.   
The Indonesian government contacted the IMF on October 8 on Suharto’s instruction.  
After short negotiations between the IMF and Suharto’s economic team from October 13–31, 
they reached agreement on the first IMF stabilization package as the first Letter of Intent (LOI), 
on October 31, 1997.  This first IMF November package was a three-year standby agreement for 
10.14 billion US dollars, with immediate disbursement of 3.04 billion US dollars.  The first LOI 
included macroeconomic stabilization measures such as setting the budget surplus target as 1 % 
during 1998/1999 as well as structural reform measures, including financial sector reforms (IMF 
1997b).57  Especially, the following financial reform measures were included as performance 
criteria: 1) closure of banks that did not submit rehabilitation plans by the end of December or 
whose plans were disapproved by the central bank, and 2) a quantitative target for state banks 
based on the agreement between the MOF, the central bank, and state banks by the end of 
December (IMF 1997c).  The list of the LOI by the Indonesian government after the onset of the 
Asian financial crisis was appended as Appendix 4.A.  
On November 1, 1997, as a part of the conditionality programs, 16 insolvent banks 
(2.5 % of the market share) were closed.  However, the lack of public announcement of the 
contents of the first LOI, the unclear standards for the closure of banks, and the lack of full 
                                                 
57 Included financial reform measures were: the immediate closure of 16 insolvent banks, the 
merger of state banks as preparation for privatization, auditing of state banks by an 
internationally recognized auditing firm, submission of a rehabilitation plan for banks to the 
Central Bank, elimination of credit allocation to specific sectors, and legal amendments to set up 
exit rules of banks, etc. (IMF 1997b). 
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 deposit guarantee raised the public’s concerns, with the public correctly suspecting that other 
major banks might also be insolvent (Enoch 2000, 6–7).  Further, the collusion between the 
Suharto family and banks continued and these Suharto-related bank owners resisted the IMF 
conditionality programs being implemented.  The owner of one closed bank, a son of Suharto, 
challenged the bank closure and was ensured he could continue his business under a different 
name (Robinson and Rosser 2000, 179).  This caused further the loss of public confidence.  As a 
result, bank run occurred in two-thirds of the 222 banks by the end of November 1997 (IMF 
2003a, 75). 
Initially, the IMF felt that the structural conditionality was a good opportunity to assist 
with structural reforms in Indonesia, where the IMF recognized rent-seeking problems in its 
surveillance (IMF 2003a, 76).  However, Suharto lacked commitment to the conditionality 
programs, and the IMF evaluated that no performance criteria had been implemented fully in its 
first assessment in December, 1997.  Though the plan of the merger of four state banks and the 
allowance of the merger by foreign banks were announced on December 31, 1997, these 
announcements were not effective at restoring public confidence (Kenward 2002, 56—57).   
The January IMF package was announced on January 15, 1998 in the midst of a further 
loss of market confidence as a result of the proposed government’s fiscal budget, which did not 
meet the IMF target.  At that time, bank runs continued and the “financial sector meltdown 
became increasingly real” (Enoch et al. 2001, 32).58  Though, the second LOI did not include 
financial reforms, the IMF stated that a plan for banking sector restructuring had been formulated 
and would be announced shortly (IMF 1998d).  Following this promise, the government took 
                                                 
58 Rupiah depreciated continuously from 4,600 rupiah per US dollar in December, 1997 to 
14,000 rupiah per US dollar by the end of January, 1998.  Depositors withdrew their deposits in 
dollars and the central bank continued to provide liquidity support, which reached 6% of GDP.   
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 measures upon approval from the IMF and announced an emergency plan to stabilize the 
banking sector on January 27, 1998 which included: 1) a blanket guarantee of deposits 
(Presidential Decree No.26 of 1998), 2) the establishment of the Indonesian Banking 
Restructuring Agency (IBRA) (Presidential Decree No.27 of 1998), and 3) corporate 
restructuring.  The IBRA was established for the purpose of supervision and bank restructuring 
(Kenward 2002, 68–69).  The roles of the IBRA were to close, merger or take over, and 
recapitalize banks.  Banks who failed to submit rehabilitation plans would be taken over by the 
IBRA.  Also, the IBRA aimed to recover banks’ bad loans by selling corporate assets transferred 
by bank owners as collateral for emergency central bank liquidity credits (Pangestu and Habir 
2002, 19).   
The first round of bank restructuring was conducted on February 14, 1998.  The IBRA 
consulted with bank owners of 50 private and regional development banks and 4 state banks that 
had received 200% of liquidity support of their capital.  These bank owners agreed to transfer 
these banks’ assets to the IBRA.  However, these IBRA operations were treated as confidential, 
so the public was unaware of then and the impact of these operations was very limited.  Further, 
despite the IMF’s suggestion that the IBRA should be an autonomous body, the IBRA was 
placed under the MOF’s authority (Enoch et al. 2001, 75—76), and so was dependent on the MOF.   
Suharto’s idea concerning the adaptation of the currency board system, the lack of 
enough implementation of the second IMF package, and re-election of President Suharto further 
aggravated crisis situation.  On March 10, 1998, Suharto was re-elected as President for a 
seventh term.  Suharto announced cabinet members who were business partners close to him 
such as Bob Hasan, who was the owner of conglomerates and Tutut, his daughter (Robinson and 
Rosser  2000, 182).   
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 The negotiations between the IMF and the government for the third IMF package started 
on March 16.  At this time, the Fund sent a strengthened staff team for negotiation.59  Moreover, 
the Fund changed its method of money disbursement.  Instead of releasing three billion US 
dollars at one time, the Fund decided to disburse one billion US dollars three times, dependent 
upon the degree of implementation of the conditionality programs based on the assessment of 
monthly reviews (Kenward 2002, 83–84).  Further, the Fund asked for a prior action by the 
IBRA, before the third package into effect, to demonstrate the IBRA’s independence in bank 
restructuring operation.  Therefore, on April 4, 1998, the second round of bank restructuring was 
conducted by the IBRA.  The IBRA took over seven large banks: one state bank (Bank EXIM) 
and six major private banks.  In addition, seven other small banks that borrowed more than 500% 
of their capital were closed (Pangestu and Habir 2002, 20).  Contrary to the first round of bank 
restructuring, this time, the criteria to close banks were publicly announced and the operation 
went smoothly.  However, while the IBRA was able to transfer the banks’ liabilities, the IBRA 
was unable to control the banks’ assets due to the delay in amending bank laws (Enoch 2000, 
13–14).   
The third IMF package announced on April 10, 1998 included the banking sector 
restructuring by the IBRA as a prior action as mentioned above.  In addition, other financial 
restructuring measures such as the complete transfer of problem loans to the IBRA’s asset 
management unit, the merger of Bank Bumi Daya and BAPINDO, and the elimination of 
restrictions on foreign ownership of banks, for instance, were included (IMF 1998c).  However, 
despite the IMF intention to strengthen the role of the IBRA, on April 22, eight banks were 
                                                 
59 The team head was led by the Director of the Asia and Pacific Department, for example, and 
Stanley Fisher continued to play an active role.  “The Fund seemed to be throwing all possible 
resources at this round of negotiation” (Kenward 2002, 83–84).   
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 released from the control of the IBRA without consultation with the IMF.  This caught the 
Fund’s attention, and they asked for clarification of the exit policy of the IBRA (Kenward 2002, 
91).  In the end, the exceptional treatment was reversed for only four banks out of the eight 
(Enoch et al. 2001, 36).  Further, the restructuring of 54 troubled banks in which bad debts had 
been transferred to the IBRA in February 1997 had been slipped out of the government’s main 
reform agenda because of lobbying by some bank owners (Enoch 2000, 16).  Finally, on May 21, 
1998, the incidence of riots due to cuts in basic commodities and students’ deaths in the midst of 
the anti-Suharto demonstration, all led to the demise of the Suharto regime that had lasted for the 
past thirty two years.   
During this period, despite the fact that Indonesia was under the IMF conditionality 
programs, financial reforms addressed in the IMF conditionality programs tended to be delayed 
due to collusion between the Suharto family and well-connected business associates.  Banking 
restructuring measures to resolve banking problems were repeatedly delayed and/or had a loop-
hole in order to protect vested interests of banks and conglomerates.  However, despite these 
problems, the establishment of the IBRA was a major achievement for the enhancement of 
banking supervision under the IMF conditionality program.   
 
4.2.4. Financial reform under Habibie presidency: 1998–1999 
 
After Suharto was ousted from the power on May 21, 1998, Vise President Habibie succeeded 
him as president.  The Habibie government committed to financial reforms than the Suharto 
government.  Under a deepening economic crisis and rising social demands for political 
liberalization soon after the demise of the Suharto government, he had little choices but to abide 
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 by the reform agenda set in the IMF conditionality programs.  The new cabinet immediately 
committed to notable changes in banking reforms.60  The first change was to take over Bank 
Central Asia (BCA).  The May riot, which had led to the demise of Suharto’s New Order regime, 
had triggered a massive bank run on BCA, the largest private bank in Indonesia, owned by the 
Salim Group, the largest conglomerate in Southeast Asia.  BCA was taken over by the IBRA on 
May 29, 1998.  Shareholders’ rights were suspended and the management was changed 
(Pangestu and Habir 2002, 21).   
The government announced the IMF package on June 24, 1998 and policies were listed as 
the second supplementary memorandum of economic and financial policies.  In this round of 
negotiation, it was decided that monthly reviews would continue and the amount of money to be 
disbursed was increased from 10 billion US dollars to 11 billion US dollars (Kenward 2002, 101).  
This IMF package included the following financial reform measures: 1) submission of a draft for 
the amendment of banking laws by August 31, 1998 and 2) submission of a bill to eliminate 
restrictions on foreign investments in listed banks by June 30, 1998 (IMF 1998b).  The new 
government had changed the role of the IBRA from both supervision and restructuring of banks 
to bank restructuring exclusively while the supervisory function of banks had been returned to 
the central bank.  Also, the Asset Management Unit was established within the IBRA (Enoch et 
al. 2001, 77).   
During the spring and summer of 1998, international audit firms had conducted portfolio 
reviews of banks that had been taken over by the IBRA in April 1998.  The results of these 
                                                 
60 Unlike the final cabinet of the Suharto government, where cronies occupied the important 
posts, Habibie allocated major posts to economic technocrats.  Habibie ensured the continuation 
of the post of Coordinating Minister of the Economy, Ginandjar Kartasasmita, who was the most 
trusted by the IMF in the Suharto cabinet.  Also, a highly respected economist, Professor Widjojo 
Nitisastro at the University of Indonesia, was appointed as an economic advisor (Sharma 2001, 
105).  For further information, see Johnson (1998, 10). 
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 portfolio reviews were leaked to the press in June 1998.  They revealed that the banking sector as 
a whole was seriously insolvent and immediate actions were necessary to restore the banking 
sector (Sharma 2001, 105—106),61 which shocked the public as there was no excuse for the banks 
under investigation to be insolvent.  In these circumstances, the IBRA conducted the third round 
of banking restructuring on August 21, 1998.  Three banks (Bank Umum Nasional, BDNI, and 
Bank Modern) were closed and their deposits were transferred to the state bank.  Further, 
anticipating the merger of four state banks in preparation for privatization, Bank Mandiri was 
established (Enoch et al. 2001, 127).  In July 1998, the IMF programs were changed from a 
stand-by agreement to an extended fund facility (EFF).  The repayment period was extended 
accordingly from 3.25–5 to 4.5–10 years (Kenward 2002, 106).   
As a big step forward for the enhancement of banking supervision over the banking sector, 
the new Banking Law replaced the Banking Law of 1992 on November 10, 1998.  The 
amendment allowed 100% foreign ownership of shares of banks in line with the IMF program.  
Also, the power to give bank licenses was transferred from the MOF to the central bank.  The 
central bank was empowered to set regulations concerning bank branches (Yokoi-Arai 2002, 
149–150).  Also this amendment gave the necessary legal power to the IBRA to do its job.  With 
this amendment, the IBRA was empowered to transfer assets against a debtor.  Furthermore, new 
regulations were issued concerning loan classification, provisioning, and debt restructuring 
(Sharma 2001, 106).   
Also, a legal amendment to ensure central bank independence, which was listed as 
performance criteria in the LOT dated on July 29, 1998 (IMF 1998a), was achieved under the 
Habibie presidency.  Upon consultation with the IMF and with the former Governor of 
                                                 
61 Non performing loans of six banks which were taken over reached 55% on average and one 
was 90% (Pangestu and Habir 2002, 22). 
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 Bundesbank, Helmut Schelsinger, the MOF and the central bank prepared the amendment bill by 
the end of 1998.  The bill was brought to the parliament and after five months deliberation by 
Commission VIII, the bill was passed in the DPR Assembly on April 14 and became effective on 
May 17, 1999 (Ali et al. 2003, 85).  As per this new Central Bank Act (Act No. 23 of 1999), the 
central bank was free from intervention by the government.  Supervision over the banking sector 
was defined as the purpose of the central bank as well as the ensuring of macroeconomic stability.  
Also, the legal base for the establishment of the IBRA was articulated (McLeod 1999, 148).  
Before the democratic election held in June 1999, the parliament had consisted of three main 
political parties: Golkar, the United Development Party (PPP), and the Indonesian Democratic 
Party- Struggle (PDI).  Golkar de facto dictated parliament with 80 % of the seats, including 
appointed military and other appointed representatives and was not constrained by any other 
opposition parties.  Thus, with respect to the dimension of the enhancement of banking 
supervision, the new Habibie government was able to conduct reforms upon close consultation 
with the IMF that prioritized the central bank independence as was necessary in its conditionality 
programs.     
However, banking restructuring reforms where bank owners’ individual interests were more 
at stakes tended to be delayed.  The IBRA developed a comprehensive recapitalization plan for 
private banks in September 1998, in which banks were categorized based on capital adequacy 
ratio (CAR), and when bank owners were not able to inject sufficient capital to push up the CAR 
to a defined level, banks would be taken over by the IBRA.  Banks were categorized as 
“Category A” when banks had a CAR of above 4%, and banks could then resume operations.  
Banks were categorized as “Category B” when the CAR was between 4% and –25%.  Bank 
owners were subject to the program.  They could inject 20 % of new capital to obtain a 4% CAR.  
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 “Category C” banks were banks where the CAR was below –25%.  Owners were given time to 
inject capital to push up the upper categories and if they failed to do so, banks would be taken 
over by the IBRA (Pangestu and Habir 2002, 23).  
Although, the plan itself was finalized by the end of December 1998, the announcement of 
the results of bank audits and the implementation of take-over were postponed until the end of 
February, 1999.  Moreover, further postponing due to a lack of consensus concerning the 
treatment of a few banks caused a negative market reaction since it suggested obvious political 
interference (Pangestu and Habir 2002, 23; Enoch 2000, 20–21).62  The IMF was aware of these 
delayed restructuring processes and demanded the appropriate closure of banks as a condition for 
the disbursement of the 43 US billion dollars agreed upon (Sydney Morning Herald 1999).63   
Finally, the audit information was released on March 13, 1999.  Out of the 150 audited 
banks, 54 banks were ranked as “Category A”, 56 banks as “Category B”, and 40 banks as 
“Category C”.  Although all state banks except one were ranked as Category C, the state banks 
were not closed but rather restructured by injection of capital.  Four state banks (Bank Ekspor 
Impor Indonesia, Bank Bumi Daya, Bank Dagang Nagara, and Bapoindo) were merged into 
Bank Mandiri (Cameron 1999, 21) on July 31, 1999.   
On that day, the IBRA conducted the fourth round of bank restructuring.  Thirty eight banks 
were closed and 8 banks were taken over (Enoch et. al 2001, 127).  Nonetheless, banking 
restructuring reforms such as settling on a bank rehabilitation plan between owners’ of banks and 
the IBRA tended to be delayed.  Since the individual stake was high for powerful business figure, 
                                                 
62 Bakrie Group’s Bank Nusa Nasional was not closed despite the fact that its CAR was –230%.  
Instead of closure, Bank Nusa Nasional was rather taken over by the IBRA.  It was believed that 
the reason for this special treatment was because the bank owner, Mr. Bakrie, had a close 
relationship with President Habibie and the Economy Minister (Greenlees 1999). 
63 “Indonesian Banks Win Another Reprieve.” The Sydney Morning Herald, 5 March 1999. 
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 bank share-holders tended to resist the repayment of their liquidity supports.  For example, Bob 
Hassan, a shareholder of Bank Umum Nasional, repeatedly postponed a meeting with the IBRA 
regarding the repayment of liquidity support to the IBRA (Tripathi and Murphy 1998, 58).  
Further, recapitalization programs and the injected money to rescue banks themselves became 
lucrative opportunities for politicians and bank owners.  In August, 1999, the IBRA claimed that 
80 million US dollars used to find a recapitalization program for Bank Bali was missing.  Later, 
it became apparent that the money was paid to a firm owned by a Golkar’s deputy treasurer, 
Satya Novanto, in exchange for the rescue of other banks (Rosser 2002, 188).  In this “Baligate” 
scandal, not only Golkar politicians but also officials of the IBRA, the Bank of Indonesia, and 
the Ministry of Finance were believed to be involved.  As a result, Habibie suspended the 
Finance Minister, the governor of the central bank, and others.  The IMF, World Bank, and the 
Asian Development Bank expressed that the disbursement of money would be dependent upon 
the result of investigation of Baligate by outsiders (Landler 1999).  Thus, bank restructuring 
processes were delayed due to collusion between politicians and conglomerates as banking 
owners.   
Nevertheless, despite these delays in hindsight, the Habibie government committed to 
financial reforms more strongly than the former Suharto government, especially in the dimension 
of the enhancement of banking supervision over the banking sector such as ensuring the legal 
independence of the banking supervisory agency, ensuring the power of the banking supervisory 
agency to issue and revoke licenses of banks, and in the dimension of the elimination of entry 
barriers on foreign banks.  Facing the end of New Order regime and realizing the inter-rim nature 
of the Habibie government, “Habibie has little alternative but to appropriate the mantle of 
reformism, pre-empting more radical agendas for a fundamental dismantling of the regime and 
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 its institutions (Robinson and Rosser 2000, 186).”  Knowing that the IMF’s disbursement would 
be conditioned upon the results of monthly reviews and the banking sector as a whole was de 
facto insolvent, there was little room to oppose the amendment of the Banking Law.  Thus, in 
terms of the dimension of the enhancement of banking supervision, especially in the dimension 
that related to the institutional reform of the banking supervisory agency, the Habibie 
government facilitated reforms because they faced IMF pressure in the form of monthly reviews 
as conditions of money disbursement.   
 
4.2.5. Post crisis financial reforms under fragile new democracies: 1999–2003 
 
The first democratic election was held on June 7, 1999.  The People’s Consultative Council or 
the Majelis Permusywaratan Rakyat (MPR), 462 out of 700 of which consisted of elected 
congresspersons of the DPR, convened in October, 1999.  The MPR was the supreme body to 
elect the president and amend the constitution.  The 700 members of the MPR consisted of 500 
members of the DPR (462 elected congresspersons and 38 appointed military members), 135 
regional delegates, and 65 appointed social delegates (Crouch 2000, 116).  Therefore, at this time, 
the president was not elected by direct election but rather elected by the MPR.  In this vein, 
although the MPR once served as an organ to “elect” President Suharto, once it mainly consisted 
of elected DPR members, Indonesia’s political system became closer to a parliamentary 
system.64  The election results of the DPR for the June, 1999 election is shown as Table 4.2 
below.   
                                                 
64 This constitutional rule was amended in 2002 and a direct presidential election was held in 
2004. Also, 38 seats for appointed military officers in the DPR were abolished.  For details of 
constitutional amendments and electoral rules, see (Sherlock 2004). 
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 Table 4.2 Results of the DPR Election in June 1999 
 
 
Political Party 
 
 
No. of Seats 
 
 
Seat Share 
 
Indonesian Democracy Party-Struggle (PDI-P)* 
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30.6% 
Golkar* 120 24% 
Unity and Development Party (PPP)* 58 11.6% 
National Awakening Party (PKB)* 51 10.2% 
National Mandate Party (PAN)* 34 6.8% 
Crescent and Star Party (PBB)* 13 2.6% 
Justice Party (PK)* 7 1.4% 
Love the Nation Democratic Party  5 1% 
Nahdlatul Ummat Party 5 1% 
Justice and Unity Party 4 0.8% 
Indonesian Democratic Party 2 0.4% 
10 parties (1 each) 10 0.2% each 
Military (Appointed) 
 
38 7.6% 
Total  500 100 
Source: Political Handbook of the World 2000-2002, 507. * shows political 
party which obtained cabinet posts in the first Wahid government. 
 
 
In the election for president, Habibie made an accountability speech seeking re-election 
on October 14 and was rejected by a narrow margin.  On October 20, 1999, the assembly elected 
Abdurrahman Wahid as president and Megawati Soekarnoputri as vice president (McIntyre 
2005, 129).  Though Abdurrahman Wahid was elected as the president, his National Awakening 
Party (PKB) did not secure a majority of seats.  His party, PKB, was not even a leading party and 
ranked as fourth, as shown in Table 4.2 above.  Rather, Vice President Megawati 
Soekarnoputri’s party, PDI-P, was the leading party. 65   Upon consultation with Megawati 
                                                 
65 However, Megawati Soekarnoputri’s presidency was not supported by Amien Rais’s National 
Mandate Party (PAN), which had a loose alliance with other Muslim parties.  Habibie was not 
supported by the Golkar itself when Akbar Tanjung, the chairman of the Golkar, was offered the 
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 Soekarnoputri (PDI-P), Amien Rais (National Mandate Party), Akbar Tanjung (Golkar), and 
General Wiranto (military), Abdurrahman Wahid formed the National Unity cabinet, which 
included all the main political parties.  Cabinet posts were allocated to PKB, PDI-P, Golkar, 
PAN, PPP, PK, and PBB as well as the military and non-party affiliates (Crouch 2000, 120).  
Key cabinet posts, such as the Coordinating Minister of Economy, Finance, and Industry, the 
Minister of Finance, and the Minister of Industry and Trade, were allocated to Kwik Kian Gie 
(PDI-P), Bambang Soedibyo (PAN), and Jusuf Kalla (Golkar) respectively.  The post of Foreign 
Minister was allocated to the PKB and the post Minister of Investment and State Enterprise to 
Laksamana Sukardi (PDI-P) (Soesastro 2000, 138).   
A critical task for the new Wahid Government was to restructure banks,66 which was also 
the IMF’s priority in its conditionality programs.  On January 20, 2000, the new Indonesian 
government canceled the previous EFF and signed a new arrangement for a three-year EFF (IMF 
2000A).  It was expected that the new Wahid government would commit to financial reforms.  
However, unfortunately, it turned out that Wahid did not demonstrate strong leadership, and the 
lack of coordination among cabinet members in economic policy-making became obvious 
(Soesastro 2000, 138).  “Fragmentation of the cabinet was reflected in the fragmentation of 
economic decision making authority between a number of competing cabinet ministers and their 
outside advisers (Sharma 2001, 110).”  Under these circumstances, the disbursement of the IMF 
money was postponed in March, 2000.   
                                                                                                                                                             
post of vice president by Megawati Soekarnoputri in the negotiation process in electing the 
president.  For more information on alliance formation in the presidential race, see (Soesastro 
1999; Crouch 2000; Vatikiotis and McBeth 1999).   
66 The cost for the government in issuing government bonds to finance liquidity supports 
reached 50 billion US dollars, and the total amount for bank restructuring reached 90 billion US 
dollars or 85% of the GDP as of 2000 (Soesastro 2000, 136).  The IBRA had to maximize its 
revenue by selling the assets of taken over banks.   
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 It turned out that Wahid lacked the necessary administrative skills to be an effective 
president.  His frequent absence due to visits abroad led members of the cabinet to question his 
competency (Budiman 2001).67  In addition, Wahid’s frequent dismissals of cabinet ministers led 
to further questioning about his capability to take the initiative in policy making among 
coalitions.  Wahid dismissed two major political figures such as Hamzad Haz (party leader of the 
third ranked political party, PPP), and General Wiranto (the most prominent military officer in 
supporting democratization processes).  Furthermore, in April, 2000, Wahid dismissed two 
economic ministers: Laksamana Sukardi (PDI-P) from the Minister for Investment and State 
Enterprises, and Jusuf Kalla (Golkar) (Gorjao 2003, 31).  In addition, Wahid dismissed the 
Governor of the Central Bank, Syahril Sabirin, and placed him in detention in June, 2000, which 
was openly criticized by the Fund.68  Facing strong demands from major political parties in an 
annual session of the MPR in August, 2000, Wahid agreed to transfer his daily duties of 
preparing the cabinet’s working agenda and determining the focus and priorities of the 
government to the vice president, Megawati.  However, Megawati refused the proposal since she 
rather wanted a formal decree from the MPR.  But this was not acceptable to Wahid since if the 
decree was issued by the MPR, Wahid would become a mere ceremonial president (Gorjao 2003, 
35).   
Wahid did not give up the presidential power to appoint cabinet members.  A new cabinet 
was announced without consultation with Megawati in August, 2000.  The new cabinet members 
did not include any PDI-P members except vice president herself and Golkar, but rather 
                                                 
67 Wahid visited 50 countries within five months after inauguration (Budiman 2001, 146–147)   
68 Syahril Sabirin was released and resumed his job as the Governor of the Central Bank in 
December, 2000 (Dick 2001, 12). 
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 appointed persons who were close to Wahid.69  Though Megawati did not explicitly criticize 
Wahid, she was absent when Wahid announced the new cabinet.70  After Wahid survived the 
annual session of the MPR in August, 2000, various proposals were considered to facilitate the 
coordination between Wahid and Megawati, though they did not work out (Gorjao 2003, 35–36).  
Further, Wahid reshuffled the cabinet five times between June, 2001 and mid-July, 2001 (Lanti 
2002, 116), which was an extraordinary amount.   
These dismissals of cabinet members were not because Wahid wanted to facilitate 
reforms by exclusively handling cabinet posts.  Rather Wahid wanted to maximize lucrative 
opportunities to nurture ties between his party or himself and close business associates.  For 
instance, Laksamana’s dismissal was believed to be because Laksamana revealed the fact that 
Marimutu Sinivasan, the owner of the Texmaco conglomerate, who violated a banking regulation 
by receiving a loan of 1.2 billion dollars as Suharto’s friend in 1997, donated money to an 
Islamic organization that Wahid represented (McIntyre 2005).  In addition, though the official 
reason for the dismissal of the central bank governor, Sabirin, was that he was a suspect in the 
Bank Bali case, it was believed that his dismissal was really because the central bank refused 
Wahid’s preferred candidate in replacing the top management of state banks because of the 
failure of fit and proper test (McLeod 2000, 8).  Furthermore, it turned out that President 
Abdurrahman Wahid himself became the center of a series of corruption scandals, the so called 
“Buloggate”, “Bruneigate”, and “Borobudurgate”.71   
                                                 
69 The other political parties in the cabinet were PPP, PKB, PAN, PBB, and PK (Shiraishi 2003, 
7). 
70 Wahid explained Megawati’s absence was because she wanted to take a shower and stated 
that one could not stop if a woman wanted to take a shower (Budiman 2001, 148). 
71  The first scandal “Buloggate” indicated the incident where money (35 billion rupiah or about 
four million US dollars) was disbursed from the staff pension fund of the Bulog, the state logistic 
agency, due to the pressure from “president”.  Bulog’s deputy was arrested.  Wahid’s masseur, 
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 Due to this paralyzation of politics, the implementation of the IMF package was also 
delayed.  The dismissal of Sabirin caused an interruption in the IMF review.  The IMF wanted to 
protect central bank independence while the Wahid government wanted to intervene.  The 
relationship between the IMF and the Wahid government rapidly deteriorated toward the end of 
2000 (Djiwandono 2003, 210).  Wahid and the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs, 
Rizal Ramli, desperately sought other solutions such as future sales of oil and gas, for instance, 
to finance government deficits rather than asking for a rescue package from international 
financial institutions.  The government continued to portray the IMF as foreign body imposing 
unrealistic conditions (Dick 2001, 10—11).  
Further, banking restructuring and the sale of assets of banks, namely the dimension of 
privatization of banks, tended to be hampered.  Although the IBRA had sold 22.5% shares of 
BCA in May, 2000 (McLeod 2000, 24), and a further 10% in July, 2000 (Siregar 2001, 296), 
additional share sales of Bank Central Asia (BCA) and Bank Niaga was rescheduled to occur in 
the first half of 2001 rather than late 2000 (Dick 2001, 21).  Although the target of the IBRA’s 
sale for the 2001 budget was to obtain 37 trillion rupiah from asset sales and bank restructuring, 
only one-third of the target, 8.6 trillion rupiah, was achieved (Lanti 2002, 125).  The chair of the 
IBRA also was changed in June, 2001, with this being the sixth head of the IBRA in the three 
years since its establishment in 1998.72  The lack of cooperation from former owners of banks, 
who were all well known conglomerates, continued and delayed bank restructuring and IBRA’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
Suwondo, was argued to be involved in this incident.  The second scandal, “Burneigate” was that 
Wahid received two million US dollars from the Sultan of Brunei and failed to report it to the 
state treasury.  Though it was explained that this money was for charity in Ache, the money did 
not go to the government but went to a project run by his political party (McLeod 2000, 7–8).  
The third scandal, “Borobudurgate” refers to the name of the hotel where Wahid met Suharto’s 
son, Tommy, who was seeking a pardon from the president (Budiman 2001, 149).  
72 I Puty Ary Sita replaced Edwin Gerungan in June, 2001 (Siregar 2001, 295). 
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 asset recovery processes (Dick 2001, 23).  Moreover, the program reviews by the IMF were 
often postponed and there was no disbursement of loans from September, 2000 to August, 2001.  
Finally, in a special session of the MPR held on July 21, 2001, President Wahid was impeached 
due to failure to provide enough evidence to prove he was not involved in scandals.  On the same 
day, Vice President Megawati succeeded to the presidency.73   
Megawati’s cabinet, announced on August 10, 2001 was called the “Dream Team” 
because of the allocation of posts to a combination of technocrats and coalition partners (Sadli 
2003, 193).  Hamzah Haz, a leader of the Muslim United Party (PPP), became the vice president.  
He was a key figure of the Central Axis, a loose alliance of Muslim parties.  The main cabinet 
posts were given to members of PDI-P, Golkar, PAN, and PBB (Crescent Star Party) (Siregar 
2001).74   
In order to obtain financial aids from international creditors such as international 
financial institutions and foreign governments, there was little choice for the new Meagawati 
government but to restore their relationship with the IMF.  The Megawati government resumed 
the relationship with the IMF when a new LOT was signed on August 27, 2001, and in 
September, 400 million US dollars were disbursed and further loan tranche was conditioned 
upon three month reviews (IMF 2001c).   
                                                 
73 For details of the impeachment of Wahid, see McIntyre (2005, 232–235). 
74 The Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs was Dorpdjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, former Dean 
of Faculty of Economics at the University of Indonesia.  The Minister of Finance was Boediono, 
a technocrat who worked in both the Suharto and Habibie cabinets.  Both Laksamana Sukardi as 
the State Minister of State-Owned enterprises and Kwik Kian Gie as the head of Bappenas (the 
National Development Planning Agency) were from PDI-P and both of them were once 
dismissed under the Wahid government.  Also, an ex-military officer, Suslio Bambang 
Yudhoyono, became the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs (Siregar 2001, 
278–279).  He became the President after Megawati on October 20, 2004.  The political parties 
in the cabinet were PDI-P, Golkar, PPP, PAN, and PBB (Shiraishi 2003, 7). 
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 However, financial reforms in the dimension of privatization of banks, namely, the asset 
recovery of taken-over banks by the IBRA, tended to be delayed due to the opposition from 
political parties in the DPR.75  For example, asset sales of 30% shares of BCA again failed in the 
first few months in 2001.  In the LOI in August, 2001, the government stated its intention to sell 
a majority of the shares of BCA and to set up a strategy for the majority sale of Bank Niaga by 
the end of 2001 in consultation with the DPR (IMF 2001c).  However, many DPR members 
expressed dissatisfaction due to the fear of selling bank assets to foreign investors and of 
changing the most influential private bank into a foreign owned bank.  Rather than selling the 
majority shares of BCA as stated in the LOR, the DPR only agreed to sell 30% of shares of BCA 
in 2001, with an additional 21% to be sold in the future (Siregar 2001, 295–297).  Finally, 
privatization of the BCA, which had originally planned for completion in 1998, was completed 
in April, 2002.  BCA was sold to an American firm, the Farallon Capital Management 
consortium, for 542 billion US dollars (Athukorala 2002, 142).  Further, a majority share of 
Bank Danamon, targeted in the LOI in July, 2000, was finally divested in June, 2003, which 
marked a three-year delay (McLeod 2004, 106).  Thus, fragmented party controls over the 
cabinet and the congress caused a delay in privatization of banks.   
Furthermore, although privatization of the majority stake of state banks had been 
particularly emphasized by the IMF, privatization of state banks was delayed.  Recapitalization 
of state owned banks should have been taken place together with privatization of state banks.  
However, though a 20% share in Bank Mandiri was sold to the general public in July, 2003 and a 
49% share of Bank Rakyat was sold in November, 2003, the government never gave up its 
                                                 
75 The IBRA, established in 1998, only restructured 30% of its non performing loans and sold 
8% of its total assets by September 2001.  Similar institution of the IBRA in Thailand and Korea 
had sold about 70% and 45% respectively (Siregar 2001, 295). 
168 
 control of the majority shares of state banks by the time of graduation from the IMF programs in 
December, 2003 (McLeod 2004, 114).  Thus, not only privatization of taken over banks but also 
privatization of state banks tended to be delayed.  
In addition, any senior persons involved in any financial scandals were not prosecuted, 
and due to unequal treatment toward former bank owners by the IBRA, debt repayments were 
rescheduled for a longer term for former bank owners (Deuster 2002, 16).  These situations 
suggest that political influence of conglomerates still resulted in delaying bank restructuring.76  
Thus, collusion between politicians and conglomerates, namely corporate owners and former 
bank owners, inhibited the progress of privatization of banks as well as bank restructuring.  In 
fact, conglomerates tended to support major political parties, not only Golkar but also other 
parties such as PDI-P and PAN after democratization (Robinson and Hadiz 2004, 232, 235).  
Thus, newly emerged political parties were backed up conglomerates respectively. 
Megawati resisted demands to increase cabinet portfolio allocation for her own party in 
2002.  However, her cabinet was regarded as highly ineffective due to a multiparty coalition 
cabinet, intra-party conflicts, and ideological disagreement.  There was often contradiction 
within the cabinet itself and the cabinet was in a gridlock in terms of economic policy making in 
2002.  The Minister for National Development Planning, Kwik Kian Gie, though he was once 
regarded as reform-oriented, kept insisting that the government should end the IMF programs, 
and the Coordination Minister for Economic Affairs, Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, was not able to 
                                                 
76 The Lippo scandal, which erupted from late 2003 and continued into early 2004, highlighted 
this point.  The Lippo Group, the former owner of Lippo Bank, tried to buy back a majority share 
of Lippo Bank at a lower price.  Finally, this attempt failed and the management of Lippo Bank 
was changed, and a fine was imposed on the management of Lippo Bank.  However, the former 
bank owner was not prosecuted at this time again, which showed the continuation of the political 
influence of conglomerates (MacIntyre and Resosudarmo 2003, 151).  A 52.05% share of Lippo 
Bank was sold to Swissasia Global consortium in February, 2004.   
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 stop him (Smith 2003, 98).  Vice President Hamzah Haz also became a troubling opponent 
within the cabinet as he emerged as a potential major candidate for the next presidential race 
scheduled in 2004 (Smith 2003, 99).  
On December 19, 2003, the DPR passed an amendment to the Central Bank Law 23/1999.  
It comprehensively addressed a lender of last resort function to the central bank.  In order to 
enhance the central bank’s accountability, an advisory body (five members) was established over 
the central bank and the president could dismiss the governors only when they engaged in 
prohibited acts (Sato 2005, 111).  However, central bank independence was rather weakened due 
to the establishment of the advisory body over the central bank and also paved the way for the 
president to dismiss central bank governors and the IMF opposed the amendment (Kenward 
2004, 28).  In addition, although the Financial Services Activity was to set up as a consolidated 
institution for financial supervision, this was not to be established until 2010 (Kenward 2004, 28).  
Thus, although the government amended the Banking Law, it did not ensure central bank 
independence and more effective banking supervision.  Rather, the central bank independence 
was weakened by its amendment of the Banking Law.   
The MPR recommended Megawati not renew the IMF programs, which would expire on 
December 31, 2003 (Suryadinata 2004, 100).  Following this MPR recommendation, the 
Megawati government chose not to renew the programs and graduated from the IMF program at 
the end of December, 2003.  The IBRA was dissolved on February 27, 2004 and unsold bank 
assets were transferred to a newly established state-owned asset management company (IMF 
2004b).   
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 After five rounds of bank restructuring, state banks became dominant again in the 
Indonesian financial system.77  Although attempts at restructuring banks and privatization of 
banks were made beginning in the early phase of the IMF programs, the dimension of 
privatization of banks tended to be delayed.  The Wahid government had not committed to 
financial reforms.  Frequent reshuffling of cabinet members, a lack of majority support from the 
DPR, favored treatments to close allies and the involvement in scandals all delayed financial 
reforms.  In addition, relations with the IMF deteriorated during the Wahid government.  On the 
other hand, the Megawati government resumed the relationship with the IMF and tried to commit 
to financial reforms.  However, her cabinet consisted of a multi-party executive collation, which 
prevented facilitating the privatization of banks.  Also, the political influence of powerful 
conglomerates and former bank owners were still strong, so banking restructuring processes 
were again delayed.   
 
 
4.3.  CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter qualitatively assesses the degree to which, the interactions between the IMF, the 
number of veto players, and societal factors such as the manufacturing sector and the banking 
sector shaped financial reforms from 1965 to 2003 in Indonesia.  During the 1960s and 1970s, 
the Suharto government strengthened control over state banks under Suharto’s highly centralized 
one party dominant authoritarian regime.  Suharto and politico bureaucrats such as state bank 
                                                 
77 It was only in 2003 when private banks’ lending ratio again surpassed state banks. 
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 officials extracted rents though preferential credit allocation and nurtured ties with pribumi 
business elites and Chinese conglomerates. 
However, facing economic recessions and the collapse of oil prices, the Suharto 
government was committed to first and second waves of reforms in 1983 and in 1988.  Through 
these two waves of reforms the Suharto government committed to financial reforms toward 
financial liberalization.  However, which dimension of financial reforms were facilitated was 
depended upon whether particular dimensions of financial reforms fit the vested interests of 
politico bureaucrats and conglomerates.  Capital account liberalization, interest rate liberalization, 
and elimination of entry barriers were accelerated due to the support from conglomerates, where 
the manufacturing sector’s interests represented as the major industry of conglomerates.  
Conglomerates wanted to expand their access to credit by liberalizing interest rates and capital 
accounts.  Also, they supported elimination of entry barriers on banks, which provided new 
opportunities to open new banks to provide credits to related group firms.  In addition, although 
state bank officials strongly opposed elimination of credit controls because of fears to lose 
opportunities to extract rents and reforms were delayed, during 1990s, credit controls were 
eliminated along with the development of private banks owned by conglomerates.  On the other 
hand, the dimension of enhancement of banking supervision over the banking sector was delayed 
and not de facto implemented in both private banks and state banks despite of the legal 
amendments and rampant inter connected lending did not cease.   
However, though the problem of inter connected lending by banks was recognized, 
because of the country’s sound macroeconomic fundamentals, nobody had predicted that the 
Asian financial crisis would hit Indonesia so hard.  In this vein, “the influence of interest groups 
… tended to have been underestimated” (Boediono 2002, 386).  Suharto asked for an IMF rescue 
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 package, but the banking crisis deepened into a systemic level.  Despite the fact that the 
president’s commitment was critical, Boediono, an economic technocrat who worked in both 
Suharto cabinet and Habibie cabinet, observed that “interest groups stepped up their efforts to 
gain access to the president” by the end of 1997 (Boediono 2002, 386).  Suharto did not 
committed to financial reforms and instead responded to these interest groups’ demands.  Thus, 
“The IMF programs lacked the ownership of those who counted the most in the decision making 
apparatus of Indonesia” (IMF 2003a, 86).   
The Habibie government, on the other hand, committed to financial reforms more than 
the former Suharto government, especially in the dimension of enhancement of banking 
supervision over the banking sector.  Legal amendments concerning the independence of the 
banking supervisory agency (i.e., the central bank), the power of issuing and revoking licenses of 
banks by the banking supervisory agency, and compete elimination of entry barriers on foreign 
banks were achieved.  For Habibie, there was little choice but to follow the IMF’s prescription 
and pursue financial reforms in order to restore market confidence and end bank runs so that he 
might be able to win a forthcoming election and to become president.   
The Wahid government did not commit to financial reforms.  Frequent reshuffles of 
multi-party executive coalitions extending favored treatments to close allies, a lack of majority 
support from the DPR, and involvement in corruption scandals delayed financial reforms.  Also, 
relations with the IMF deteriorated during his government.  On the other hand, the subsequent 
Megawati government resumed the relationship with the IMF and tried to commit financial 
reforms.  However, despite good relations with the IMF, concerning privatization of banks, a 
fragmented multi-party executive collation and the necessity of obtaining approval from the DPR 
tended to result in delaying the privatization of banks.  Also, powerful conglomerates and former 
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 bank owners were still politically influential; therefore, banking restructuring processes were 
delayed.  Although privatization of banks and bank restructuring had been emphasized in the 
IMF programs, these dimensions tended to be delayed.  Thus, the number of veto players and the 
interest of the banking sector resulted in delaying privatization of banks and bank restructuring. 
This chapter illustrates the case of Indonesia, examining whether hypotheses listed in 
Chapter 2 were upheld.  Macroeconomic deteriorations and subsequent IMF programs affected 
financial reform outcomes.  However, the IMF programs were not the only factor to affect 
financial reform outcomes; domestic political factors such as the number of veto players and 
societal pressures also shaped financial reforms in Indonesia.  Suharto facilitated financial 
reforms in such dimensions as capital account liberalization, interest liberalization, elimination 
of credit controls, and elimination of entry barriers, in which he was able to provide business 
opportunities and better credit access to conglomerates.  On the other hand, other dimension such 
as banking supervision tended to be delayed.  Thus, with collusion between political elites and 
business elites was rampant, financial reform outcomes reflected the colluded interests of 
Suharto and his business associates.   
Facing a massive bank run and the risk of collapse of the whole economy in the Asian 
financial crisis, the government asked for IMF assistance.  From 1997 to 2003, Indonesia was 
under the Fund conditionality programs.  Though the IMF approach was assumed to be apolitical, 
in fact, “The IMF does not only determine the reforms to be undertaken and the target deadlines, 
but in a number of instances has had to prescribe also how the reforms should be implemented: 
for example, determining guidelines for debt structuring and selecting individual banks for 
divestment” (Pangestu and Goeltom 2001, 146).  Thus, the government tended to be under strong 
pressure of the IMF.   
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 However, despite of this pressure, the commitment to financial reforms varied.  From 
1997 to 2003 when Indonesia was under the IMF programs after the Asian financial crisis, 
Indonesia experienced four presidents.  As mentioned, Suharto did not commit to financial 
reforms but rather responded to conglomerates’ demands.  On the other hand, Habibie did 
commit to financial reforms and relatively free from conglomerate influence, given the political 
uncertainty after the demise of the Suharto government and the possibility of political 
liberalization.  In addition, Habibie already commanded majority supports in the parliament 
given the de facto Golkar dominated parliament.  Under these circumstances, he could commit to 
the Fund conditionality programs and he facilitated the enhancement of banking supervision and 
banking restructuring operations by the IBRA.   
After the election of the DPR, President Wahid was a minority president that needed 
majority support from the DPR, and he appointed a national unity cabinet which consisted of 
seven political parties.  However, frequent reshuffles in cabinet members, his involvement in 
scandals, the favoring of personal allies and party supporters caused a lack of progress in 
financial reforms despite the country being under IMF programs.  Relations with the IMF 
deteriorated and disbursement of money was suspended.   
The subsequent Megawati government resumed the relationship with the IMF.  However, 
in fact, an executive coalition consisting of fragmented political parties caused prolonged 
discussion on privatization of banks.  In addition, the fragile new democratic government was 
not free from political interference from conglomerates.  These conditions resulted in delays of 
privatization of banks and restructuring of banks. 
Thus, by looking at temporal variation in Indonesian financial reforms, as illustrated in 
this chapter, not only macroeconomic conditions and the IMF programs but also the number of 
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 veto players and societal pressures also affected financial reforms.  Moreover, which dimensions 
of financial reforms were facilitated or hindered was also conditioned upon political factors such 
as the number of veto players and societal demands.  In the following chapter, Chapter 5, I will 
illustrate the cases of Thailand and Korea.  Thailand is a case of delayed financial reforms due to 
highly fragmented political parties and multi-party coalition governments.  Korea is depicted as a 
case of facilitated financial reform because of the executives’ initiatives.   
176 
 Appendix 4.A Indonesia and IMF Programs under the Asian Crisis 
 
 
 
 
Title of Documents Date
Suharto Government
Indonesia Letter of Intent 31 October 1997
Indonesia—Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies 15 January 1998
Indonesia—Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial
Policies 10 April 1998
Habibie Government
Indonesia—Second Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and
Financial Policies 24 June 1998
Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Economic and Financial
Policies 29 July 1998
Indonesia—Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial
Policies 11 September 1998
Indonesia—Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial
Policies 19 October 1998
Indonesia—Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial
Policies 13 November 1998
Indonesia—Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial
Policies: Fourth Review under the Extended Arrangement 19 March 1999
Indonesia—Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial
Policies: Fifth Review under the Extended Arrangement 14 May 1999
Indonesia—Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial
Policies: Sixth Review under the Extended Arrangement 22 July 1999
Wahid Government
Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies Medium-Term
Strategy and Policies for 1999/2000 and 2000 20 January 2000
Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies 17 May 2000
Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies 31 July 2000
Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies 7 September 2000
Megawati Government
Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies 27 August 2001
Indonesia—Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and
Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding, 13 December 2001
Indonesia—Letter of Intent 9 April 2002
Indonesia—Letter of Intent 11 June 2002
Indonesia—Letter of Intent 20 November 2002
Indonesia—Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and
Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding, 18 March 2003
Indonesia—Letter of Intent 11 June 2003
Indonesia—Letter of Intent 16 September 2003
Indonesia—Letter of Intent 10 Decemebr 2003
Source: http://www.imf.org/external/country/IDN/index.htm, accessed on March 21, 2007.  
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 5.0 FINANCIAL REFORMS IN THAILAND AND KOREA 
 
 
5.1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, I further explore two cases, Thailand and Korea, to test my claims qualitatively.  I 
examine the impact of the IMF, the number of veto players, and interest groups on financial 
reforms in Thailand and Korea by comparing these cases with the Indonesian case.  Thailand and 
Korea, as well as Indonesia, were admired as examples of the East Asian miracle of growth 
through pursuing export-oriented industrialization.  However, in the turmoil of the Asian 
financial crisis, all three countries experienced not only a currency crisis but also a banking crisis.  
They all asked the IMF for rescue packages in which financial sector restructuring and banking 
reforms were the critical policy arenas.   
Nevertheless, despite the emphasis on financial reforms by the IMF for all three countries 
after the Asian financial crisis, the pace of conducting financial reforms varied.  Therefore, I 
assume that the number of veto players and political influence of the banking sector and the 
manufacturing sector explain the variation of the outcomes of financial reforms, holding the IMF 
pressures as constant.   
Contrary to Indonesia, where state banks dominated the financial system as a pre-
condition to financial reforms, Thailand had maintained a financial system where private banks 
owned by financial conglomerates dictated its financial system.  The banking sector acted as a 
powerful interest group and resisted financial reforms, which can be especially observed in the 
dimension of elimination of entry barriers on banks before the Asian financial crisis.  Also, the 
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 situation of many veto players because of the multi-party ruling coalition based on highly 
fragmented political parties caused a delay in financial reforms in Thailand not only before the 
Asian financial crisis but also after the Asian financial crisis.  Therefore, even when Thailand 
was under the IMF conditionality programs, Thailand’s financial reform tended to be delayed.   
On the other hand, Korea was more similar to Indonesia, where state banks dictated its 
financial system.  However, in the Korean case, financial policies were part of a state-led 
industrialization strategy, and the state more systematically imposed restrictions on banks, with 
conglomerates called chaebals systematically benefiting from the government industrialization 
policy.  However, rather than suffering from too many veto players or too fragmented a 
multiparty ruling coalition as seen in Thailand and in Indonesia after democratization under 
President Wahid and President Megawati, Korea successfully conducted financial reforms under 
the IMF conditionality programs.  Under the Asian financial crisis, the new president, Kim Dae-
jung, wanted to break up the previous government’s ties with conglomerates. Therefore, in 
contrast to the situation in Indonesia and Thailand, where the government delayed reforms, the 
Kim Dae-jung government accelerated financial reforms.   
In the second and third sections of this chapter, I illustrate the Thailand case by 
chronologically dividing periods into “before the Asian financial crisis” (section 5.2) and “after 
the Asian financial crisis” (section 5.3).  In the fourth section (section 5.4) and fifth section 
(section 5.5), I similarly illustrate the Korean case.  In the last section, I discuss the Thai and 
Korean cases compared with the Indonesian case.  
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 5.2.  THAILAND: BEFORE THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
 
5.2.1. Financial conglomerates and the domination of the banking sector 
 
Financial conglomerates dictated Thailand’s financial system vis-à-vis state banks.  In fact, in 
Thailand, after World War II, the five large Sino-Thai banks became the core of Thailand’s 
financial system (Suehiro 2002, 162).78  As a result, private banks were dominant rather than 
state banks, which differed from the initial conditions in Indonesia and Korea where state banks 
were predominant as prior conditions of financial reforms.  In Thailand, these five financial 
conglomerates nurtured strong ties with military leaders during the 1950s and 1960s.  Also, these 
banking groups diversified into various industrial sectors in the 1960s and 1970s as 
conglomerates, and they established their own manufacturing firms.  Moreover, when Thailand 
aimed at promoting export-led manufacturing industrialization in the 1980s, commercial banks 
also developed ties with export-oriented firms in such areas as textiles, electronics, and 
automobiles.  However, despite these connections between banks and export-oriented firms, the 
relationship between the banking sector and the manufacturing sector was not as close in 
Thailand as in Indonesia in general.  In fact, there were no formal institutionalized ties between 
the Thai Bankers’ Association (TBA) and the Federation of Thai Industries (FTI), which 
represented the interests of bankers and manufacturers, respectively (Zhang 2003, 54).  Thus, in 
                                                 
78 Banks owned by the five financial conglomerates were the Bangkok Bank, the Bank of 
Ayudhya, the Thai Farmers’ Bank, the Bangkok Metropolitan Bank, and the Siam Commercial 
Bank.  Concerning the bank concentration ratio of the five largest banks, i.e., the percentage of 
the total assets held by five financial conglomerates, they were 70.6 % in 1979, 70.5% in 1983, 
62.3% in 1990, and 59.5% in 2000 (see Suehiro 2002, 170).   
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 Thailand, the banking sector, concentrated in the form of financial conglomerates, acted 
separately from the manufacturing sector.   
In these circumstances, privatization of banks was not an important dimension of 
financial reforms in Thailand because banks were already mainly privately owned.  Also, credit 
controls were less rampant as pre-financial reform conditions relative to Indonesia and Korea.79  
Hence, the elimination of credit controls was a less contentious issue than in Indonesia and 
Korea as well.  On the other hand, these financial conglomerates were heavily protected by high 
entry barriers against both new domestic and foreign banks.  Also, the banks faced less pressure 
from competition due to the fixed interest rates set by the central bank.   
At the end of the 1970s and in the early 1980s, due to the second oil shock, Thailand 
experienced a balance of payment crisis and implemented the IMF conditionality programs.  
However, although the government tried to eliminate entry barriers against foreign banks and 
domestic banks, these financial conglomerates acted as a powerful interest group and strongly 
opposed these reform measures.  The government therefore postponed the decision toward the 
elimination of entry barriers on banks and dropped it from the reform agenda (Zhang 2003, 112).   
 
5.2.2. Emergence of the new business interests 
 
Politically, Thailand experienced gradual democratization processes.  Though legislative 
elections had been held since the late 1970s, the prime minister, Prem Tinsulanonda, an ex-
military independent officer who took office from 1980 to 1988 and led coalition governments, 
was not elected by the populace.  Thailand was democratized as a parliamentary system with a 
                                                 
79 See Doner and Unger (1993) in this regard.   
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 constitutional monarchy in August, 1988, when Chatchai Choonhavan became the first elected 
prime minister.  Thailand’s democracy was characterized by highly fractionalized political 
parties under its parliamentary system, with frequent attempts to vote on non-confidence motions.  
Political party composition in coalition governments from 1988 to 2004 was appended as 
Appendixes 5.A, 5.B, and 5.C.   
When in August, 1988 Chatichai Choonhavan took office as Thailand’s first elected 
prime minister, Chartichai’s Chart Thai Party represented newly emerged business interests who 
supported liberalization measures.  Politicians began to fill cabinet posts which had previously 
been occupied by the military and technocrats (Handley 1997, 98-99).  Pramual Sabbavasu, the 
deputy head of the Chart Thai Party, was appointed as finance minister and promised to pursue 
rapid financial reforms (Zhang 2003, 114).  Financial liberalization was considered an important 
means to reduce the dominant power of the banking sector relative to the manufacturing sector.  
Therefore, Chartichai’s newly installed democratic government pursued some financial reforms 
backed by the manufacturing sector’s interests.  For instance, the government abolished the 
interest rate ceilings on fixed deposits of more than 1 year’s maturity in June, 1989 (United 
Nations 1999, 162).  Industrialists welcomed this move to curtail the power of oligopolistic 
banks.  Private bankers and the TBA leaders, on the other hand, opposed this move due to the 
fear of having to face harsher competition among banks.  However, despite the opposition from 
the banking sector, the government facilitated the reform toward the elimination of interest rate 
controls by taking advantage of the dominant position of the Chart Thai Party within the 
coalition government as a leading party (Zhang 2003, 122).  With respect to capital account 
liberalization, in May 1990, the Thai government accepted Article VIII of the IMF agreements 
and the multiple exchange rate system was abolished (United Nations 1999, 162).   
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 However, concerning the elimination of entry barriers, as in previous years, strong 
opposition from the banking sector again caused a halt to the move toward reforms.  In Thailand, 
entry barriers against not only foreign banks but also domestic banks had continuously been 
maintained as mentioned above.  When a draft of a bill for eliminating entry barriers was finally 
announced in 1987, many restrictions still remained in the bill draft.  The high capital 
requirement, the requirement of joint venture, and the requirement for equity participation in 
existing domestic banks rather than the allowance of opening of foreign bank branches were 
listed as conditions in order to open new foreign banks in Thailand.  Even this bill draft was 
harshly opposed not only by banks and but also by the TBA leaders.  As a result, the plan to 
eliminate entry barriers on banks was again dropped from the government’s agenda in 1990 
(Zhang 2003, 124).  Thus, the banking sector strongly opposed the move toward elimination of 
entry barriers against on banks, which resulted in delaying the elimination of entry barriers on 
banks.  In this vein, although the newly emerged manufacturing sector and the benefited middle 
class supported the Chart Thai Party in its aim to promote the elimination of entry barriers on 
banks, financial conglomerates were still influential players, and these reform measures were not 
achieved (Handley 1997, 98).   
 
5.2.3. Financial liberalization in the early 1990s  
 
In February, 1991, the military staged a coup, having felt threatened by their marginalized status 
under democracy.  Ananda Panyarachun accepted the premiership, backed by the military 
(Samudavanija 1997, 52).  Though Ananda’s cabinet was backed by the military, the military 
refrained from intervening in economic policy making.  Ananda was a liberal-minded 
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 businessman, and Ananda’s cabinet made most of the major decisions toward financial 
liberalization.  They aimed for the establishment of a financial center in the Southeast Asian 
region (Phongpaichit and Baker 2000, 24).  A bill for interest rate liberalization was approved 
unanimously by the cabinet and full interest rate liberalization was achieved in June, 1992 
(United Nations 1999, 162).  The Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF), an offshore 
banking center, was established in 1993 and commercial banks were allowed to engage in 
foreign exchange transactions (United Nations 1999, 162).  Banks and firms were now allowed 
offshore borrowing. As a result, not only financial conglomerates but also newly emerged firms 
benefited from liberalized capital inflow.  Capital inflow massively increased in the form of 
portfolio investments.  Banks started to invest in real estate, service industries (hotels, media 
etc.), and infrastructure development.  Investment in real estate caused an especially serious asset 
bubble.   
 
5.2.4. Coalition governments and delay in the enhancement of banking supervision 
 
Politically in Thailand, after the political turmoil of another coup and following the King’s 
intervention, democracy was restored in September, 1992, and Chuan Leekpai, the leader of the 
Democratic Party, became the prime minister.80  Chuan’s coalition cabinets had to be formed 
with other political parties which had a wide range of preferences with respect to the banking 
sector.  In particular, coalition partners included the New Aspiration Party and the Chart Pattana 
Party (the Thai Development Party), both of which had close ties with financial companies 
                                                 
80 The military lost its influence due to violence against street protesters and following the King’s 
intervention in May, 1992 (Samudavanija 1997, 53). 
184 
 (Satyanath 2006, 56).81  Despite Chuan’s clean image, being free from corruption, his cabinet 
did not seriously tackle corruption (Phongpaichit and Baker 2000, 109) and the Chuan 
government did not take effective measures to enhance banking supervision over the banking 
sector. 
 which did not deter banks’ risky lending 
behavio
                                                
From mid-1995, the new Banharn Silpa-Archa government started, and it also had to 
make a fragile coalition with provincial businessmen-politicians of provincial political parties.  
Banharn allocated cabinet posts, including that of Finance Minster, to new business groups 
(Phongpaichit and Baker 2000, 112–113), and the governor of the Bank of Thailand was 
dismissed due to political interference.  While the Banharn government and the newly emerged 
business groups supported capital account liberalization, they opposed any prudential regulatory 
measures over the financial sector.  Furthermore, the Bank of Thailand did not have enough 
independence to ensure strict banking supervision and prudential regulations over the banking 
sector.  This resulted in lax banking regulations
r (Charoenseang and Manakit 2002, 601).   
In November, 1996, Chavalit Yongchaiyut from the New Aspiration Party became the 
new prime minister and formed a new coalition government.  Again, the central bank governor 
was changed and the finance minister was replaced with a minor banker.  Lax banking 
supervision was not changed because many political parties within the ruling coalition were the 
same from the previous government (Phongpaichit and Baker 2000, 114–115).  Under these 
circumstances, coalition partners did not have any interests in enhancing banking supervision 
over the banking sector.  Moreover, the banking sector remained as an influential actor and the 
Thailand Bankers Association also remained as a powerful lobbying group in Thailand.  Overall, 
 
81 On December 8, 1994, the New Aspiration Party withdrew from coalition.  However, on 
December 12, 1994, the Chart Pattana Party joined coalition. 
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 then, there was no new entry of banks from the entire period of 1966 to 1997 in Thailand (Polsiri 
and Wiwattabajabtang 2006, 348).  Thus, the existence of fragile multi-party ruling coalitions 
under the influence of the banking sector’s vested interests resulted in a lack of competition 
among 
mpanies had liquidity 
problem suspended (Jumbala 1998, 278-279).   
 
5.3.  THAILAND: AFTER THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS 
.3.1. Party politics and delayed financial reforms under the IMF programs 
companies were suspended.  In total, 58 financial companies’ operations were suspended from 
                                                
banks or no entry of new banks and lax regulations over the financial sector.   
Before the Asian financial crisis, Thailand’s financial sector was already in trouble.  For 
example, on March 3, 1997, a few months before the crisis began, Finance One, the most 
developed financial company up to that date, was taken over by the Thai Danu Bank.  On May 
15, 1997, the government lost US $10 billion in one day in defending the baht.  On June 26, 
1997, the government announced that sixteen out of ninety-one finance co
s and their operations were 
 
 
5
 
The Asian financial crisis was triggered in Thailand when the Bank of Thailand gave up 
defending the baht and the baht was allowed to float on July 2, 1997.  The government asked for 
IMF assistance on August 5, 1997, and on August 14, 1997, the first LOI was announced, in 
which macroeconomic stabilization and financial sector restructuring were included as two main 
targeted policy objectives (IMF 1997d).82  In early August, the operations of 42 more financial 
 
dix 5.D.  
82 The list of LOI by Thai governments under the Asian financial crisis is appended as 
Appen
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 June to August, 1997.  However, despite the increase in popular demand for Chavalit’s 
resignation, Chavalit survived a motion of a vote of no-confidence on September 27, 1997.83   
As the October deadline to decide on a more detailed plan of financial restructuring 
approached, the indecisiveness of the multi-party coalition cabinet became apparent.  Chatichai, 
the party leader of the coalition partner of the Chart Pattana, had considerable interest in the 
financial sector, including in suspended financial companies.  The Association of Financial 
Companies intensely lobbied Chatichai and Chavalit for a relaxation of the criteria of the 
rehabilitation plan.  Moreover, the IMF publicly expressed concerns about the independence of 
the committees examining financial companies’ conditions (MacIntyre 1999, 152).   
Facing IMF demands, on October 15, 1997, the following restructuring plan for the 
financial sector was announced.  The remaining 15 banks and 33 financial companies were 
required to boost capital (Jumbala 1998, 284).  The Financial Restructuring Agency (FRA) was 
established in October, 1997 in order to oversee the restructuring plans which the 58 suspended 
financial companies had submitted.  Also, the Asset Management Company (AMC) was set up in 
order to sell bad assets under the control of the FSA.  Loan classification was tightened and full 
deposit guarantee was ensured for both depositors and creditors of the remaining 15 local banks 
and 33 financial companies.  In addition, foreign bank entry was allowed by obtaining majority 
shares in Thai banks for ten years (Lauridsen 1998, 150–151). 84   However, after obtaining 
cabinet approval, the Chart Pattana gained political control over the FSA and the AMC and 
                                                 
83 On the same day, the bill of constitutional amendment which envisaged democratic 
constitution was also approved at the parliament.  In the midst of the economic turmoil and 
continuing demands for Chavalit’s resignation, the government had no option but to accept the 
constitutional amendment (Jumbala 1998, 284).   
84 However, after ten years, the share of foreign ownership should not be increased though shares 
in excess of 49% in last ten years can be held beyond these ten years (IMF 2000c).  This 
condition is different from that in Indonesia and Korea where no year restrictions were set in 
increasing foreign ownership of banks. 
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 successfully undermined these two agencies’ independence (MacIntyre 1999, 152; Haggard 2000, 
55).  Thus, because of the indecisiveness of Chavalit’s “shaky multi-party coalitions” (Haggard 
and MacIntyre 1998, 386), the financial restructuring plan was delayed and undermined.   
Demands for Chavalit’s resignation continued because of a further crisis situation — baht 
depreciation did not halt.  Finally, Chavalit resigned on November 3, 1997, but the ruling 
coalition was not able to find a new premier.  Consequently, Chuan Leekpai, a leader in the 
Democratic Party, again became prime minister on November 15, 1997 (Haggard 2000, 94).  A 
new coalition government consisting of six political parties was formed and two highly respected 
technocrats were appointed to main ministerial posts: Supahcai Panitchpakdi as deputy prime 
minister, and Tarrin Nimmanahaeminda as finance minister (Jumbala 1998, 287).   
The new government announced the second LOI on November 25, 1997, in which the 
government expressed the intention to promptly implement the restructuring plan announced in 
October (IMF 1997e).  In December, 1997, under intensive pressure from the IMF, the FRA 
announced that 56 out of 58 financial companies had to be permanently closed (Suehiro 2006, 
206).  As planned, their bad assets were transferred to the FRA and the AMC and bad assets 
were sold to the AMC for gradual liquidation (Lauridsen 1998, 152).  Also, not only financial 
companies but six troubled commercial banks out of fourteen existing banks were nationalized.85   
However, despite this impressive beginning to financial restructuring by the Chuan 
government, the actual implementation of these plans was significantly delayed.  There were 
issues concerning how to restructure the financial sector: 1) how the assets and liabilities of 
closed financial institutions would be treated under the lack of an adequate legal framework of 
bankruptcy laws, 2) how and at what pace the government should introduce new stricter 
                                                 
85 They were Bangkok Metropolitan Bank, Siam City Bank, First Bangkok City Bank, Laem 
Thong Bank, Union Bank of Bangkok, and Nakornthon Bank (Nidhiprabba and Warr 2000, 109).   
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 prudential regulations over the banking sector, and 3) the degree to which the government should 
assist in restructuring banks’ bad loans.  The government wanted to take some drastic measures 
to raise the banks’ capital.  However, this meant that existing shareholders would have to suffer 
huge losses.  Banks were unwilling to take any further losses.  Further, several major 
shareholders had influential connections to the government.  Therefore, it was hard for the 
government to take any radical measures for restructuring banks (Flatters 2000, 85–87).  In fact, 
in the middle of 1998, it was found that banks’ balance sheets had not been cleaned up at all 
(Charoenseang  and Manakit 2002).   
Under these circumstances, the forth LOI, announced on May 26, 1998, included a new 
schedule to hasten the pace of the financial sector restructuring (IMF 1998e).  Banks and 
financial companies were encouraged to sign memoranda of understandings (MOUs), which 
outlined a plan for improving loan classification and provisioning.86  Further measures were 
announced on August 14, 1998.  The August package included the following four major 
measures: 1) the provisioning requirement was changed and banks were required to meet a 
refined capital adequacy ratio soon after the capital injection,87 2) the government preserved 300 
billion baht for the injection of tier 1 and tier 2 capital schemes in order to facilitate 
recapitalization of commercial banks and financial companies,88 3) the government encouraged 
                                                 
86 This was included as the performance criterion in the LOI dated on November 25, 1997 (IMF 
1997e).  However, this was again set as the performance criterion that should be met by August 
15, 1998, in the LOI dated May 26, 1998 (IMF 1998e). 
87 The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) was changed.  For tier 1 capital, the CAR was decreased 
from 8.5% to 4.25% and for tier 2 capital, the CAR was increased from 2.5% to 4.25%.  Overall, 
the CAR was unchanged from 8.5% for banks and 8% for financial companies (Charoenseang 
and Manakit 2002, 603).   
88 The tier 1 capital scheme was intended in exchange for the adaptation of loan classification 
and provisioning standard which was to be met by December 2000.   The tier 2 capital scheme 
aimed at restructuring corporate debts.  The government provided capital in the form of non-
tradable government bonds in exchange for bank debentures of 2% of risk weighted assets 
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 the setting up of private bank-owned AMCs, and 4) central bank intervention became the only 
resolution when banks and financial companies were not able to recapitalize by themselves 
(Charoenseang  and Manakit 2002, 603–604).   
After this banking package was announced, the relationship between banks and Tarrin, 
the minister of finance who was trying to follow the IMF programs, deteriorated (Phongpaichit 
and Baker 2000, 142).  Tarrin hoped that banks would take part in the August restructuring plan.  
However, firms did not want tougher treatment with respect to repaying their debts.  On the other 
hand, creditors wanted to have tougher foreclosure and bankruptcy laws and banks wanted 
government assistance without heavy burdens.  International creditors wanted government 
guarantees to ensure their credit would be repaid.  The government was afraid to bear any further 
fiscal burden to bail out troubled banks and financial companies (Flatters 2000, 86).  As a result 
of this situation, the government was unable to decide whether they should behave moderately or 
harshly toward banks.   
In October, 1998, Chuan asked for the Chart Pattana Party to join the ruling coalition, 
which meant that Chuan had to allocate cabinet posts to the Chart Pattana Party.  The cabinet 
was reshuffled and the Chart Pattana Party rejoined the government, which gave Chuan’s ruling 
coalition the clear majority (Haggard 2000, 99).  However, the increase in coalition partners 
meant that cooperation among coalition partners became more difficult and the Chart Pattana 
Party’s inclusion itself caused intra-party conflicts (Thabchumpon 1999, 319).  In fact, the intra-
party conflict between the Democratic Party and the Social Action Party resulted in the 
withdrawal of the Social Action Party from the ruling coalition in July, 1999 (Haggard 2000, 99). 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Charoenseang and Manakit 2002, 603).   
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 Meanwhile, the restructuring plan of the August package did not improve restructuring of 
banks as planned.  There were only two commercial banks, the Siam Commercial Bank and the 
Thai Military Bank, which asked for capital injection as assistance from the government.  Most 
banks did not ask the government for a capital injection because the conditions of the MOU were 
too strict, so banks were afraid to be punished when they were not able to meet them (Higashi 
2002, 6 — 7).  Neither banks nor major corporate debtors made adjustments or submitted 
restructuring plans (Flatters 2000, 93).   
In addition, Thailand adopted a “self-help” approach, in which privately owned AMCs 
were set up.  This is a marked difference from the situation in Indonesia and in Korea (which 
will be illustrated later), where the government set up its own banking restructuring agency and 
tried to sell transferred bad loans.  In Thailand’s approach, creditors and debtors negotiated with 
each other directly.  The Thai Bankers Association and the central bank acted as coordinators to 
facilitate debt restructuring (Suehiro 2006, 208).  Under this arrangement, debts were merely 
rescheduled and problem resolutions were postponed.  As a result, in May of 1999, non-
performing loans reached 47.7% (Charoenseang and Manakit 2002, 604–607).  Because of this, 
the government was increasingly criticized by banks.  Despite the fact that banks had to follow 
stricter provisioning rules and higher capital adequacy ratios, non-performing loans were at the 
same time left in the hands of banks (Flatters 2000, 99).  Moreover, business people, who 
represented the manufacturing sector more, also criticized the government’s crisis management 
because banks hesitated to provide new loans to firms as banks had to fulfill stricter prudential 
regulations without enough government bailout.   
Furthermore, the legal amendment necessary for reforms to enhance banking supervision 
over the banking sector was also delayed because of Thailand’s fragmented party system and 
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 frequent attempts at vote of no confidence.  The opposition New Aspiration Party launched a no-
confidence debate in the beginning of 1999 (Phongpaichit and Baker 2004, 77).  Though the 
Chuan government survived the vote of no-confidence motion at the beginning, they also had to 
survive another vote of no-confidence motion at the end of 1999 and the government’s clean 
image was certainly damaged because of the corruption scandals that triggered the vote of non-
confidence motions.  In the beginning of 2000, the government tried to present a set of new bills 
to the parliament to enhance the regulatory framework over the banking sector.  These laws 
included the Financial Institution Law that would unify the Commercial Banking and Finance 
Company Laws, the Deposit Insurance Law, and a new Central Bank Law to enhance central 
bank independence (IMF 2000c, 38—39), which had already been included on the financial 
reform agenda in the fifth LOI dated on August 25, 1998.  However, again, these laws did not 
pass.   
 
5.3.2. Graduation of the IMF programs and financial reforms under the Thaksin 
government  
 
On June 19, 2000, Thailand graduated from the IMF conditionality programs.  Though the IMF 
noted the importance of speeding up corporate debt structuring and financial sector reforms (IMF 
2000b), the IMF no longer had influence.  On January 6, 2001, Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai Party 
(TRT) won the near majority at the first general election of the House of Representatives based 
on the 1997 Constitution.  The Thai Rak Thai Party won 248 out of 500 seats whereas Chuan’s 
Democratic Party, which obtained only 128 seats, was defeated.  Thaksin Shinawatra, a 
billionaire who owned telecommunication firms, became prime minister, and the TRT formed a 
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 coalition with the Chart Thai Party, the New Aspiration Party, and the Seritham.  Cabinet posts 
were allocated to Thaksin’s close allies, TRT’s key business supporters, old politicians within 
TRT, and coalition partners (Phongpaichit and Baker 2004, 92—93).  On July 2001, TRT 
absorbed 14 Seritham members, and TRT secured majority seats as a single leading party for the 
first time in Thailand’s democratic history.89   
Backed by the TRT’s majority status at the House of Representatives mentioned above, it 
was the Thaksin government that established the government-led debt restructuring agency, the 
Thailand Assets Management Corporation (TAMC), despite the lack of the pressure from the 
IMF.  A lot of enforcement power was given to the TAMC in order to collect debts from banks’ 
debtors. 90   Banks were not enthusiastic about the establishment of the TAMC due to the 
government’s prolonged delay in responding to the banking crisis up to that point.  The TAMC 
could also be regarded as a vehicle that let indebted firms “stay in the game” (cited in Hewison 
2005, 322).   Nevertheless, the TAMC was still effective in reducing non-performing loans of 
banks.  As a result of transferring assets to the TAMC, banks’ non-performing loans drastically 
decreased from 47% in July, 1999, to 10 % in December, 2001 (Suehiro 2006, 208).   
On January 27, 2002, because the TRT merged with another party, the New Aspiration 
Party, Thaksin commanded a majority not only in the House of Representatives but also in the 
Senate (Metebi 2003, 102).  Backed by the majority in both Houses, the Thaksin government 
developed a financial master plan from 2002 to 2004 (Menkhoff and Suwanaporn 2007, 8).   
                                                 
89 See Political Handbook of the World 2000–2002 (1088). 
90 The TAMC was allowed to restructure debts by amending loan terms, mandating debt-equity 
convention, taking debts or assets in order to settle debts, and buying shares to increase debtors’ 
capital.  The TAMC was allowed to take these measures only upon approval by the board of the 
TAMC (Charoenseang, and Manakit 2002, 611).   
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 However, while a plan toward the development of non-bank financial institutions and 
security markets was articulated, credit controls were also introduced, even though preferential 
credit allocations were not traditionally used as policy tools in Thailand.  The beneficiaries of 
preferential credit allocations were small and medium enterprises, and users of export-import 
credits, as well as rural small farmers (Menkhoff and Suwanaporn 2007, 11).  After graduation 
from the IMF programs, and also after the completion of an early repayment of the IMF credits 
of the Stand-By Arrangement on July, 31, 2003 (IMF 2003b), IMF influence further diminished.  
In these circumstances, as seen the introduction of credit controls, the policy direction of the 
financial master plan was not necessary liberal-oriented.   
Also, although regulations for enhancing prudential regulations had been gradually 
enacted since 2002 (Polsiri and Wiwattabajabtang 2006), a bill to enhance central bank 
independence was quietly dropped from the agenda due to opposition from businessmen 
(Phongpaichit and Baker 2004, 122).91  According to the Bank of Thailand Act of B.E. 1942, the 
Bank of Thailand is under the supervision of the MOF.  The governor of the central bank is 
nominated, appointed, and dismissed by the King upon the recommendation of the MOF and the 
approval of the cabinet.  Also, the MOF is the superior authority over the Bank of Thailand with 
regard to banking supervision.  Therefore, the Bank of Thailand has to obtain approval from the 
MOF in order to revise major policy instruments such as setting the capital adequacy ratio 
(Polsiri and Wiwattabajabtang 2006, 343–344).  Hence, the central bank is very much legally 
                                                 
91 As another example that the government undermined the central bank autonomy, Thakshin 
dismissed the central bank governor because of a disagreement on interest rate policy (Polsiri 
and Wiwattabajabtang 2006, 344). 
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 dependent and not free from political interference in Thailand, which is still true as of June, 
2007.92   
Thus, while TRT’s majority position enabled the Thaksin government to act decisively, 
the policies pursued by the Thaksin government rather aimed at protecting vested interests of 
business groups as well as rural small farmers, which were primary supporters of TRT.  
Therefore, without the IMF pressure, the Thaksin government imposed credit controls to protect 
farmers and did not choose to enhance the independence of the central bank as a banking 
supervisory agency.  This is a marked difference from the Indonesian case, in which legal 
amendments to ensure central bank independence were enacted under the IMF pressure during 
the Habibie presidency, as well as a difference from the Korean case discussed below.   
 
 
5.4.  KOREA: BEFORE THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
 
5.4.1. Financial repression and developmental state 
 
As stated, similar to Indonesia, Korea had maintained a state-bank dominant repressed financial 
system before financial reforms in the 1960’s and 70’s.  Korea at this time is an especially well 
known “developmental state”, where a state aimed to achieve economic development based on 
                                                 
92 As mentioned earlier, the Thaksin government was ousted by the successful military coup on 
September 19, 2006. The interim cabinet was installed and Surayud Chulanont became prime 
minister.  A post-coup constitution will be drafted and a general election will be held on 
December, 2007 based on this new constitution.   
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 state-led industrialization, in which the allocation of preferential credits to strategic sectors at 
subsidized rates was the center of policy tools.   
After Park Chung-hee took power by the military coup in 1961, the Park Chung-hee 
government introduced some repressive financial policy measures.  In 1962, the new government 
nationalized banks and the government amended the Banking of Korea Act so that the central 
bank was clearly redefined as dependent on the government.  Both financial policy and monetary 
policy were set not by the central bank but by the Ministry of Finance, which reflected 
conglomerates or chaebols’ interests (Choi 1993, 26–27; Zhang 2003, 63).  When President Park 
Chung-hee further strengthened his authoritarian rule by declaring martial law in 1972, he clearly 
set the economic development strategy with heavy and chemical industrialization as the 
country’s goal and established the Heavy and Chemical Industry Promotion Committee as the 
central organ of industrialization policy planning in 1973.  Some industries such as iron and steel, 
shipbuilding, petrochemical industries, and defense industries, were set as strategic industries.  In 
order to finance industrialization projects in these areas, preferential credit allocation called 
“policy loans” were utilized as major policy tools. 93   As a result, credit allocation in the 
manufacturing sector was heavily concentrated in heavy and chemical industries.  These 
preferential credit allocations were in favor of the chaebols and big businesses that mainly 
represented the manufacturing interests (Choi 1993, 35–40).   
In Korea, the manufacturing sector, represented by chaebols, was dominant rather than 
the banking sector.  The banking sector was interested in the performance of chaebol firms 
because they heavily lent to chaebols.  On the other hand, however, chaebols were less interested 
                                                 
93 In the “policy loans” credits, nominal loan rates were lower than inflation rates.  Therefore, 
real interest rates were negative.  Thus, “policy loans” were allocated with subsidized interest 
rates by banks (Graham 2003, 40).    
196 
 in the performance of banking institutions.  Almost all banking institutions were members of the 
Federation of Korean Industries (FKI), an organization representing chaebols’ interests.  In 
addition, the FKI and the Korea Federation of Banks (KFB), an organization representing banks’ 
interests, had close contacts between them.  However, the FKI was predominant over the KFB in 
terms of the influence in decision making processes in their meetings (Zhang 2003, 53-54).  Thus, 
the state-led industrialization policies favored chaebols and under the state’s control, banks were 
subordinate to chaebols and served to finance necessary capital under the state’s developmental 
strategy.   
By the 1970s, it became clear that heavy industrialization was problematic due to the lack 
of enough demand in heavy industry in Korea and in export markets.  The second oil shock 
further aggravated economic problems.  Furthermore, the assassination of President Park on 
October 26, 1979, created political uncertainly as well as doubt concerning the government’s 
commitment to industrialization centered on heavy and chemical industries.  In fact, Park’s 
assassination marked an end to heavy and chemical industrialization (Graham 2003, 38). 
 
 
5.4.2. Some liberalization measures in the 1980s and 1990s 
 
Under the political turmoil of the inter-rim governments, the military general Chun Doo-hwan 
was appointed as the acting head of the KCIA in April 1980, which triggered massive opposition 
from the populace and demands for democratization.  After the bloody Kwangju event on May 
18, 1980, in which the military killed protesters who demanded democratization,94 Chun Doo-
                                                 
94 Three opposition leaders, Kim Jong-pil, Kim Yong-san, and Kim Dae-jung, called “the three 
Kims”, were put into detention.   Kim Dae-jung was sentenced to death and escaped to the US 
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 hwan became the self-appointed president in September, 1980 (1980-1987).  Although 
legislative elections were held in 1981 and 1985, Chun Doo-hwan’s ruling Democratic Justice 
Party (DJP) continually won and obtained majority seats.  Due to the stagnation of the economy 
and inflation, the new government tried to reorient heavy and chemical industrialization.  The 
government asked for an IMF rescue package and the inter-rim government and the subsequent 
Chun Doo-hwan government reached three Stand-by agreements with the IMF from March 1980 
to March 1985.  Facing demands for democratization, Chun had a strong incentive to conduct 
financial reforms and to overcome the economic crisis — to demonstrate the differences of his 
new regime from the economically failed previous Park regime (Zhang 2003, 75–76).   
Under the IMF programs, the government took some financial liberalization measures in 
such dimensions as privatization of banks and entry barriers on banks.  Concerning privatization 
of banks, in March, 1981, the best performing state bank, the Hanil Bank, was privatized.  Two 
chaebol groups obtained shares in the Hanil Bank.  In addition, three commercial banks were 
privatized: the Korea First Bank in 1982, the Bank of Seoul and Trust Company in 1982, and the 
Chohung Bank in 1983.  As a result, all leading commercial banks were privatized.  In these 
moves, large chaebols obtained shares of banks by acquiring shares through their nonblank 
financial institutions (Choi 1993, 43–45).  Thus, chaebols took advantage of privatization of 
banks.   
Moreover, the FKI and chaebols demanded the elimination of entry barriers on banks.  
Although chaebols already owned non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), these NBFIs were not 
able to engage in deposit-taking activities.  Therefore, hoping that chaebols would be able to 
establish their own new banks, the FKI and leading chaebols lobbied the government to allow 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Graham 2003, 52).   
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 new entry of banks (Zhang 2003, 81).  As a result, the Chun Doo-hwan government moved to 
deregulate entry barriers and to establish more commercial banks.95  Further, commercial banks 
were allowed to set up more overseas subsidiaries and branches in 1986 and the number of 
foreign bank branches increased (United Nations 1999, 117).     
On December 16, 1987, Korea held a democratic presidential election for the first time.  
The DJP’s presidential candidate Roh Tae-woo, an ex-general, won the election (1988–1992) by 
taking advantage of the split of opposition votes between the two main opposition leaders, Kim 
Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung.  Though the government lacked the majority command after the 
legislative election in April, 1988,96 the DJP merged with the Reunification Party led by Kim 
Young-sam and the New Democratic Republican Party led by Kim Jong-pil and a new political 
party, the Democratic Liberal Party, was established.  As a result, the Roh government secured 
majority command on the legislature (Chung-si and Hoon 1999, 149).97  
Backed by a secure majority, other financial reform measures toward financial 
liberalization were further taken by the succeeding Roh Tae-woo government, though 
government’s intervention into the market was not eliminated.  The government announced its 
comprehensive plan to reform the financial system in May 1988.  Politicians wanted to develop 
the financial industry and also wanted to meet political needs (Zhang 2003, 84).  In order to do 
so, entry barriers on banks were lowered.  Three new commercial banks (Donghwa Bank, 
                                                 
95 As a result, the number of commercial banks increased from seven in the mid 1980s to fifteen 
in the early 1990s (Zhang 2003, 82). 
96 The DJP obtained 46％ of seat shares in the legislative election in February, 1990 (Chung-si 
and Hoon 1999, 147).   
97 In Korea, the president’s party tends to be dominant over oppositions parties.  The president’s 
party often seduced a legislator to defect from an opposition party to a president party.  In 
addition, the president’s party tended to merge with other parties until a legislative majority was 
formed (Lim 2002, 2).  On the other hand, opposition parties in Korea are typically fragmented, 
personalistic, not well consolidated, and seldom united on particular issues among opposition 
parties (Chung-si and Hoon 1999, 149).   
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 Dongnam Bank, and Daedong Bank) were established in 1989.  In addition, Korea accepted the 
IMF’s Article VIII in 1988 and started to liberalize foreign exchange controls.  Repatriation of 
capital became fully permitted in 1991, and capital account transactions were made easier for 
foreign investors (Kaminsky and Schmukler 2003).  Also, interest rate controls, which were once 
attempted in 1988 but did not progress due to unfavorable economic conditions, were partially 
liberalized in 1991 as the first stage of a four-stage plan.  Most short-term lending rates and 
deposit rates of more than three-year maturity were liberalized in 1991 (United Nations 1999, 
116–117).  However, chaebols opposed the elimination of credit with preferential rates.  
Therefore, “policy loans” to chaebols by commercial banks continued (Choi 1993, 52).  Thus, 
under the Roh Tae-woo government, financial reforms gradually progressed in the dimensions of 
elimination of entry barriers, capital account liberalization, and interest rate liberalization as 
chaebols were able to take advantage of these reforms.  However, in terms of credit controls, 
credit allocation with subsidized interest rates was not eliminated because chaebols demanded it 
continue. 
In the presidential race in 1992, Kim Yong-sam became the presidential candidate of the 
Democratic Liberal Party.  In February 1993, Kim Yong-sam became the first civilian president 
in over three decades.98  On December 1995, he renamed the DLP the New Korea Party in order 
to attach his own image to the party name.  Democratization strengthened chaebols’ relative 
position vis-à-vis the government.  The FKI leaders clearly stated that they would contribute 
money only to political parties that would protect their business interests and not to politicians 
who took an anti-business stance (Zhang 2003, 86).  Therefore, even though the government 
wanted to contain chabeols’ power, individual politicians wanted to meet these chaebols’ 
                                                 
98 Kim Yong-sam obtained 44% of votes, followed by Kin Dae-jung’s 36% of votes, and Chung 
Ju-yung’s 20% (Graham 2003, 89). 
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 demands, given the need for contributions from them (Kang 2002, 153—154).  Chaebols 
demanded the government not intervene in the market and demanded more liberal policies.  In 
these circumstances, the Kim Yong-sam government ended the government’s industrialization 
planning.   
Further, in July, 1993 the government announced the five-year plan called “Blueprint for 
Financial Liberalization and Internationalization” (Graham 2003, 90).  As a result, the 
government significantly liberalized the financial sector, though it did not reach full 
liberalization.  Capital account liberalization was facilitated in the area of short-term capital 
borrowing, but long-term capital borrowing was still restricted.99  As a result, short-term foreign 
borrowing by banks increased massively.  Short-term offshore borrowing by banks and NBFIs 
were estimated as 86 billion US dollars as of the end of September 1997, out of which banks 
owned 69 billion US dollars.  The rapid increase in short-term offshore borrowing was argued to 
be the one of the causes of the currency crisis, due to the maturity mismatch (IMF 2003a, 112).  
Interest rates were also gradually liberalized by following previously determined Roh’s 
four-stage plan.  The reduction of “policy loans” was also set as a policy goal.  Entry barriers 
were further lowered and the number of merchant banks increased from 6 before 1994 to 9 in 
1994 and to 15 in 1996.100  Contrary to commercial banks, these merchant banks were not 
strictly controlled by the government.  Moreover, no banking supervision was conducted over 
these merchant banks (Ha-Joon 1998, 226—228).  Chaebols owned these banks and took full 
advantage of these new banks for expanding their access to credit and financing their debts.  
Thus, despite the fact that the Kim Yong-sam government accelerated financial reforms in the 
                                                 
99 Notification to the government was mandatory for long-term foreign loans, whereas not 
mandatory for short-term foreign loans (Yanagita 2000, 19). 
100 For instance, the Hyundai group established and acquired more than eight financial 
institutions including NBFIs, merchant banks, and insurance companies (Graham 2003, 63).    
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 dimensions that chaebols did not strongly oppose, the government did not enhance banking 
supervision over the banking sector, but rather the government allowed chaebols to take 
advantage of the opportunity to establish their own banks and also to borrow heavily from banks 
without enough examination of loan risks.   
In this vein, before the Asian financial crisis, chaebols had been already heavily indebted 
to banks.  Banks continued to provide policy loans to some chaebols, fearing that bankruptcy of 
weak chaebols’ affiliates would trigger the collapse of the whole group of chaebols.  In some 
cases, debts were even used to merely pay debt-servicing charges.  Thus, banks continued to lend 
to chaebols despite the fact that their loans were, in fact, non-performing (Graham 2003, 83).  
Finally, in early 1997, some banks and chaebols collapsed.  Hanbo Steel went bankrupt in 
January 1997 due to a 6 billion US dollars debt.  Later, it was revealed that the close relationship 
between the second son of Kim Yong-sam and Hanbo favored Hanbo’s entry into the steel 
industry and resulted in continuous financing of debts despite its problems (Yanagita 2000, 24).  
As a result, Kim Yong-sam lost political influence in the nomination race for the next 
presidential candidate of the NKP (Graham 2003, 102).   
Facing the mounting problems of banks’ non-performing loans, in January 1997, the 
government established the Presidential Commission on Financial Reform, which consisted of 31 
members from the industrial sector, the financial sector, and academic researchers.  The 
commission recommended further liberalization of interest rates and elimination of entry barriers 
on foreign banks as well as enhancement of banking supervision over the banking sector 
(Graham 2003, 101).  However, little progress was made in implementing recommended 
financial reforms.  Rather, necessary financial reform measures such as the enhancement of 
banking supervision were postponed until after the presidential election in December 1997, and a 
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 financial reform bill to establish the independent banking supervisory agency failed to pass the 
Assembly on November 18, 1997 (IMF 2003a, 108, 118).  Moreover, big conglomerates such as 
Sammi, Jinro, and Kia went into bankruptcy.  In these circumstances, it was found that non-
performing loans had reached the equivalent to 7% of the GDP by September, 1997.  These 
bankruptcies scared off foreign investors (Yanagita 2000, 24).  Thus, facing these mounting 
problems of banks and chaebols, the Presidential Commission recommended further necessary 
financial reforms.  However, the Kim Yong-sam government was not able to take any effective 
measures because of its close ties with chaebols. 
 
 
5.5.  KOREA: AFTER THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
The Asian financial crisis, which started in Thailand in July, 1997, spread to Korea on October 
28, 1997, when the Bank of Korea spent 6.7 billion US dollars in one day to defend the Korean 
won.  On November 18, facing further exchange rate pressures against the Korean won, Korea 
gave up defending the won and allowed it to float.  The Korean government asked the IMF for 
assistance on November 21, 1997.  On December 3, 1997, the Kim Yong-sam government 
announced the first LOI (IMF 1997f), and three-year stand-by agreement programs were 
endorsed, with 21 billion US dollar credits approved by the Fund Executive Board.101  In these 
IMF conditionality programs in Korea, financial sector restructuring was the most prioritized 
policy arena along with macroeconomic stabilization (IMF 1997f).  In negotiating with the IMF, 
the Kim Yong-sam government resisted the restructuring of banks, i.e., the closure of troubled 
                                                 
101 The list of LOIs by the Korean governments under the Asian financial crisis is appended as 
Appendix 5.E. 
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 commercial and merchant banks, arguing that because Korea had no history of troubled banks 
being closed.  The IMF pushed the Korean government to close insolvent banks, and in the final 
phase of negotiations, the Kim Yong-sam government agreed to close nine merchant banks and 
restructure two commercial banks, which were set as prior actions in the first LOI.  However, the 
Kim Yong-sam government did not seriously undertake any further measures and postponed 
necessary actions until the next presidential election was held on December 18, 1997, in which 
Kim Dae-jung won the election.   
On December 29, 1997, the National Assembly passed 13 financial reform bills, 
including bills for facilitating financial restructuring, enhancing banking supervision, and 
accelerating capital market liberalization. This was similar to the failed reform bills 
recommended by the Presidential Commission on Financial Reform prior to the crisis.  The IMF 
insisted that the new banking supervisory agency should be independent from the Ministry of 
Finance and Economy (MOFE) (IMF 2003a, 109).  In January, 1998, the Banking Act was 
amended and the Bank of Korea became independent.  Thus, the passage of the bill to ensure the 
central bank independence was only achieved under the IMF influence.  In this amendment, the 
supervision function over banks was transferred from the BOK to the newly established 
Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) (Yokoi-Arai 2002, 142).   
Also, restructuring of the banking sector progressed, but it did not perfectly meet the 
IMF’s demands in that the IMF originally demanded that two commercial banks, Seoul Bank and 
Korea First Bank, be sold or closed while these two banks were rather nationalized.  
Nevertheless, restructuring of the banking sector did progress.  Six out of 26 commercial banks 
and 16 out of 30 merchant banks merged or closed between December, 1997 and March, 1998 
(IMF 2003a, 108–109).   
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 Reforms were further accelerated after Kim Dae-jung became the president on February 
25, 1998.  Kim Dae-jung believed that financial repression and political repression went together.  
He believed that financial repression was an effective way for the authoritarian state to control 
and maintain strong ties with chaebols (Woo-Cumings 1999, 131).  Therefore, by committing to 
financial reforms, Kim Dae-jung tried to break up the old ties between chaebols and the previous 
authoritarian regime and the Kim Yong-sam government.  In this way, he would be able to 
secure his new democratic government by breaking with the past and would be able to reward his 
supporters.  With region being the most important political cleavage in Korea, Kim Dae-jung 
allocated cabinet posts to several critics of chaebols which came from the southwest region 
where Kim Dae-jung came from — a disadvantaged region in the authoritarian past.  Chon Chol-
howan, a progressive economist, became the governor of the Bank of Korea, and North Cholla 
Province Governor You Jong–keun, a former economist at Rutgers University, became an 
economic advisor to the president (Cumings 1999, 39).   
Consequently, under the Kim Dae-jung government, reform measures to enhance banking 
supervision were facilitated.  The supervisory function over all types of the financial sector 
(including banks, non-bank financial institutions, and the security market) was consolidated 
under the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC), established in April, 1998 (Graham 2003, 
111).  In other words, the FSC was established as a “mega-supervisor” and all types of financial 
institutions were supervised under the FSC.  The FSC was placed as accountable to the prime 
minister and was also responsible for amending and creating supervisory rules.  Moreover, the 
Financial Supervisory Board (FSB) was established in January, 1999, by presidential decree.  
The FSB was responsible for conducting inspections, audits, and calling for sanctions against 
troubled banks as per the decision of the FSC (Yokoi-Arai 2002, 152–153).  Thus, the Kim Dae-
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 jung government tried to tackle both bank restructuring and corporate restructuring together by 
establishing an independent agency, the FSC (Woo-Cumings 1999, 132).  In addition, all deposit 
insurance protection agencies were merged into the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(KDIC).  Also, all deposits were guaranteed by the government until 2000 (Baliño and Ubide 
1999, 31).   
Restructuring of the banking sector further progressed under the Kim Dae-jun 
government, with 12 commercial banks with a Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) below 6% being 
directed to submit rehabilitation plans by April, 1998.  The FSC classified banks into 
“disapproved, “conditionally approved,” and “approved” upon review of these rehabilitation 
plans.  In June, 1998, the FSC then took an unprecedented move.  The FSC revoked the licenses 
of the five banks categorized as disapproved and merged them with healthy banks.  The other 
seven out of the 12 banks were allowed to operate conditionally, dependent upon restructuring 
efforts or upon mergers.  As a result, a merger of banks took place.102  The other 13 healthy 
banks that had met the 8% CAR requirement were also reviewed, and three of these banks were 
required to follow management recommendations by the FSC (Park 2006, 173–174).  In addition, 
merchant banks were also required to submit rehabilitation plans in order to meet 4% CAR by 
March, 1998 and 6% CAR by June, 1998.  Ten merchant banks were closed in February, 1998 
because they did not have a chance of meeting these conditions (Yokoi-Arai 2002, 156).   
In terms of capital account liberalization, the Kim Dae-jung government embarked upon 
reform measures and eliminated the control over foreign ownership of Korean firms in the stock 
                                                 
102 Commercial Bank and Hanil Bank were merged and Hanvit Bank was established in January, 
1999.  In February, 1999, Kwangwon Bank and Hyundai Merchant Banks were merged with 
Chohung Bank.  Chungbuk Bank was taken over by Chohung Bank in May 1999.  Korea 
Exchange Bank chose to restructure itself by obtaining capital from the German-based Cimmerz 
Bank and Korea Exim Bank (Park 2006, 174).    
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 market.  55% of foreign ownership of Korean firms’ shares was allowed by the end of 1997 and 
further, 100% foreign ownership of shares was allowed by the end of 1998 (Yanagita 2000, 33).  
Thus, the Kim Dae-jung government accelerated financial reforms under the IMF programs more 
than ever, not only in the dimension of capital account liberalization but also in the regulatory 
dimensions of financial reforms, i.e., enhancement of banking supervision over the banking 
sector and restructuring of the banking sector.   
Korea graduated from the IMF programs on July 12, 2000.  Even after the graduation of 
the IMF programs, banking restructuring processes continued without policy reversals.  In 
September, 2000, the second round of financial restructuring was launched and five commercial 
banks were placed as subsidiaries under the bank holding company established in April, 2001, 
the Woori Financial Holding Company, and public money was injected.  Also, other healthy 
banks were encouraged to create universal banks via consolidation by mergers.  As a 
consequence of mergers, large universal banks were established.  In September, 2003, the US-
based Lone Star took over Korea Exchange Bank and also in March, 2004, the Citigroup 
acquired more than 10% shares of KorAm Bank, which exceeded the 10% limit as a single 
investor.  This meant that it actually paved the way for mega foreign banks to acquire 100% 
shares of Korean banks.  In this light, restructuring of the banking sector and consolidation of 
banks were more facilitated in Korea than in any other Asian countries hit by the Asian financial 
crisis (Park 2006, 176).   
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 5.6.  DISCUSSION 
 
 
5.6.1. Recapitulation of two cases: Thailand and Korea 
 
This chapter qualitatively examines the effects of the IMF conditionality programs, the number 
of veto players, and two sectoral interests— the manufacturing sector and the banking sector — 
on financial reforms by examining two cases: Thailand and Korea.  In Thailand, private banks 
dictated by financial conglomerates were dominant and acted as powerful interest groups.  Even 
when Thailand was under the IMF conditionality programs because of the economic recession 
during the end of the 1970s and 1980s, the elimination of entry barriers was not achieved 
because of strong opposition by the banking sector.  During the Prem government from 1980 to 
1988, which was a semi-democratic government consisting of a multiparty coalition headed by 
an unelected prime minister, Thai banks were heavily protected by interest rate controls and high 
entry barriers.  Thailand was democratized after 1988 and except for interrupting periods by 
coups during 1991 and 1992 Thailand was characterized as a country that had many veto players 
due to multi-party ruling coalitions.  
Chatichai and his Chart Thai Party were backed by the newly emerged manufacturing 
sector based on export-led industrialization.  Because of the manufacturing sector’s support, the 
Chatichai government (1988–1990) made progress on financial reforms partially despite 
opposition from the banking sector.  Interest rate controls were partially liberalized and multiple 
exchange rate regimes were abolished.  Thus, due to the manufacturing sector’s supports, 
financial reforms were facilitated in the dimensions of interest rate liberalization and capital 
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 account liberalization.  However, even the Chatichai government was not able to eliminate entry 
barriers on banks because of the strong opposition by the banking sector.   
The Ananda government was installed following the coup in 1991 by the military. The 
Ananda government was not constrained by many veto players.  Therefore, the Ananda 
government took policy decisions toward major financial liberalization in the early 1990s.  
Financial reforms were achieved in the dimensions of interest rate liberalization and capital 
account liberalization.  As a consequence, firms and banks were allowed to engage in offshore 
borrowing, which led to the rapid increase of capital inflow.   
In 1992, Chuan Leekpai became the premier as a result of the restoration of democracy.  
However, the Chuan government (1992–1995) as well as the subsequent Banharn government 
(1995 — 1996) and Chavalit government (1996–1997) were not able to enhance banking 
supervision over the banking sector despite the surge of capital inflow following capital count 
liberalization because some political parties within the ruling coalitions tended to maintain close 
political ties with the banking sector.  Therefore, these political parties, such as the New 
Aspiration Party and the Chart Pattana Party, tended to oppose taking measures to enhance 
banking supervision.  Because the governments did not take any effective measures to deter risky 
lending behavior of banks, Thailand was unable to avoid being hit by the Asian financial crisis in 
1997.   
After the Asian financial crisis, Thailand aimed at addressing the issue of restructuring of 
banks as well as the enhancement of banking supervision under the IMF conditionality programs.  
However, restructuring of banks was significantly delayed in Thailand even under IMF pressure.  
Not only the Chavalit government but also the second Chuan government (1997–2000) were not 
able to advance these necessary reforms due to multi-party coalition governments or too many 
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 veto players until the graduation from the IMF programs in 2000.  Although the “self-help” 
method that Thailand adopted required the commitment to increase banks’ capital, banks were 
not able to obtain enough capital injection from the government in exchange for increasing 
banks’ capital by their own efforts.  In these circumstances, firms as debtors and banks as 
creditors together postponed the necessary measures for reducing non-performing loans.  
Furthermore, despite facing the pressures by the IMF with regards to making banking 
supervision legally independent, the governments were unable to achieve this as well.  Thus, in 
the case of Thailand, because of many number of veto players, financial reforms tended to be 
delayed.   
Thailand had to wait in order to progress restructuring of banks until Thaksin took power 
and established the government-led restructuring agency in 2001.  However, although the 
Thaksin government took more decisive actions than the previous governments in terms of 
restructuring of banks, without IMF pressure, the legal independence of the banking supervisory 
agency still was not achieved.   
In the case of Korea, the Park Chung-hee regime (1961–1979) adopted repressive 
financial policies.  His government nationalized private banks and kept strict controls over banks 
in terms of credit allocation and interest rates.  Banks merely served to provide capital for 
Korean conglomerates, or chaebols, in order to pursue the state-led heavy and chemical 
industrialization policies.  Chaebols followed these government industrialization plans by taking 
advantage of “policy loans”, or preferential credit with subsidized interest rates.   
In the early 1980s, the succeeding Chun Doo-hwan government (1980—1987) asked the 
IMF for assistance due to the economic recession at that time and facilitated some financial 
reform measures in the dimensions of privatization of banks and elimination of entry barriers on 
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 banks.  Chaebols demanded the lowering of entry barriers on new banks and NBFIs, since they 
wanted to establish their own banks to finance their groups.  Chaebols also demanded less 
intervention by the government into the market.  Therefore, the Roe Tae-woo (1988–1992) 
government and the Kim Yong-sam government (1993—1997) further made progress on financial 
reforms in the dimensions of capital account liberalization, elimination of entry barriers on banks, 
and interest rate liberalization, but “policy loans” were not completely eliminated since chaebols 
wanted to maintain the preferential access to credits.  In this vein, although I assumed that the 
manufacturing sector would support the elimination of credit controls, in this case chaebols did 
not seek liberalization of credit controls but rather took the advantage of better access to 
preferential credit with subsidized interest rates.   
The increase in capital inflow along with the lax banking supervision resulted in an 
increase in banks’ bad loans, and some chaebols even went into bankrupt.  The Kim Yong-sam 
government was well aware of the banking sector’s problems.  The Presidential Commission on 
Financial Reform had already recommended a comprehensive set of financial reforms.  However, 
without any external pressures, the government did not take any effectual means to implement 
them before the Asian financial crisis.   
After the Asian financial crisis, under the IMF conditionality programs, the Kim Dae-
jung government committed to financial reforms.  Kim Dae-jung wanted to break up ties which 
had developed between the previous authoritarian regime and the subsequent democratic 
governments and chaebols.  As a consequence, he accelerated financial reforms and made 
considerable progress in terms of restructuring of banks and enhancement of banking supervision 
over banks.  The Financial Supervisory Commission, an independent banking supervisory 
agency, was established in 1998 and acted decisively in expediting restructuring of banks.  
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 Moreover, capital account liberalization further progressed by allowing the full foreign 
ownership of shares of Korean firms.  Thus, in the case of Korea, the executive initiative that 
tried to break up ties between previous governments and powerful interest groups, chaebols, 
accelerated financial reforms.  
 
5.6.2. Comparison between three cases: Indonesia, Thailand, and Korea 
 
By comparing Thailand and Korea with Indonesia, financial reform outcomes in Thailand tended 
to be seriously delayed in terms of restructuring of banks as well as enhancement of banking 
supervision.  Thailand is the only country in which the legal independence of the banking 
supervisory agency has not been achieved yet.  This can be explained by the fact that a large 
number of veto players caused a delay in enhancing banking supervision even under the IMF 
pressures.   
On the other hand, in the case of Indonesia, legal independence of the banking 
supervisory agency was achieved during the Habibie presidency, in which the Habibie 
government did not face constraints by other veto players given political uncertainty after the fall 
of the Suharto regime and prior to the first democratic election, although this central bank 
independence in which banking supervision was set as one of the functions of the central bank 
was rather weakened later during the Megawati presidency.   
In the case of Korea, legal independence of the banking supervisory agency was realized 
under the Kim Dae-jung presidency.  The Kim Dae-jung government had a strong incentive to 
break up old ties between the previous governments and chaebols.  Given the dominance of the 
president’s party and the lack of opposition to reforms among opposition parties given the fragile 
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 political party system in Korea, the Kim Dae-jung government was able to commit to reforms in 
order to enhance the independence of banking supervisory agency.  Thus, even though all three 
countries were under the IMF conditionality programs after the Asian financial crisis, financial 
reform outcomes differed concerning whether the legal independence of banking supervisory 
agency was achieved according to the differences in the number of veto players in the three cases.  
In looking at these three cases, it can be said that as the number of veto players increases, the 
IMF’s influence in accelerating enhancement of banking supervision decreases.   
With respect to restructuring of banks, it took a longer time to restructure banks both in 
Indonesia and in Thailand than in Korea.  In Indonesia, due to the lack of cooperation of former 
bank owners or conglomerates with the IBRA and also due to the collusion between banks and 
politicians, asset recovery processes of taken-over banks were significantly delayed.  In Thailand, 
the government was not able to formulate effective restructuring plans; hence, banks and firms 
repeatedly postponed necessary debt restructuring processes.  On the other hand, in Korea, the 
FSC took decisive action and accelerated restructuring of the banking sector.  As with the legal 
independence of the banking supervisory agency, the reason for these different outcomes is 
attributable to the difference in the number of veto players with all three countries under the IMF 
programs.  In Thailand and Indonesia, multiparty ruling coalitions or too many veto players 
delayed bank restructuring processes by responding to societal pressures to postpone 
restructuring.  On the contrary, in Korea, the government was able to take the initiative to 
restructure banks to break up old governments’ ties with conglomerates because of having to 
contend with fewer veto players than Thailand and Indonesia.   
In terms of privatization of banks, in Thailand, privatization of banks was not contentious 
because private banks were already predominant in Thailand’s financial system.  In Indonesia 
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 and Korea, privatization of banks was an important financial reform dimension.  Korea was able 
to privatize banks faster than in Indonesia because in Indonesia, multi-party ruling coalition 
governments during the Wahid presidency and the Megawati presidency took time in deciding 
on privatization of banks and also banks owners or conglomerates remained politically 
influential, which resulted in the delay in privatization of banks.  On the other hand, in Korea, 
the newly established banking supervisory agency was able to act more decisively.   
Concerning the societal interests, the situation in Thailand is distinguished from that in 
Indonesia and Korea due to the presence of a strong banking sector where banks acted as 
influential interest groups.  Also, the relationship between the banking sector and the 
manufacturing sector was not so close and acted as separate interest groups.  On the other hand 
in Indonesia and Korea, because of the presence of powerful conglomerates, i.e., Chinese 
conglomerates in the case of Indonesia and chaebols in Korea, which tended to represent the 
manufacturing interests, the manufacturing sector’s interests tended to dictate policy outcomes 
rather than the banking sector’s interests.  This difference was particularly well observed in the 
reform dimension of elimination of entry barriers on banks.  In Thailand, new entry of banks was 
strictly restricted until the Asian financial crisis whereas in Indonesia and Korea, entry of new 
banks was accelerated because the governments corresponded to conglomerates’ demands in 
which they wanted to establish banks in order to finance their own projects.  As a consequence, 
in Indonesia and in Korea, elimination of entry barriers on banks was accelerated even before the 
Asian financial crisis. 
In terms of other dimensions of financial reforms such as capital account liberalization 
and interest rate liberalization, these reforms also tended to be accelerated because of the 
manufacturing sectors’ demands.  In these dimensions, conglomerates in Indonesia, newly 
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 emerged firms in Thailand, and chaebols in Korea demanded capital account liberalization as 
well as interest rate liberalization as illustrated before.   
However, in terms of elimination of credit controls, while this dimension was not a 
contentious one in Thailand, in Korea, this dimension of reform was significantly delayed.  
Chaebols obtained enormous benefits from preferential credit allocation, and the government 
also tried to utilize preferential allocation of credit as a means to nurture ties with chaebols; 
hence, elimination of credit controls in Korea was significantly delayed.  On the other hand, in 
Indonesia, preferential credit allocation mainly benefited puribumi firms rather than the Chinese 
large conglomerates.  Therefore, these Chinese conglomerates rather preferred to eliminate 
preferential credit allocation.  In these circumstances, though state bank officials strongly 
opposed to the elimination of credit controls, this dimension of reform was not as contentious as 
in Korea.  Therefore, although I assumed that the manufacturing sector would support  
elimination of credit controls, when large firms benefited from preferential credit allocation, 
these large firms opposed these reform measures.  Therefore, conditioning upon whether large 
firms or medium and small firms were protected by preferential credit allocation, the impact of 
the manufacturing sector on elimination of credit controls differs. This echoed the results of the 
quantitative analysis in Chapter 3, in which I was not able to obtain a statistically significant 
impact of the manufacturing sector in this dimension. 
As discussed above, although Indonesia, Thailand, and Korea were all under IMF 
programs after the Asian financial crisis, the differences in the progress in financial reforms can 
be observed, especially in the dimensions of enhancement of banking supervision over the 
banking sector and privatization of banks as well as restructuring of the banking sector.  In this 
light, I qualitatively confirmed my expectations.  As illustrated in Chapters 4 and 5, although the 
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IMF programs were the most important factor in explaining financial reform outcomes, the 
number of veto players and two societal actors —the manufacturing sector and the banking 
sector— also played a role in shaping financial reform outcomes by holding the IMF pressures 
constant.   
 
 Appendix 5.A Party Composition in Coalition Governments and Opposition Parties in Thailand I 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Chatichai Government
(1988.8-1990.12)
No. of
Seats
Seat
Share
Chatichai Government
(1990.12-1991.3)
No. of
Seats
Seat
Share
Chuan  Government
(1992.9-1993.9)
No. of
Seats
Seat
Share
Chuan  Government
(1993.9-1994.12)
No. of
Seats
Seat
Share
Chuan  Government
(1994.12-1995.5)
No. of
Seats
Seat
Share
Chart Thai* 87 Chart Thai* 96 Democrat* 79 Democrat* 79 Democrat* 79
Social Action* 54 Thai Citizens* 31 New Aspiration* 51 New Aspiration* 51 Chart Pattana* 60
Democrat* 48 Citizen* 21 Righteous Force* 47 Righteous Force* 47 Righteous Force* 47
Citizen* 21 Solidarity* 10 Social Action* 22 Solidarity* 8 Solidarity* 8
Mass* 5 Community Action Party* 9 Solidarity* 8 Seritham* 8 Seritham* 8
United Democratic* 5 Progressive Party* 8
United Democratic* 5
Ruling Colaition Total 220 62% Ruling Colaition Total 180 50.4% Ruling Colaition Total 207 58% Ruling Colaition Total 193 54% Ruling Colaition Total 202 56%
United Thai 35 Social Action 54 Chart Thai 77 Chart Thai 77 Chart Thai 77
Thai Citizens 31 Democrat 48 Chart Pattana 60 Chart Pattana 60 New Aspiration 51
People 19 United Thai 35 Seritham 8 Social Action 22 Social Action 22
Thai Mass 17 Thai Mass 17 Mass 4 Mass 4 Mass 4
Righteous Force 14 Righteous Force 14 Thai Citizens 3 Thai Citizens 3 Thai Citizens 3
Community Action 9 Mass 5 Citizen 1 Citizen 1 Citizen 1
Progressive Party 8 Liberal 3
Liberal 3 Social Democratic Force 1
Social Democratic Force 1
Opposition Total 137 38% Opposition Total 177 49.6% Opposition Total 153 42% Opposition Total 167 46% Opposition Total 158 44%
Source: Political Handbook of the World (various years) and Keesing’s Contemporary Archives: Record of World Events (various years) . * shows political party which obtained
cabinet posts.
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Chuan  Government
(1995.5-1995.7)
No. of
Seats
Seat
Share
Banharn  Government
(1995.7-1996.11)
No. of
Seats
Seat
Share
Chavalit Government
(1996.11-1997.11)
No. of
Seats
Seat
Share
Chuan Government
(1997.11-1998.10)
No. of
Seats
Seat
Share
Chuan  Government
(1998.10-1999.7)
No. of
Seats
Seat
Share
Democrat* 79 Chart Thai* 92 New Aspiration* 125 Democrat* 123 Democrat* 123
Chart Pattana* 60 New Aspiration* 57 Chart Pattana* 52 Chart Thai* 39 Chart Pattana* 52
Solidarity* 8 Righteous Force* 23 Chart Thai* 39 Social Action* 20 Chart Thai* 39
Seritham* 8 Social Action* 22 Social Action* 20 Cobra faction 12 Social Action* 20
Dynamic Thai* 18 Thai Citizens* 18 Solidarity* 8 Cobra faction 12
Thai Citizens* 18 Mass* 2 Seritham* 4 Solidarity* 8
Mass* 3 Seritham* 4
Ruling Colaition Total 155 43% Ruling Colaition Total 233 60% Ruling Colaition Total 256 65% Ruling Colaition Total 206 53% Ruling Colaition Total 258 66%
Chart Thai 77 Democrat 86 Democrat 123 New Aspiration 125 New Aspiration 125
New Aspiration 51 Chart Pattana 53 Solidarity 8 Chart Pattana 52 Thai Citizens 5
Righteous Force 47 Seritham 11 Seritham 4 Thai Citizens 5 Mass 2
Social Action 22 Solidarity 8 Thai 1 Mass 2 Righteous Force 1
Mass 4 Righteous Force 1 Righteous Force 1 Thai 1
Thai Citizens 3 Thai 1
Citizen 1
Opposition Total 205 57% Opposition Total 158 40% Opposition Total 137 35% Opposition Total 186 47% Opposition Total 134 34%
Source: Political Handbook of the World (various years), Haggard (2000, 95-96), and Keesing’s Contemporary Archives: Record of World Events (various years) . * shows political
party which obtained cabinet posts.
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 Appendix 5.C Party Composition in Coalition Governments and Opposition Parties in Thailand III 
 
 
 
 
 
Chuan  Government
(1999.7-2001.2)
No. of
Seats
Seat
Share
Thaksin Government
(2001.2-2001.7)
No. of
Seats
Seat
Share
Thaksin Government
(2001.7-2002.3)
No. of
Seats
Seat
Share
Thaksin Government
(2002.3-2003.11)
No. of
Seats
Seat
Share
Thaksin Government
(2003.11-2004.3)
No. of
Seats
Seat
Share
Democrat* 123 Thai Rak Thai * 249 Thai Rak Thai * 263 Thai Rak Thai * 296 Thai Rak Thai * 296
Chart Pattana* 52 Chart Thai* 41 Chart Thai* 41 Chart Thai* 39 Chart Thai* 39
Chart Thai* 39 New Aspiration* 36 New Aspiration* 36 Chart Pattana* 30
Citizen* 12 Seritham* 14
Solidarity* 8
Seritham* 4
Ruling Colaition Total 238 61% Ruling Colaition Total 340 68% Ruling Colaition Total 340 68% Ruling Colaition Total 369 74% Ruling Colaition Total 335 67%
New Aspiration 125 Democrat 128 Democrat 128 Democrat 130 Democrat 130
Social Action 20 Chart Pattana 29 Chart Pattana 29 Citizen 2 Chart Pattana 30
Thai Citizens 5 Citizen 2 Citizen 2 Social Action 1 Citizen 2
Mass 2 Social Action 1 Social Action 1 New Aspiration 1 Social Action 1
Righteous Force 1 Mass 1 New Aspiration 1
Thai 1 Mass 1
Opposition Total 154 39% Opposition Total 160 32% Opposition Total 160 32% Opposition Total 131 26% Opposition Total 165 33%
Source: Political Handbook of the World (various years), Haggard (2000, 95-96), and Keesing’s Contemporary Archives: Record of World Events (various years) . * shows political
party which obtained cabinet posts.
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 Appendix 5.D Thailand and IMF Programs under the Asian Crisis 
 
 
 
 
Title of Documents Date 
  
 Chavalit Government 
Thailand Letter of Intent  14 August 1997 
  
 Chuan Government 
Thailand Letter of Intent  25 November 1997 
Thailand Letter of Intent and Memorandum on Economic Policies 24 February 1998 
Thailand Letter of Intent  26 May 1998 
Thailand Letter of Intent  25 August 1998 
Thailand Letter of Intent  1 December 1998 
Thailand Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Economic Policies 23 March 1999 
Thailand Letter of Intent  21 September 1999  
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 Appendix 5.E Korea and IMF Programs under the Asian Crisis  
 
 
 
 
Title of Documents Date 
  
 Kim Young-Sam Government 
Korea Letter of Intent  3 December 1997 
Korea Letter of Intent  24 December 1997 
Korea Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Economic Policies 7 February 1998 
  
 Kim Dae-Jung Government 
Korea Letter of Intent  2 May 1998 
Korea Letter of Intent  24 July 1998 
Korea Letter of Intent  13 November 1998 
Korea Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Economic Policies 10 March 1999 
Korea Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Economic Policies 24 November 1999 
Korea Letter of Intent and Memorandum on Economic Policies for 
2000 12 July 2000 
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6.0 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This project aimed to account for political determinants of the magnitude and the pace of 
financial reforms in developing countries.  In this chapter, I present a summary of findings and 
discuss them.   
 
 
6.1.  SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
Despite the general presumption during the late 1980s and the 1990s that no differences between 
countries exist in neoliberal economic reforms in developing countries, as we saw, there indeed 
does exist a surprising diversity concerning the magnitude and the pace of financial reforms in 
these countries.  For instance, concerning the magnitude of financial reforms, we saw some 
countries engaged in “big-bang” type of financial reforms at the extreme end of the larger 
magnitude of financial reforms while other countries engaged in more gradual reforms over three 
decades.  In order to account for determinants of the magnitude and the pace of financial reforms 
in developing countries, in the preceding chapters, I examined how the IMF, the number of veto 
players, and two societal sectors’ interests — the manufacturing sector and the banking sector — 
shaped financial reform outcomes quantitatively and qualitatively.   
Especially in the quantitative examinations, the Financial Reform Database developed by 
the IMF which coded financial reforms as separate six dimensions in thirty developing countries 
from 1973 to 2002 allowed me to examine not only capital account liberalization, to which 
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 researchers have paid most attention, but also five other dimensions of domestic banking 
reforms: privatization of banks, enhancement of banking supervision, interest rate liberalization, 
elimination of credit controls, and elimination of entry barriers against banks.   
With respect to the magnitude of financial reforms, by creating the additive change index 
and employing ordinal logit regressions, rather than arguing whether a country should conduct 
financial reforms in a “big-bang” manner or gradual manner from normative viewpoints as 
economists had done in prior research, I aimed at specifying the conditions under which a 
country is more likely to engage in a larger magnitude of financial reforms empirically.   
Findings largely confirmed my expectations.  While the IMF programs facilitate a larger 
magnitude of reforms, the results demonstrated that the IMF effects are conditioned by the 
recipient countries’ domestic political factor: the number of veto players.  As the number of veto 
players increases, the IMF effect of facilitating a larger magnitude of financial reform decreases.  
In addition, results also confirmed that a country where the manufacturing sector has a stronger 
influence is more likely to engage in a wider range of financial reforms at one time.  In addition, 
results revealed that a non-democratic government is more likely to take radical financial reform 
measures ceteris paribus.  On the other hand, a role of the banking sector with respect to the 
magnitude of financial reformed was not observed, contrary to my expectation.   
Concerning the determinants of the pace in each of the six dimensions of financial 
reforms, I employed event history analysis by modeling financial reforms as repeated events.  
With respect to the interaction effects between the IMF and the number of veto players, findings 
mostly confirmed my expectations; as the number of veto players increased, the IMF’s impact on 
bringing forward the timing of financial reforms decreased.  When I used the number of political 
parties within a ruling coalition as the indicator of the number of veto players, these expected 
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 results were obtained in five out of the six dimensions — privatization of banks, enhancement of 
banking supervision, capital account liberalization, interest rate liberalization, and elimination of 
credit controls.  When I used the widely used other indicator of veto players, POLCONIII, I also 
obtained significant results in the following five out of six dimensions using only democratic 
cases — privatization of banks, enhancement of banking supervision, capital account 
liberalization, interest rate liberalization, and elimination of entry barriers.  Thus, these findings 
provide strong empirical support for a negative relationship between the number of veto players 
and the occurrence of financial reforms. 
In terms of the impact of the manufacturing sector on the pace of financial reforms, I 
obtained the expected effect of accelerating financial reforms in the dimensions of privatization 
of banks, capital account liberalization, interest rate liberalization, and elimination of entry 
barriers.  However, significant results were not obtained in the dimension of elimination of credit 
controls.  Also, concerning the effects of the banking sector on the pace of financial reforms, 
although I hypothesized that a stronger banking sector influence would delay all dimensions of 
financial reforms, expected findings were only obtained in the dimensions of elimination of 
credit controls and interest rate liberalization.  Therefore, in terms of the banking sector, I was 
not able to obtain enough expected results after doing the quantitative analysis.   
Hence, in order to further explore the role of the banking sector and to examine whether 
the quantitatively obtained results could be confirmed, I employed case studies of the following 
three countries: Indonesia, Thailand, and Korea.  These three cases were selected on the grounds 
that all three countries followed a similar developmental pattern, based on export-led 
industrialization in Asia.  In addition, all three countries suffered from the Asian financial crisis 
and asked the IMF assistance.  As a result, all three countries pursued financial sector reforms 
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 under IMF influence, with financial sector reforms being a key component of the IMF 
conditionality programs.  However, despite these similarities, the outcomes of financial reforms 
were different in these countries.  Hence, I argued that the differences in the number of veto 
players and in the societal pressures of the manufacturing sector and the banking sector could 
explain the differences in the financial sector reforms in these countries after the Asian financial 
crisis, holding the IMF constant.   
In Thailand, a large number of veto players and a strong influence of the banking sector 
caused a delay in the restructuring of banks and enhancement of banking supervision over the 
banking sector after the Asian financial crisis.  Indonesia also experienced a delay in 
restructuring of banks due to the fragile coalition governments under President Wahid and 
President Megawati.  In Korea, on the other hand, financial restructuring and enhancement of 
banking supervision tended to be accelerated due to the initiatives of the Kim Dae-jung 
government, which wanted to break up the old ties between the previous governments and 
Korean conglomerates, or chaebols.  Therefore, although Korea and Indonesia share a similarity 
in terms of societal interests, in which conglomerates which represented the manufacturing 
interests were dominant vis-à-vis the banking sector, in the case of Indonesia, banking 
restructuring was delayed.  Using these case studies, then, I was able to confirm my expectations 
qualitatively as well: as the number of veto players increases, the effects of the IMF in 
accelerating financial reforms tended to decrease.  In the case of Korea, there existed fewer veto 
players than in the cases of Thailand and Indonesia, which caused acceleration in financial sector 
restructuring under the IMF programs compared with Thailand and Indonesia.  With respect to 
the magnitude of financial reforms, a fewer number of veto players tended to cause a larger 
magnitude of financial reforms, as seen in the cases of the Habibie government in Indonesia, the 
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 Ananda government in Thailand, and the Kim Dae-jung government in Korea, though it meant 
“a larger magnitude” in relative terms compared with other periods in the same country.   
Especially, in the case of Indonesia, by looking at temporal dimensions in terms of the 
number of veto players across the four governments which were all under the IMF conditionality 
programs after the Asian financial crisis, the results revealed that the number of veto players and 
also the collusion between conglomerates and the government shaped financial reform outcomes.  
While Suharto delayed financial sector reforms due to the collusion between the government and 
conglomerates, the Habibie government committed to financial reforms than the Suharto 
government due to no veto player constraints and less close ties with bank owners than those of 
the Suharto government.  However, the Wahid government and the Megawati government 
delayed financial sector restructuring and privatization of banks.  President Wahid, who led a 
fragile multi-party ruling coalition, lacked commitment to the IMF programs.  As a consequence, 
the Wahid government delayed bank restructuring.  In terms of the succeeding Megawati 
government, on the other hand, even though Megawati had an incentive to commit to financial 
reforms and Megawati herself did not have close ties with bank owners, fragile multi-party 
ruling coalition governments or many veto players caused a delay in bank restructuring and 
privatization of banks.   
 
 
6.2.  DISCUSSION 
 
Given the results for both the quantitative and qualitative analyses discussed above, it is worth 
reiterating that in spite of empirical controversy surrounding the effects of the IMF conditionality 
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 programs, which tend to suffer from low implementation rates, concerning financial reforms, 
where the IMF’s core competency lies, this study showed that the IMF conditionality programs 
have a significant impact in both facilitating a larger magnitude of financial reforms and also 
accelerating the pace of financial reforms in each of the six dimensions of financial reforms in 
developing countries.   
Moreover, although the IMF conditionality programs are touted as apolitical, this study 
demonstrated that the effects of the IMF programs are conditioned by the domestic political 
factor: the number of veto players.  In this light, as expected, though the IMF is the most 
predominant factor in determining the magnitude and the pace of financial reforms in developing 
countries, the IMF is not independent from recipient countries’ domestic political conditions.  
Further, though empirical findings on the relationship between the number of veto players and 
policy outcomes have varied and are controversial in conventional studies, concerning financial 
reforms, this study suggests that a negative linear relationship exists between the number of veto 
players and the magnitude and the pace of financial reforms.  However, as stated, the number of 
veto players works in a way that conditions the effects of the IMF in general rather than working 
independently of the IMF programs.  Therefore, it would be necessary for the IMF to take into 
consideration a recipient country’s political conditions in designing conditionality programs.  If a 
country has a large number of veto players, it would be likely to take more time for a country to 
conduct financial reforms with the country also more likely to conduct a smaller scale of reforms.   
With respect to societal impacts, it can be stated that it is easier for a developing country 
to conduct financial reforms in dimensions such as privatization of banks, capital account 
liberalization, and interest rate liberalization when a country has a stronger influence of the 
manufacturing sector because in these circumstances, firms would demand better access to 
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 credits.  However, concerning the elimination of credit controls, as the insignificant impact of the 
manufacturing sector in quantitative analyses suggests, depending upon whether large firms can 
profit from preferential credits, large firms may want to preserve preferential credits rather than 
eliminate those credits, as was observed in the Korean case.  Concerning the effects of the 
banking sector, although I was not able to obtain enough significant results in quantitative 
analysis, from the Thai case I was able to observe that a strong banking sector had the effect of 
delaying financial reforms, especially in the dimension of the elimination of entry barriers on 
banks.  A stronger opposition from the banking sector caused postponement of financial reforms 
for lowering entry barriers on banks, with these reforms being postponed for many years.   
With respect to the dimension of the enhancement of banking supervision over the 
banking sector, a prior study done by Satyanath (2006) showed that a signaling problem between 
an executive leader and a banking regulator results in lax banking regulation under liberalized 
capital flows in a democratic government because the executive leader in a democratic county 
does not know the real state of the banking sector due to the polarization of preferences between 
executive leaders and bank regulators.  Therefore, even if the leader himself/herself is free from 
corruption, lax banking regulation can still occur.   
Because it is difficult to assess the impact of this signaling problem on the likelihood of 
the enhancement of banking supervision quantitatively, Satyanath also employed case study 
methods to verify this theory.  Although his study is convincing, banking supervision does not 
only mean policy measures to know the real information of banks’ accounts but also should take 
into account policy measures such as enhancing the independence of the banking supervisory 
agency and giving a stronger power to the banking supervisory agency to resolve problems of 
insolvent banks when necessary, for example.  In this vein, quantitative assessment in this study 
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 used a more comprehensive indicator of the enhancement of banking supervision in which not 
only supervisory measures to know banks’ real balance sheets but also the independence of 
banking supervisory agencies and measures to enhance prudential regulations of banks.  Further, 
this study offered more comprehensive empirical assessment, employing quantitative studies 
using the data of thirty developing countries spanning three decades.   
The results of this study do not refute that the signaling problem between chief executive 
and bank regulators may cause lax banking regulation.  However, as the above quantitative 
findings and case studies show, the number of veto players and societal pressures from the 
banking sector and the manufacturing sector may matter more than signaling problems in 
determining the outcomes of the enhancement of banking supervision.  In particular, case studies 
after the Asian financial crises in Thailand and Korea in this study revealed that both the Chuan 
government in Thailand and the Kim Yong-sam government in Korea were not able to articulate 
effective measures for enhancing banking supervision after the Asian financial crisis.   
Both of them were used in Satyanath’s study as the cases supporting his theory of a 
signaling problem in which executive leaders did not know the real state of the bank problems.  
Even though they doubtless knew the bad condition of the banking sector after the Asian 
financial crisis, because of a large number of veto players in the case of the Chuan government in 
Thailand and because of the close ties of Kim Yong-sam’s political party with chaebols in the 
case of Korea, their governments were not able to take effective measures in responding to 
banking sector problems after the Asian financial crisis.   
Further, even though Chuan, especially was relatively free from corruption scandals and 
did not have close ties with bank owners, when his coalition partners had close ties with indebted 
firms and banks, his government was not able to act decisively in enhancing banking supervision.  
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 Therefore, as this shows, the number of veto players and societal pressures may more matter than 
the signaling problem in determining the enhancement of banking supervision. 
In this vein, concerning the relationship between the number of veto players and the 
likelihood of policy changes in the cases of developing countries, this study’s results were 
contradictory to some previous findings.  MacIntyre (2003, 2001)’s studies, which were also 
cited in Satyanath (2006)’s work, showed a curvilinear relationship between the number of veto 
players and the degree of governability under the Asian financial crisis.  He argues that a middle 
range of number of veto players works best in terms of the responses to currency crisis after 
examining four Asian cases (Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines).  However, his 
studies focused on a shorter period and his results were based only on case studies.  On the other 
hand, Hicken, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2005) examined 44 countries and compared growth 
difference between 1990 to 1997 and 1997 to 2002.  They found that there is no systematic 
relationship between the number of veto players and economic growth recovery from forced 
devaluations and rather conflicting results exist depending on the measurement of veto players.  
In contrast, the present study looked at longer periods in three cases and also quantitatively 
examined a thirty-year period in thirty developing countries; as a result, this study confirms 
Tsebelis’s claim in terms of financial reforms.103  These different results may come from the fact 
that while these other studies examined responses to currency crisis and growth rate recovery, 
this study looked at more direct sets of policy changes in financial reforms. 
Under the turmoil of the Asian financial crisis, the IMF faced massive criticism from 
researchers, policy makers, and street protesters alike because it demanded draconian sets of 
contractionary economic policy measures despite the sound macroeconomic fundamentals of the 
                                                 
103 However, I do not imply committing to faster and larger scales of financial reforms means 
better governability in developing countries. 
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 Asian countries. 104   In this vein, though the IMF’s objective is to maintain an objective, 
apolitical stance, it is difficult to exclude the importance of political conditions of recipient 
countries taken into account in order to ensure implementation of conditionality programs.  This 
study suggests that it would be worth it for the IMF to consider more country-specific contextual 
political conditions when designing conditionality programs.  Considering not only the interests 
and the roles of key political players but also the interests and the roles of key societal groups is 
important for understanding how to enhance the “ownership” of recipient countries in 
implementing conditionality programs.   
It is also noteworthy that since the Asian financial crisis, much emphasis has been given 
to the quality of banking supervision over the banking sector in order to establish a sound 
banking sector.  In this light, it would be important for the IMF to analyze why some 
liberalization measures such as the free entry of domestic banks and capital account 
liberalization tend to be more facilitated than those in the regulatory dimension, i.e., 
enhancement of banking supervision, even in the same policy area of financial reforms.  Since I 
assumed that both the manufacturing sector and the banking sector oppose this regulatory 
dimension of financial reforms, which was confirmed in the case studies, this study suggests that 
it may be difficult for a developing country to enhance banking supervision without external 
pressures.  Though economists suggest that a proper sequential order of economic liberalization 
is desirable, with economists arguing that enhancement of banking supervision over the banking 
sector should come prior to external liberalization such as capital account liberalization,105this 
                                                 
104 The IMF was also criticized because the IMF was perceived to have failed in detecting the 
risks of the currency crisis beforehand and also in estimating the depth of the Asian crisis once it 
occurred.   
105 For literature review on sequential economic liberalization, see Nsouli, Rached, and Funke 
(2005), for instance.   
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 study revealed why developing countries may suffer from a failure to implement financial 
reforms in the suggested sequential manner.  Because of opposition from banks and firms, 
politicians tend to delay enhancement of banking supervision more than other dimensions of 
financial reforms toward liberalization.   
In this regard, one notable implication of this research is the effective roles of the relevant 
international institutions in enhancing banking supervision over the banking sector.  Given the 
difficulties in achieving this regulatory dimension of reforms, the existence of some forms of 
external pressure at the international level, such as from the IMF, the World Bank, and the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS), can be important.  The FSAP, started in 1999 as a joint 
operation by the IMF and the World Bank, plays an important role in facilitating the 
enhancement of banking supervision in developing countries by assessing the extent of 
compliance to the Basle Committees’ Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision as a 
part of programs.  Also, the BIS and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, which set the 
unified international standards for both developed and developing countries, has been quite 
important in providing the benchmark to establish the effective banking supervision as used in 
the FSAP.   
From a broader perspective, this study implies that states tend to commit more to 
mandates from international organizations when states are able to obtain critical benefits from 
the commitments to these mandates.  However, even in cases where states can obtain critical 
benefits from commitments to mandates, states’ compliance to mandates is still affected by 
domestic political factors both at the national level and the societal level.  This study suggests 
that an increase in domestic institutional constraints such as in the number of veto players makes 
states commitments to mandates harder.  In addition, it seems that states’ compliance to 
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 mandates is also affected by how influential societal actors can obtain gains from the 
commitments to mandates from international organizations and how these influential societal 
actors can exert influence over executives to obtain their desirable outcomes.  But even under 
conditions of more institutional constraints due to many veto players and lack of the support 
from influential societal actors, international organizations can still effectively promote their 
agenda only if states critically rely on resources from international organizations.  In these 
limited circumstances, these domestic political constraints would tend to work as intermediate 
factors rather than independent sources to affect the outcomes of states’ commitment to 
mandates.  Therefore, in these circumstances, states would still provide commitments to 
mandates even though they may repeatedly delay in committing to mandates from international 
organizations.   
As to a future research agenda, since I only examined three Asian cases in this study, I 
would like to extend case studies to Latin America regions.  Given the history of frequent 
currency crises and the following frequent IMF interventions in this region, this extension would 
provide other good cases to illustrate how the interaction between the IMF, veto players, and 
societal actors shape the outcomes of various dimensions of financial reforms.  In the meanwhile, 
I hope that this dissertation contributes to accumulation of knowledge concerning why financial 
reforms occur in developing countries. 
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